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Do Migrants Remit Democratic Beliefs and Behaviors?

A Theory of Migrant-Led International Diffusion

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A Theory of Migrant-Led International Diffusion

by

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Do Migrants Remit Democratic Beliefs and Behaviors?

A Theory of Migrant-Led International Diffusion

Clarisa Pérez-Armendáriz, Ph.D.

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Supervisors: Gary Freeman and Kurt Weyland

How do migrants from Mexico to the U.S., including those who return permanently to Mexico and those who engage in cross-border communication from the U.S., contribute to changes in the political attitudes and behavior of Mexicans living in Mexico?

Individuals who return to Mexico after experiencing U.S. democracy directly are less likely to influence change among their non-migrant co-nationals than are migrants who remain in the U.S. This holds even though the former can share their experiences face-to-face, while the latter must transmit them from a distance and across the border.

Non-migrants' propensity to learn foreign political practices and beliefs from migrants is conditioned by their ambivalent attitudes towards the U.S. These attitudes condition both migrants' willingness to share the forms of civic engagement they learned up north and non-migrants' receptivity. Non-migrants are more receptive to migrants who remain in the U.S. than to returnees because they have a higher esteem for them and because the long-distance ties that bind non-migrants to migrants abroad, as opposed to those back home, are stronger. Both types of migrants have an interest in sharing their new beliefs and behaviors with non-migrants; but while

returnees struggle to accept adaptations of American-style practices to the Mexican context, this produces little inconvenience for migrants abroad. The anti-American attitudes returnees find in Mexico also dampen their efforts to introduce change.

I employ statistical regressions, Qualitative Comparative Analysis and process tracing to evaluate two data sources: (1) a large-n database that draws from an original survey administered on a nationwide sample of Mexican citizens living in Mexico; and, (2) scores of interviews with migrants and the people in Mexico with whom they communicate. The statistical results indicate the outcomes that migrant-led international diffusion produces. The qualitative analysis explains the mechanisms that drive or constrain diffusion.

The project applies theories of international diffusion to change occurring among individuals at the level of mass publics. It highlights the importance of intersubjective beliefs about the sources of foreign innovations—including both people and countries—in shaping diffusion processes.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research Question

Research shows that international migrants contribute in numerous ways to changes in their sending localities. Much of this influence results because emigrants continue to engage in social transactions with their home country after departing. For example, they may send money home; communicate with loved ones via phone, letters, and the Internet; receive visitors from the homeland in their new country of residence; and return to their homeland as tourists. Such transactions have been shown to transfer information and material resources capable of modifying both the cultures (Levitt, 1998) and strategic options (Merino, 2005) of those who receive them. There is also evidence that trans-state engagement between migrants and people who stay behind can alter the political organization (Fitzgerald, 2000; Goldring, 2002; Rivera Salgado, 1999; Smith, M.P., 2003; Smith, R., 1995), rules and outcomes (Burgess, 2005; Martínez Saldaña, 2002; Martínez Saldaña & Ross Pineda, 2002), and economies of sending communities (Nyberg–Sørensen, Van Hear, & Engberg–Pedersen, 2002; Orozco, 2006; Taylor, 1999).

Migrants may also import change into their countries of origin when they return there permanently[1] after having experienced the values, attitudes, and practices of another country firsthand. Returnees have transformed the face of their sending communities as a result of the significant portion of savings they direct to housing and local infrastructure improvements. Many utilize the resources obtained abroad to compete for, and win, local political offices (Bakker & Smith, M.P., 2003; Smith, M.P. & Bakker, 2007; Smith, R., 2006).

Do these distinct cross-border movements of people, resources, knowledge, and ideas contribute to the diffusion of political behavior and beliefs

[1] I use the term permanently to refer to migrants who return with the intention of re-establishing their residence in Mexico for the foreseeable future. Although their intentions at the time of return are to settle in Mexico, many migrants emigrate again.

from migrants' host countries to the country of origin? What factors either encourage or prevent migrants from transferring innovative political attitudes and practices across borders? How and what do people who remain rooted in their country of origin learn from their co-nationals with significant experience living in another nation-state as migrants? How and under what conditions do the beliefs and behaviors of migrants themselves change as they travel from the political context of one country to another? Finally, does the diffusion of political behavior and beliefs help to strengthen civic engagement in migrants' countries of origin?

International diffusion is a "process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system" (Rogers, 1995, p. 5). The core proposition driving this project is that international migration produces a unique set of channels through which innovations pertaining to civic engagement may travel among members of a trans-state social system.

This project first determines whether diffusion via migrants occurs and examines its effects on political behavior and attitudes of non-migrant Mexicans. Are the presence of migrants who have become politically socialized in the U.S., the existence of two distinct pathways for the interpersonal transmission of ideas from one country to another, and demand in Mexico for a better quality of democracy sufficient conditions for the diffusion of U.S. forms of civic engagement to Mexico?

I subsequently compare the different processes by which return migrants and stayers[2] contribute to the diffusion of U.S. political beliefs and behaviors. The objective is to explain what facilitates or constrains the diffusion of political innovations via each pathway. Is long-distance cross-border communication a viable path for transmission of both foreign political attitudes and practices to

[2] I employ the term "stayers" to refer to migrants who remain in their host country. In this project it refers to migrants who remain in the U.S.

non-migrant friends and kin? How does crossing the border back into Mexico influence migrants' propensities to supply information and the content of the information they convey to others? In what ways does a migrant's distance or presence in the U.S. condition the diffusion process? What and under what conditions do non-migrants learn from their co-nationals with significant experience living as migrants in another nation-state? In addressing these questions, I take seriously that the channels of diffusion in question—social transactions between migrants and non-migrants—are embedded in an international context involving a politically charged border.

For the dependent variable, I utilize a conception of civic engagement that includes both behavioral and attitudinal dimensions. Behaviorally, civically engaged citizens ought to support "an 'activist' role of the self in the polity" (Almond & Verba, 1989). This signifies that in addition to voting, democratic citizens should have information, knowledge, opinions about and an interest in political issues (Almond & Verba, 1989); they should consider themselves politically efficacious. Furthermore, participant citizens should support the right to join organized civic groups and protest (Dahl, 1971). Attitudinally, civically engaged citizens should be tolerant and broadly supportive of democracy. That is, they should support the right of minority dissent, including approving of the civil liberties of unpopular groups or regime critics (Dahl, 1971). We might also refer to this combination of attitudes and behaviors as democratic citizenship.

1.2 Findings and Theoretical Argument

I find that migrants contribute to the international diffusion of political beliefs and behaviors, but the findings are more nuanced and mixed than one would expect. The availability of information from people with whom non-migrants have affective ties about how democracy can function better, coupled with a strong demand for knowledge about how to improve the quality of democracy among non-migrants, would seem to represent the optimal conditions

for diffusion. However, I do not uncover uniformly positive differences between the attitudes and behaviors of Mexicans who are touched by international migration versus those who are not.

Instead, long-distance cross-border social transactions contribute strongly to the diffusion of more democratic political behaviors, while communication between return migrants and Mexicans who have not migrated does not contribute to diffusion at all. In other words, individuals who return to Mexico after experiencing democracy directly in the U.S. are less likely to contribute to the international diffusion of political behaviors and attitudes than are migrants who continue living in the host country. This is true even though returnees can share their experiences face-to face with their non-migrant co-nationals when they resettle in their country of origin, while people who remain abroad must communicate information from a distance.

Another key finding is that attitudes do not diffuse in lockstep with behavioral dispositions. Although long-distance communication between stayers in the U.S. and non-migrants living in Mexico contributes to the diffusion of both aspects of civic participation, it principally leads to the transfer of behavioral dispositions. In contrast, return migrants, who overall diffuse very little, mainly import new attitudes.

What explains the inconsistent and counterintuitive patterns by which international migration contributes to modifications in attitudinal and behavioral dispositions among Mexicans living in their country of origin? More specifically, why are long-distance social transactions between migrants and non-migrants more effective channels for the diffusion of democratic citizenship? And, why do patterns of diffusion among behaviors and attitudes differ?

The central argument is that the migration-driven diffusion of political beliefs and behaviors is conditioned by a unique set of attitudes that are shared by members of localities, such as Mexico, where significant portions of the population have either emigrated, returned home after emigrating, or are thinking

about emigrating in the future. In such cases, sentiments toward migrants and emigration tend to mirror a broader sense of ambivalence towards the country to which emigrants move, and concerning bilateral relations between migrants' home and host country.

Deeply rooted anti-Americanism continues to characterize popular sentiments about Mexico's relationship with the U.S., even as North American interdependence has intensified. Unwelcome U.S. involvement in Mexico's domestic affairs has been a thorny issue for Mexicans since the mid-nineteenth century. Popular resentment of American military, political and economic involvement in Mexico, including the U.S. annexation of rich Mexican territories and its intermittent, but notable, ownership of key Mexican assets, underpins many of Mexico's post-revolutionary ideals. Although NAFTA has attenuated anti-American sentiments by facilitating unprecedented levels of economic and cultural integration between the two countries during the last two decades, the core elements of popular nationalism enshrined in the 1917 Constitution persist, including widespread—if not growing—opposition to allowing U.S. investment in the Mexican energy sector (González & Minushkin, 2006), and strong objections to the presence of U.S. law enforcement officers within Mexico to help fight crime (CIDAC-Zogby, 2006).

A central feature of anti-Americanism in Mexico as well as the rest of Latin America has been "ambivalence—the relatively clear-headed espousal of contradictory feelings or beliefs" (McPherson, 2003, p. 7). For instance, 73 percent of Mexicans believe Americans are either racist or very racist, and 63 percent consider the U.S. wealthy because it exploits others. Yet, 45 percent claim that their lives would improve if they migrated illegally to the U.S. (CIDAC-Zogby, 2006). And, one-third of Mexicans say they would be willing to move to the U.S. if they could, even though 57 percent feel disdain or indifference towards the country and 53 percent feel distrust (González & Minushkin, 2006). Even more strikingly, asked if they would support a U.S. plan, similar to the

Marshall Plan, to help Mexico's development in exchange for stronger controls on illegal migration, only 29 percent of Mexicans agreed (CIDAC-Zogby, 2006). Correspondingly, the majority (65%) of Mexicans indicated their refusal to exchange greater U.S. access to investment in petroleum and gas for more flexible migration policies (CIDAC-Zogby, 2006).

Mexicans' attitudes toward migration are a specific aspect of a broader set of incongruous attitudes toward the U.S. On one hand, Mexicans perceive entry into the U.S. as a promising means of improving their lives; on the other hand they are fiercely nationalist and protective of their sovereignty—especially with respect to the U.S. Moisés Naím aptly characterizes this paradoxical form of anti-Americanism as "fueled by jealousy, resentment, ambivalence, and crushed expectations. The seductive allure of American capitalism, freedoms, products, and culture often coexists with ambivalence about them as economically or politically unattainable" (2002, p. 103).

My argument draws on a constructivist perspective. According to Finnemore and Sikkink, "constructivism is an approach to social analysis that asserts the following: (a) human interaction is shaped primarily by ideational factors, not simply material ones; (b) the most important ideational factors are widely shared or "intersubjective" beliefs…and (c) these shared beliefs construct the interests and identities of purposive actors" (2001, pp. 392-393; see also Wendt, 1999). Migrant-led diffusion from the U.S. entails people and information traveling across an international border that is highly symbolic and politically charged from the perspective of most Mexicans. The intersubjective beliefs that Mexicans hold both about U.S.-Mexico relations and the place of Mexican migration within those relations influence the innovations that migrants share and those to which non-migrants are receptive.

This dissertation argues that anti-Americanism is akin to a social norm in Mexico. Finnemore and Sikkink define a norm as a "standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity… what is appropriate by reference to the

judgments of a community or a society" (1999, p. 891-892). Dozens of scholars have argued that anti-Americanism is a core element of Mexican identity (see e.g., Castañeda, 1993; Morris, 1999, 2000, 2005; Paz, 1979; Ramos, 1962; Reyes Heroles, 1995). Scholars also argue that anti-Americanism is a norm that contributes to shaping the range of acceptable public policies—a norm that strongly influences Mexican public attitudes toward the U.S. and determines the type of bilateral relationship they are willing to accept with their northern neighbor (Krauze, 2005; Pastor & Castañeda, 1989; Weintraub, 1990). Mexican attitudes toward the U.S. fundamentally define the scope of U.S.-Mexico relations and the possibilities for closer regional integration (Inglehart, Nevitte, & Basáñez, 1996). Andrew Selee recently remarked that "In the case of Mexico-U.S. relations, the role of public perceptions is even greater than in most bilateral relationships, however—and perhaps more important than in any other relationship that either country has with another" (2005, p.1).

These shared beliefs reify the border and infuse it with meaning beyond that of a line marking the limits of the state (Bustamante, Jasso, Taylor, & Trigueros Legarreta, 1998). Political attitudes and behavioral dispositions traveling from the U.S. to Mexico via migrants must therefore bridge both a politically charged state boundary and two distinct normative contexts. The bridging process is complex because migration itself contributes to Mexicans' anti-American norms. Migrants have to navigate a set of normative beliefs that their own cross-border movements (inadvertently) help constitute.

This anti-American social norm guides the distinctions that non-migrants make between migrants at home and abroad, and underlies the paradoxical strength of long-distance communication as a path for diffusion. It explains why long-distance ties between migrants abroad and their friends and kin in Mexico are stronger than ties between returnees and their co-nationals who never leave.

Widely held anti-American beliefs underlie non-migrant Mexicans' beliefs regarding the risks involved in crossing the border into the U.S. and the

challenges of maintaining oneself in that “distant” country. These beliefs in turn cause non-migrants who stay behind to worry about their friends and family in the U.S.; to take personal pride in the migrants’ ability to integrate into the U.S. economy and political system; and to carefully attend to them whenever they communicate. Any material benefits, such as receiving cash remittances, that accrue to non-migrants as a result of having a friend or family member in the U.S. further strengthens their orientations towards migrants. Non-migrants’ positive orientations, in turn, encourage migrants to express themselves openly and freely.

In contrast, migrants who resettle in Mexico must face perception of them as “Americanized”, possessing aggrandized perceptions of themselves and their capabilities, and as lazy. These understandings of return migrants make them targets of non-migrants’ anti-American sentiments. That return migrants are generally less capable of providing material benefits once they have returned to Mexico only worsens non-migrants perceptions of them. Non-migrants are not attentive and receptive to return migrants. As a result returnees do not express themselves openly and freely after they return.

Migrants who remain abroad communicate long-distance and across an international border from a supportive normative context, while migrants who have returned home communicate face-to-face the new ideas they learned abroad under social constraints. This dynamic explains the paradoxical strength of long-distance cross-border ties. Highly ambivalent anti-American social norms cause non-migrants’ perceptions of migrants to vary, depending on whether they are located at home or abroad.

This dynamic also makes it relatively easier for foreign innovations transmitted from abroad to find a fit in Mexico, as compared with those imported personally by migrants when they resettle there. Many returnees come home with the expectation that they may improve life in their country or locality of origin if they can successfully implement what they learned abroad. Their efforts often

fail because they are unable to adapt the innovation in question into their home country context. Returnees become easily frustrated and disappointed by the incongruity they observe between their idealized recollection of how the practice functioned in the U.S. and the process or outcome it produces in Mexico. Their emphasis on how the practice in question functions in the U.S. hinders diffusion precisely because it activates anti-American sentiment among non-migrants, who snub energized and optimistic co-nationals who they perceive as lauding U.S. political practices—or worse as traitors against Mexican traditions.

Quite the opposite, non-migrants can implement foreign innovations of which they learn from migrants residing abroad more easily because they have never witnessed or experienced the innovation firsthand in its native context; they do not have an idealized model against which to compare their interpretation and reconstruction of the innovation; the absence of specific expectations makes them less likely to abandon efforts to import change. Moreover, the migrant who conveys the information is not present to supervise and criticize the manner in which the innovation has been implemented. For all these reasons, non-migrants who change their attitudes or behavior in response to information transmitted by migrants abroad are less likely to be seen as traitors who simply emulate Americans.

This dissertation also finds that political attitudes diffuse less than behaviors. We can explain differences in how attitudes and behaviors diffuse using the same theoretical framework I advanced above. Specifically, differences in the nature of attitudes as opposed to behaviors have important implications for how each interacts with the Mexican domestic social environment. The political behaviors I explore inherently involve observable public actions. Migrants who return to Mexico and engage in the new political behaviors that they learned abroad must publicly stand up to Mexicans' shared anti-American attitudes. However, they can keep their new individual attitudes private, since attitudes are

not publicly observable. Migrants can thus retain their new values and think globally—so to speak, but act locally to conform publicly to social constraints.

A different logic underpins the finding that long-distance social transactions do not contribute significantly to the diffusion of political beliefs. Migrants tend to share with co-nationals back home their observations about the political actions and practices of Americans; and these reflect U.S. political values. For example, migrants may share that they freely participated in a political march, even though their presence in the U.S. is undocumented. This message could convey to non-migrants' ideas about the extent of political tolerance that exists in the U.S., but long-distance communication does not appear to contain explicit discussions about political values as such. The infrequency and brevity of long-distance communication appears to privilege the discussions about the daily lives and concerns of both migrants and non-migrants.

To reprise, migrant-driven international diffusion is conditioned by the intersubjective beliefs that Mexicans hold regarding Mexico-U.S. relations and the place of migration within those relations. These beliefs can best be characterized as anti-American, yet they are highly ambivalent. Shared beliefs among Mexicans living in Mexico cause the attitudes toward migrants to differ depending on their location either in the U.S. or Mexico. They explain the strength of long-distance trans-state social transactions between migrants and non-migrants as a channel of diffusion while diminishing the value of face-to-face transactions between returnees and their co-nationals. The social context to which migrants return inhibits diffusion on the part of returnees by making it more difficult for them to adapt U.S. practices to the Mexican context and by encouraging returnees to keep their new ideas to themselves. In contrast, experience with a U.S. ideal does not limit non-migrants who learn of political innovations from their U.S.-based friends and kin; non-migrants can thus implement innovations as they like in the absence of the migrant. In sum, due to

the prevailing anti-Americanism in Mexico, an American political innovation conveyed from abroad is more meaningful to potential adopters than one that is conveyed face-to-face. There is greater demand and acceptance for new political ideas from migrants abroad; this, in turn, encourages their transfer, rather than stifle it.

1.3 Theoretical Significance of the Project

The study of international diffusion has recently come into vogue to account for the wave-like spread of similar public policies, regime transitions, and changes in national-level social norms. Early scholars argued that the adoption of certain political institutions and habits in one country effectively influence the probability that another country will also adopt them (Strang, 1991). Studies of international democratic diffusion studied macro-level regime change—that is, entire countries' transitions from authoritarianism to democracy—principally to confirm empirically that the hypothesis that these spatio-temporal clusters existed. For example, Starr (1991) determines that regime transitions to democracy occur closer together in time than mere chance would predict. Przeworski, Álvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (2000) find that democracies surrounded by other democracies are more likely to survive. Brinks and Coppedge (2006) show that the level of democracy of a country’s neighbor contributes to determining the level of democracy in the country itself.

A more recent and closely related body of scholarship has strengthened this broader research area by accounting for the role of agents in the diffusion process. This literature concerns not only democratic diffusion, but also that of norms and public policies. The first wave of this literature stressed the role of transnational or foreign agents as advocates of change within countries, without much concern for how leaders of those countries incorporated external ideas. A second wave has enhanced our understanding of diffusion by taking seriously the role of domestic agents as active adopters of the innovations being diffused.

Both waves of scholarship focus on state and non-state agents of diffusion, including national leaders (e.g., Acharya, 2004; Weyland, 2007), grass-roots activists (e.g., Brooks & Fox, 2002; Tarrow, 2005); non-governmental organizations (e.g., Keck & Sikkink, 1998); members of organized transnational epistemic communities (e.g., Kapur & McHale, 2005); and members of organized diasporas (e.g., Scheffer, 2003).

Although scholars who study diffusion claim to address the broader question of how foreign influences contribute to modifying domestic political outcomes, little work in this field has explored the question with respect to outcomes observable among ordinary individual citizens. This is surprising since the literature on democracy widely concurs that civic engagement, including both its attitudinal and behavioral aspects, is an essential component of a healthy, consolidated democracy (Barber, 1984; Dahl, 1971; Diamond, 1999; Lijphart, 1997; Linz, 1990; Linz & Stepan, 1996). Moreover, in today's globally integrated world, we have reason to believe that external—or international—factors might also contribute to explaining changes in this critical aspect of democracy.

Identifying factors that contribute to civic engagement has been a central concern of scholars of comparative politics for decades precisely because of its importance to the democratic process. However, theories of civic participation have privileged domestic explanations and ignored the rich literature that developed in parallel regarding the effects of international forces on domestic political phenomena. The most salient explanations of civic participation emphasize local and historically rooted levels of social capital (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1995; Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti,1993); socialization (Beck & Jennings, 1982; Sears & Funk, 1999; Sears & Valentino, 1997) and social communication (Huckfeldt, Beck, Dalton, & Levine, 1995; Beck, Dalton, Greene, & Huckfeldt, 2002; Huckfeldt, Beck, Dalton, Levine, & Morgan, 1998); modernization (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Lipset, 1981); or the role of institutions (Holzner, 2007; Lijphart, 1997; Nie, Powell, & Prewitt, 1969).

Few scholars have seriously integrated international forces into their explanations, even though some have clear testable implications at the global level.

At the domestic level, scholars argued for decades that political discussions contribute to spreading information about politics (Downs, 1957), and that they are a widespread activity with influential consequences (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954; Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1944). Contemporary social communication theories have grown increasingly sophisticated; however, the thrust of their arguments continues to be that social interactions strongly influence political behavior—more so than the media, political parties, and other organizations (Beck, Dalton, Greene, & Huckfeldt, 2002). Although this scholarship has examined how a multitude of variations in the social contexts and social transactions of citizens influence behavior, it has ignored cross-national social transactions. Again, this is surprising given the unprecedented level of global social integration and communications that exists today.

This project makes two major contributions to the broader theoretical and empirical endeavors of contemporary comparative political scientists. First, it applies theories of international democratic diffusion to questions observable at the level of mass publics. In so doing, it shifts the level of analysis from the national to the individual level. Additionally, it focuses on a distinct type of agent; rather than study purposive actors such as elite political leaders or organized activists, I focus on the prosaic trans-state transactions of ordinary people. Second, I examine the possibility that international forces, in addition to domestic forces, contribute to changes in patterns of civic engagement. Specifically, I strengthen theories of social communication by considering them in the case of trans-state social transactions.

I also add novel evidence and ideas to the ongoing debates within the diffusion literature regarding the nature of the process itself. The transfer of

political beliefs and behaviors across borders via migrants represents a new type of diffusion that we can explore to better understand the causal forces that underpin international diffusion more broadly. Is the process rational, boundedly rational or constructivist in nature? I find that diffusion is a complex process shaped by the attitudes and beliefs that non-migrants hold concerning the country to which their co-nationals emigrate—the country in which their migrant friends and family learn new political practices and beliefs. This process is similar to that advanced by constructivist scholars. Constructivists argue that the beliefs that potential adopters share about the appropriateness or normative desirability of an object of international diffusion fundamentally determine if that object will be accepted or rejected. In this case, shared beliefs about the state in which migrants learn the political beliefs and behaviors that they then transmit to Mexico condition the likelihood of adoption.

1.4 Significance of the Project for Mexico

My research has several implications for Mexico specifically. First, although Mexico's transition to an electoral democracy is widely viewed as successful, elections alone have not sufficed to effectively channel citizen demands and hold political leaders accountable. By most accounts, the institutional hardware required of an enduring democracy is in place, but the necessary participative behaviors and attitudes are weak. There is a need within Mexico for greater civic engagement.

My research has mixed implications about the impact of migration on the democratization of political beliefs and behaviors. The positive impact is most significant with respect to the type of trans-state social transaction that is most widespread: long-distance communication between migrants and non-migrants. However, it is difficult to pass judgment on the value of a domestic democratic deepening process that is being driven by the departure of hundreds of thousands from their own country to another nation in which most are not

citizens. Though communication between returnees and non-migrants comprise a smaller portion of trans-state social transactions, they are substantial and promise to remain so in the future. Mexicans' habitual rejection of innovations imported by returnees is striking. Such intolerance of new political ideas and practices is antithetical to democracy and raises serious questions about the proposition that migration contributes to enhancing the latter.

With 1 in 9 Mexican-born nationals living outside the country (about 90 percent of these live in the U.S.), cross-border social interactions represent a significant source of regional integration. Scholars have argued that regional integration and cultural convergence (including the convergence of political beliefs and behaviors) go hand-in-hand. Inglehart, Nevitte, and Basáñez have made the claim that "the medium- and short- term projections indicate that in the next few decades there will be a very significant cultural confluence between the new inhabitants of Mexico and the citizens of the U.S" (1996, p. 164). Similarly, Seligson and Booth argue that "both Mexico's proximity to the United States and the tradition of heavy migration of Mexicans to their northern neighbor have widely exposed Mexicans to liberal democratic norms and practices…[and] may well account for the emergence of democratic values among urban Mexicans in spite of their authoritarian polity" (1993, p. 131).

My research focuses explicitly on migrants as vectors of change. The time frame for my study comes nearly fifteen years after the implementation of NAFTA and corresponds with a 50 percent increase in the rate of emigration from Mexico between 2000 and 2008. Nonetheless, my findings contradict the convergence thesis and reveal the strength of domestic factors. The extent and means through which the intersubjective anti-American beliefs of Mexicans limit diffusion is surprising in light of the dominant academic thinking to date. The findings show that borders constrain actors because they are legal boundaries marking the limits of nation states. Other than representing a state's sovereign territory, which civilian and military officials may enforce coercively, borders have symbolic

meanings rooted in power, history and culture. Citizens of nation-states reify these socially constructed interpretations of borders enough for them to influence the fate of innovations that cross them.

Most of the research concerning migration´s effects on democracy in Mexico has focused on communities that are newsworthy precisely because of the political involvement of migrants. This research helps us understand migrants' transnational activities, including how these have contributed to expanding the degree to which migrants can participate in home country politics and with what effect. However, their focus on exceptional cases probably leads them to overstate the effect of migration on the political behavior and beliefs of Mexicans overall. My research thus presents a more balanced national assessment of how migration affects civic engagement in the country.

1.5 Research Design

This study examines how two aspects of migration serve as channels of ideational and behavioral diffusion: migrant returns and long-distance cross-border social transactions. The concept of migrant returns encompasses individuals who have worked, studied or resided for at least one year in the U.S. and subsequently re-settled in Mexico. Long-distance cross-border social transactions comprise any type of communication—including phone calls, letters, electronic mail or other Internet communication, brief personal visits, videos, and so forth—that occurs between migrants who at the time of my research were studying, working or living for at least one year in the U.S. and Mexican citizens living in Mexico.[3] I explore how these two migration-driven paths of diffusion

[3] Note, residents of Mexico may have previously migrated and engagement in trans-state exchanges from their country of origin following their return. My research considers migrants all migrants who are abroad versus all migrants who return. Many migrants abroad will claim that they intend to return, but will not do so for decades. The difficulty of distinguishing between sojourner (migrants who stay for only a short time) and true settlers led me to lump them together as a group and compare them to bona fide returnees.

affect political attitudes and behavior. Attitudes involve judgments, meaning opinions of approval and disapproval, and values, meaning the ethical criteria that guide individuals' thoughts and actions. I consider four attitudes: (1) tolerance of political differences (value); (2) the belief that individuals can bring about political change (value); (3) satisfaction with democracy (judgment); (4) and evaluations of government respect for rights (judgments). Behavior encompasses individual and collective political participation that attempts to influence public decision-making. I examine four *behaviors*: voting, individual non-electoral political activity, participation in civic organizations, and organized protest.

I use three methods of comparative inquiry. First, I use large-N data to conduct multi-level linear and logistic regressions to estimate the influence of migration on political attitudes and behaviors. This analysis draws on the data gathered through an original survey conducted in Mexico called Desencanto Ciudadano en México (Citizen Disenchantment in Mexico). The survey was originally designed to evaluate how Mexicans view their democracy. Its principal author, David Crow, generously agreed to incorporate a battery of questions about the international migration experiences of Mexican citizens living in Mexico. Berumen y Asociados, a well-established Mexican firm dedicated to market and public opinion research since 1991, conducted the survey face-to-face between June 16 and June 28 of 2006. Respondents comprised 650 voting-age Mexican citizens selected at random nationally. The statistical analysis also employs publicly available data collected in 2000 by Mexico's National Institute of Geography, Statistics and Information (INEGI) and the country's National Population Council (Conapo).

Second, I conduct fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis to analyze data obtained from over 120 semi-structured field interviews of return migrants, non-migrants who know return migrants, and leaders of communities that produce large numbers of emigrants. I employ the method to identify both the

necessary and sufficient conditions for migrants to have learned and introduced into Mexico U.S. political beliefs and behaviors. Fuzzy sets can be utilized to evaluate the same relationships that traditional “crisp” sets assess, such as membership, intersection, and union. However, fuzzy sets allow various levels of membership within a set. Rather than limit membership to strict binary variables, in which a case is either “in” or “out” of a set, fuzzy sets allow membership scores to range anywhere between zero and one. Fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) involves organizing the fuzzy set data into a “truth table”, which represents every possible configuration of causal conditions and outcomes, comparing all possible causal configurations, and simplifying them via Boolean minimization procedures. The technique serves to identify all of the combinations of conditions that are sufficient for an outcome to arise; it also helps us identify the conditions that are necessary to observe an outcome.

Finally, I employ the process tracing method to clarify the theoretical nature of the diffusion process that migration sets in motion. Like fsQCA, process tracing differs from methods that rest on a correlational logic; however, unlike both of the former methods, process tracing does not even involve comparison across cases. Instead, the research method is theory-driven. It requires researchers to trace the process leading to an outcome to determine whether each step along the way conforms to the expectations generated by theory A or theory B (George & Bennett, 2005). I use process tracing to compare the causal forces that drive four distinct components of the migrant-led international process. The objective is to evaluate each of these components’ conformity with the expectations generated either by rational choice theory or constructivism. First, I assess whether return migrants’ failure to diffuse the beliefs and behaviors they learn in the U.S. is because they believe they have no utility in Mexico (rational choice), or if the prevailing norms in Mexico discourage their practice and proliferation (constructivism). I compare these findings to three others: returnees’ propensity and reasons for keeping to themselves the new beliefs they

import; the decision to share beliefs and behaviors by migrants abroad; and non-migrants' decisions to embrace or reject the innovations that each type of migrant shares with them.

This mixed research method is ideal, because the quantitative analysis allows me to identify national tendencies with respect to what attitudes and beliefs are affected by migrant returns and long-distance cross-border social transactions, while the qualitative analysis permits me to explore in-depth the processes that underlie these outcomes.

Understanding whether and under what condition migrants might transform their countries of origin is fascinating in and of itself. In some countries, as much as 39 percent of the native-born populations live in another country as migrants (in this case, Jamaica). The percentage of Salvadorans, Nicaraguans, and Mexicans living outside of their country are 16, 13, and 11 percent, respectively. With at least one in ten citizens moving principally to well-established democracies and hundreds of thousands returning home after significant stays, migration represents an important link between sending and receiving countries such as these. Exploring the implications of these connections is important.

This dissertation's focus on migrants is also valuable because migrants who return to their home country or engage in long-distance cross-border social transactions with people who do not migrate represent a "most likely" vector for the diffusion of foreign political beliefs and behaviors at the level of mass publics.

Those who return to their home country or have close friends and family with whom they remain in touch have a more personal stake in that country's future than do other potential transmitters of foreign political beliefs and behaviors, such as the governments of other nation-states, the media, and non-governmental organizations that promote democracy. Migrants should be especially steadfast in their commitment to the political beliefs and behaviors they believe will benefit their country of origin.

Migrants are both insiders and outsiders in their communities of origin. They can introduce within their own community the foreign ideas and practices that they experienced first-hand outside their country. Migrants tend to belong to the same reference group as the friends and family they left behind. As a result, they ought to be able to explain foreign political attitudes and behaviors to non-migrants using familiar language and concepts. This is important because people tend to be suspicious of agents who actively proselytize their behavioral dispositions and beliefs in countries to which they do not belong.

Finally, unlike other potential transmitters such as the media, migrants can engage in deliberations and discussions with non-migrants. They can clarify the doubts of potential adopters and provide additional supporting arguments for their new views and behavioral dispositions as necessary.

My research concentrates on the “critical case” of migration from Mexico to the U.S. Implicitly, if my argument holds in the case of this migration corridor, it probably also holds for others. The case combines huge migratory flows, on the one hand, with significant differences in levels of democratic civic engagement, on the other. Mexico produces the largest, most consistent and enduring flow of international migrants in the world. Nearly half a million Mexican-born nationals emigrate to the U.S. annually, and about one in ten Mexican-born individuals currently reside in the U.S.

Furthermore, although Mexico’s democracy has developed significantly over the past decade, there remains a sufficiently large gap between levels of democracy in the U.S. and Mexico to set diffusion in motion from north to south. The U.S. consistently ranks higher than Mexico on indices that assess the level of democracy (including Freedom House and Polity IV), and Americans are more likely engage in democratic citizenship, including both its attitudinal and behavioral dimensions.

The U.S.-Mexico migration corridor is also unique in that it involves two countries that share a continuous 2,000 mile land border. For various reasons,

including natural geography, rising levels of economic interdependence, and the growth of regional transportation and communications infrastructure, people, money, ideas, and goods can cross this border with relative ease. Return migration and long-distance cross-border social transactions are therefore particularly prevalent in this case.

Focusing on a single migrant source country is also methodologically advantageous. It allows me to hold constant (relative to cross-national studies) several aggregate level variables within the migrants' country of origin that also influence individual political beliefs and behavior, such as political institutions; national history, religion, and culture; and economic development. The fact that nearly all Mexicans migrate to the U.S. or Canada permits me to control for diversity among the political systems and practices of migrant host countries.

1.6 Organization of the Project

The dissertation is organized into six chapters as follows. Chapter two explains the new theory of migrant-driven international diffusion that I develop based on the critical case of Mexico-U.S. migration. I argue that migrant-driven international diffusion is conditioned by the intersubjective beliefs that Mexicans hold regarding Mexico-U.S. relations and the place of migration within those relations. These beliefs can best be characterized as anti-American, yet they are highly ambivalent. Shared beliefs among Mexicans living in Mexico cause the social status of migrants to differ depending on their location either in the U.S. or Mexico. They cause the value of communication between migrants and non-migrants to vary depending on whether the former have returned home or remain abroad. And, the social context to which migrants return inhibits diffusion on the part of returnees by making localization more difficult and by encouraging returnees to keep their new ideas to themselves.

Chapter two also explains that neither rational choice nor boundedly rational approaches to the study of diffusion or social learning help to explain the

patterns by which international migrants contribute to the diffusion of political beliefs and behaviors. The two approaches fail to account for the incongruent spread of attitudes and behaviors. Additionally, they do not adequately account for the fact that return migrants face a constraint on behavioral changes inspired by the U.S. model, while non-migrants with friends and family in that country do not. The chapter concludes that a constructivist explanation provides the most compelling account of why migrant-led international diffusion produces the counterintuitive outcomes we observe.

Chapter three employs statistical techniques to evaluate two hypotheses:

1. Migrating to the U.S. causes return migrants to hold political beliefs and behaviors different from those of non-migrant Mexicans.
2. Non-migrants who engage in long-distance cross-border social transactions with migrant Mexicans who reside in U.S. are relatively more participative and possess more democratic attitudes.

The analysis uses data drawn from the Desencanto Ciudadano en México survey. It reveals that non-migrants with links to Mexicans abroad differ somewhat in their political beliefs and notably in their behaviors from non-migrants without such ties. In contrast, it finds that while having migrated leads returnees to change their beliefs, this experience does not give rise to behavioral modifications among this group. The results suggest that long-distance trans-border social transactions between migrants abroad and non-migrants represent more effective channels of diffusion than do face-to-face interactions between the latter and return migrants. Additionally, they suggest that attitudes and behaviors do not diffuse in lockstep. These surprising—if not puzzling—findings are the foundation for the subsequent two chapters.

Chapters 4 and 5 examine the processes by which migrant returns, as compared with long-distance cross-border social transactions, contribute to the diffusion of political beliefs and behaviors. The chapters draw on a set of in-depth field interviews I conducted with Mexicans living in both Mexico and the U.S.,

including migrants abroad, return migrants, friends and family of both types of migrants, and Mexican leaders.

Chapter 4 examines how migrants who return contribute to the diffusion of political beliefs and behaviors. Based on three different research techniques, I find that return migrants learn both beliefs and behaviors abroad; however, they fail to diffuse these in Mexico because the shared attitudes of the non-migrants to whom migrants return are hostile towards them. The source of these hostilities appears to be that return migrants benefitted from emigrating to the U.S.; returnees are the target of Mexicans' widespread resentment towards the U.S. Consequently, as returnees, they receive little of the respect and attention they did while they were abroad. Returning to this social context discourages migrants, who arrive with a great interest in implementing what they witnessed abroad, from following through with their efforts. Furthermore, because returnees have personally witnessed how democracy functions in the U.S., they struggle to adapt what they observed there to the Mexican context. They come to believe that some political beliefs and behaviors are uniquely possible in the U.S., and infeasible in Mexico; there is nothing in-between.

Chapter 5 compares diffusion via long-distance cross-border communication to diffusion via returns. The chapter both confirms and strengthens the theoretical observations I make in Chapter 4 concerning return migrants. Specifically, it finds that migrants abroad do not feel constrained by Mexicans' (in Mexico) attitudes toward them. Friends and family who communicate with migrants abroad do not report a similar disdain for migrants abroad as they do for migrants who return. Instead, they perceive those abroad as brave, successful risk-takers. Migrants in the U.S. represent for entire families, household, or businesses—a connection to better opportunities. For these reasons and because migrants are far away in another country, attitudes towards migrants abroad are supportive and attentive rather than demeaning and unaccommodating. Overall, non-migrants are receptive to migrants abroad and

endeavor to implement the suggestions they share. They implement the behaviors of which they learn as they imagine them; since they have not travelled to the U.S., they do not have an “ideal” reference point with which to evaluate their efforts.

Chapter 6 draws theoretical conclusions from the extensive empirical investigation I report in the dissertation. The first part restates the new variant of constructivism I propose and explores its wider value for diffusion research. This new form of constructivism argues that a populations’ shared views toward the vector of foreign ideas or toward the entity from which a given object of diffusion originates is important. The core implication, in this case, is that even if potential adopters normatively support the more democratic beliefs and behaviors being diffused, their attitudes toward the U.S. and migration’s unique role within U.S.-Mexico relations precludes their adoption as expected.

The second part of Chapter 6 shows that my argument is applicable to a wide range of cases in Latin America, Africa, and Eastern Europe. It shows that the new theory I advance in the dissertation has general validity beyond the U.S.-Mexico case. I conclude by indicating a number of research avenues that will help to confirm and strengthen my conclusions both in the U.S.-Mexico case and comparatively.

CHAPTER 2: A THEORY OF MIGRANT-DRIVEN INTERNATIONAL DIFFUSION

"The range of the inward as of the outward vision is capable of being increased in every individual; and while he gauges the extent of his geographical space by his freedom of movement and his right to enjoy it, he shapes accordingly his ideas and habits: and so as a whole does a people." Friedrich Ratzel, 1898, p. 463.

2.1 Introduction

This chapter argues that shared understandings among Mexicans about their country's relationship with the U.S. fundamentally shape both non-migrants' willingness to embrace information about U.S. political practices and beliefs and migrants' own propensity to share them. Octavio Paz, in an allusion to "Snow White", famously referred to the U.S. as an indiscreet mirror that conveys to Mexico that the U.S. is the true beauty of the region. Mexico's long-standing tradition of defining itself in comparison to the U.S. has given rise to contradictory collective sentiments toward the U.S. Similar to attitudes towards the U.S. around the world, these are "fueled by jealousy, resentment, ambivalence, and crushed expectations. The seductive allure of American capitalism, freedoms, products, and culture often coexists with ambivalence about them as economically or politically unattainable" (Naím, 2002, p.103). In the case of Mexico, geographic proximity further strengthens the allure of the U.S., while strong popular perceptions of the U.S. as a latent threat sustain negative views. These strong paradoxical attitudes lead Mexicans to reify the border and infuse it with meaning beyond that of a line marking the limits of the state.

As a result of these shared understandings, non-migrants consider migrants who are currently located in the U.S. to be self-sacrificing, courageous, and successful. Non-migrants are therefore very attentive to U.S.-based migrants and consider them worth emulating. In contrast, they pay little attention to returnees. Non-migrants disparage returnees because they perceive them as

regrettably having lost their Mexican identity; having forgotten how things are done in their native country; as individuals who return with inflated egos; and, as lazy.

Non-migrants' interest and willingness to embrace the foreign political innovations that migrants (including both returnees and stayers) convey is therefore socially structured; it is not influenced by a migrant's personal merits, the success and strength of the U.S., or the inherent value of the idea being transmitted. Because non-migrants are of two minds in their attitudes towards migrants, the latter are more likely to share information about U.S. practices and values while they are abroad, when non-migrants are highly receptive to them, whereas they constrain their impulse to share once they have returned to Mexico, because non-migrants shut them out.

Non-migrants are also better able to adapt foreign ideas to the local context in the absence of migrants. Returnees who import innovations personally give up relatively quickly on seeking ways to implement U.S. practices and beliefs in Mexico due to the social constraints that non-migrants' attitudes towards them represent; they also overestimate the difficulty of carrying out change in Mexico as compared to in the U.S., and because they idealize the U.S. once they return home.

My argument advances a new theoretical perspective that is consistent with constructivism insofar as it stresses the importance of irreducible intersubjective beliefs in shaping outcomes; however, I reject most diffusion scholars' assumption that democratic change flows hierarchically and automatically from more to less democratic countries. Democratic behaviors, and to a much lesser extent, beliefs, do flow from the U.S. to Mexico via migrants, but not uniformly. The new form of constructivism that I put forth highlights the power of collective sentiments towards the country from which innovations emanate. It shows that feelings of resentment toward strong and successful countries can

stop changes that might otherwise be embraced as normatively superior, while simultaneously held feelings of admiration can contribute to their adoption.

2.2 Democratic Diffusion and Political Learning via Social Interactions: Shifting Levels of Analysis and Exploring New Types of Relationships

Theories of international diffusion offer compelling explanations for how international forces influence domestic politics. Broadly speaking, they argue that political changes outside of a country's borders influence the probability that a similar change will occur within that country as well (Strang, 1991). Studies of democratic diffusion have evaluated the hypothesis that democracies exist in geographic clusters, or that they spread in a wavelike fashion from one country to another (Gleditsch & Ward, 2006; O'Loughlin, Ward, Lofdahl, Cohen, Brown, Reilly, Gleditsch, & Shin, 1998; Starr, 1991; Starr & Lindborg, 2003). Scholars have strengthened support for these claims by using increasingly sophisticated approaches and research techniques, and by evaluating alternative indicators of democracy (Brinks & Coppedge, 2006; Hannan & Carrol, 1981; Most & Starr, 1990; Przeworski, Álvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2002; Starr, 1991). However, nearly all studies of democratic diffusion employ minimal conceptions of the dependent variable (democracy), such as regime transitions; and they use aggregate level indicators (e.g., national Freedom House or Polity scores) to operationalize democracy.

A significant research agenda opens up if we consider the implications of international diffusion on other aspects of democracy and assess diffusion's effects at alternate levels of analysis. As we saw in the first chapter, my specific objective is to determine whether and under what conditions migrants contribute to the diffusion of political beliefs and behaviors from migrants' host countries to their countries of origin. The broader goal of this research project is to direct the study of international diffusion to democratic processes caused by, and outcomes observable among, individuals at the level of mass publics.

This task requires us to carefully consider the micro-level processes that underlie diffusion. The existing literature depicts a democratization process that is set in motion by exogenous change; it posits that change leads to change (Brinks & Coppedge, 2006; Most & Starr, 1991). The literature on model and principle diffusion significantly enhances our understanding of how the process functions on the ground. The first seeks to explain why leaders emulate policy models developed outside of their country. The second explores how changes in intersubjectively held understandings of what is appropriate in social life, which originate outside of a country, contribute to modifying the interests, beliefs, and/or choices of that country's leaders. The main debate in the literature centers on the logic that drives decisions to adopt a foreign model or principle—that is, whether adopters behave rationally or otherwise. Another concerns whether international forces impose change on domestic actors, or if the latter play an active role in the diffusion process.

Although research on model and principle diffusion focuses on processes that occur at the level of elite decision makers or involve organized activists, it offers useful perspectives for the study of mass level diffusion. In particular, unlike other scholarship that explores the spread of ideas, the international diffusion scholarship focuses on processes that are embedded in an international system comprised of sovereign nation-states and transnational or international organizations (TOs and IOs, respectively). The research contributes significantly to our understanding of the conditions under which actors anchored to one nation state decide to adopt models and principles developed either internationally or in another nation-state. It also sheds light on how foreign actors serve as agents of international diffusion.

A separate research tradition explores how social communications influence political behavior among mass publics. This work complements the diffusion literature in helping us think about how beliefs and practices spread among actors other than elites and organized activists. It broadly concurs that

political information conveyed through interpersonal social mechanisms, such as discussions on the job or on the street, campaign buttons on a friend's shirt, or even casual remarks have a powerful influence on individuals—even more powerful than do political information conveyed through speeches and media reports (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1987, p. 1197). The most salient theoretical debates that frame this research revolve around similar issues as those that drive diffusion scholars. For instance, one debate regards whether individuals who learn from others do so rationally or not. There is also some disagreement regarding whether close personal ties contribute most to the spread of information, or whether other factors, such as local social structures have a stronger influence.

Despite all of its contributions, however, the social communications scholarship has failed to consider whether and how informal social mechanisms that span the borders separating sovereign nation-states contribute to spreading political information. It typically focuses on face-to-face encounters, and operates under the assumption that this modality accounts for most interactions within primary groups. In principle, scholars recognize that an individual can access a distant social environment via close interpersonal relations with a second individual who is far removed from the day-to-day environment of the first. But, despite the explosion of globalization research, social communications researchers have not considered the possibility that the social spaces in which close interpersonal communications are situated may be international.[4] Exploring this variant of interpersonal communication allows us to strengthen existing theories of social and political learning.

The proportion of the population that has emigrated internationally from numerous countries is significant. In about one out of ten of the countries in the world over ten percent of the native-born population lives in another country

[4] There is a growing area of research concerning the effects of digital networks. These are quite distinct from the intimate cross-border links on which I focus this research project.

(Ratha & Xu, 2008). In some countries, such as Jamaica, the proportion of the native born population living in foreign lands is as high as 39 percent. The number of people living outside of their country of birth has doubled since 1975 to about three percent of the world's population. These data suggest that expanding the scope of pertinent social interactions to include cross-border ties does not simply satisfy a theoretical curiosity, but has substantive value in the real world as well.

The data also imply that there are many countries of emigration in which critical masses of people who do not migrate have close friends or family residing outside of their country; many such people are exposed to foreign beliefs and behaviors as a result of their ongoing relations with those who have left. The relations I examine in this project therefore have much in common with those that social communication scholars study, except that they bridge international borders.

My objective in the following paragraphs is to create a bridge between theories of international diffusion and social communication to develop competing sets of expectations regarding migrant-led international diffusion. I discuss the merits of each competing theory in turn. The chapter concludes by explaining more fully the new theory of migrant-driven international diffusion summarized in the first chapter.

2.3 Theoretical Approaches to Learning: Elites versus Mass Publics

Among those who study either international diffusion or political behavior among mass publics, there are significant numbers of scholars who focus on the issue of political learning. Multiple researchers in the area of diffusion examine how foreign information contributes to domestic political leaders' existing knowledge, and what motivates domestic leaders to either embrace or reject foreign models or principles. Many scholars of political behavior evaluate how socially obtained information influences the political choices and beliefs of

individuals at the level of mass publics. Scholars in both fields disagree regarding the logic that underlies each process, with some claiming that actors involved are purely rational, others claiming they are boundedly rational, and a third group arguing that the process is socially constructed.

2.3.1 Constructivist Approaches

The constructivist approach to diffusion explores how the collectively held understandings or intersubjective ideas about social life in one country influence the identities, interests, behaviors, practices and decisions of actors rooted in another country (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001; Kratochwil & Ruggie, 1986). Unlike rationalist accounts of diffusion, constructivism does not start from the premise that the interests of potential adopters are given. Additionally, although some level of domestic demand for policy solutions is required for the diffusion of models and principles, demand does not have to emerge from a country's leaders. The demand for, or supply of, foreign models and beliefs among active, organized, and strategically placed domestic actors may be sufficient to create an environment in which domestic leaders also become interested. A leader's interests may alternatively change as do the prevalent views in their surrounding environment (this may be the local, domestic, or international environment). Finally, leaders may become fundamentally convinced of the value of the principles and ideas in question. In sum, intersubjectively held beliefs about social life that flow into a country from an external source may constitute, regulate or enable leaders (Kratochwill & Ruggie, 1990), increasing the likelihood that they will embrace a democratic regime change, or policies that improve the quality of democracy.

By and large, constructivist perspectives on the international diffusion of democracy argue that leaders will embrace democracy because they embrace its underlying values. In other words, actors will aspire to emulate or adopt a well-functioning model of democracy because they consider it normatively superior.

We should consequently expect political beliefs and behaviors to flow from more to less advanced democracies.

There are various trajectories that foreign principles and models may follow as they come into contact with domestic actors, however. Domestic actors at various levels of analysis (based, in part, on their own intersubjective beliefs) may either embrace foreign models or principles, or call them into question (Cortell & Davis, 2000; Legro, 1997; Sikkink, 1991). Often, the interaction between international and domestic norms sets in motion a dynamic process in which domestically rooted actors and/or transnational activists work actively to make foreign models or principles more palatable or legitimate to local actors (Acharya, 2004, Checkel, 2001; Farrell, 2001; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1999; Sikkink, 1991, Tarrow, 2005). For example, they may introduce the foreign concept strategically into the domestic environment by reframing (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1999), grafting (Risse-Kappen, 1995), and localizing (Acharya, 2004). Similarly, international actors may access influential, well-placed domestic actors who share their preference for the policy in question or share beliefs and utilize these actors to advance the model or principle of interest (Chayes & Chayes, 1995; Checkel, 1999). Foreign practices can also become dominant domestic norms once a critical mass has embraced them (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1999), or as elite actors legitimate them via official policies or laws.

The literature indicates that international forces are not unstoppable. Collective beliefs and ideas existing at the local, regional, national, sub-national, or organizational levels may be sufficiently rigid to prevent the introduction of new norms altogether (Acharya, 2004; Cortell & Davis, 2000). For instance, individuals may reject foreign models or principles if they seem inappropriate by

local standards, even if a cost-benefit analysis indicates that the foreign option represents the "best" strategy for achieving one's objectives.[5]

The constructivist scholarship concerning international diffusion has not carefully explored and tested the above arguments with respect to mass publics. Nonetheless, scholars who study how individuals learn via social communication advance theories that similarly emphasize structure, norms and beliefs. For example, the structural equivalence model of social learning argues that the actions and choices of individual A—a total stranger with whom individual B may not even engage in political discussion—may nonetheless influence individual B if the former belongs to a social group whose principles appeal to the latter (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1991). The logic behind the structural equivalence model is that people are likely to accept the practices they observe among individuals who belong to groups that share with them the same intersubjective beliefs about what is appropriate. Actors may even adopt behaviors and beliefs they know to be ineffective (irrational), so long as the transmitter of these goods belongs to the same "moral reference group" as the adopter or to a group for which the adopter has deep respect and admiration.[6]

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[5] The perspective contrasts with ideal-typical rational choice approaches, which predict that a leader would be willing to defy local norms to implement the "best" policy prescription. Rational choice theories do not rest on a material ontology; actors' constraints and utilities may be social and ideational or material (Blyth, 1997; Chong, 1991, 1996; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Katzenstein, Keohane, & Krasner, 1998; Sugden 1989). However, the prevailing emphasis has been on the material. Rational choice institutionalists are an exception to this pattern. They part with the view that rational man is fully autonomous and unconnected to the social structure in which he is embedded and argue that socially constructed institutions are a structural constraint on actions akin to a material constraint. Nonetheless, as the following paragraph indicates, the differences between the rational choice and constructivist perspectives are deeper than whether *constraints* are material versus social or ideational.

[6] Note that structured social communication can help rational actors maximize their interests also. If the social relationships to which an individual belongs strongly represent her interests, then following this structural cue will be an efficient means of maximizing utilities. The difference between the rational choice and constructivist interpretation is that in the latter, adopters are persuaded of the normative value of the transmitters beliefs and behaviors.

This dissertation has an interest in understanding whether migrants effectively transmit or import to Mexico the collective understandings in the U.S. (or migrants' understandings of Americans' collective understandings) about the behaviors and beliefs that constitute democratic citizenship. Constructivism argues that non-migrants and returnees living in Mexico ought to embrace the intersubjective beliefs that underlie American-style democracy. Concretely, migrants should be sufficiently committed to the democratic values they experienced and observed in the U.S. to transmit them to their non-migrant co-nationals. Moreover, although local norms about political beliefs and behaviors could override external ones in theory, the political beliefs and behaviors of Americans should be sufficiently compelling, for normative reasons, to overcome the rational or ideational objections of potential non-migrant adopters.

2.3.2 Rational Choice Approaches

With respect to leaders, theories of rational learning assume that individual preferences are given. Leaders look to external models because their existing repertoire of policy solutions is insufficient to resolve the problems they face. The central argument of the rational choice approach involves how actors utilize external information. It claims that:

> actors (in our case politicians) have prior beliefs about which outcomes are expected from a particular policy…Politicians learn rationally only if they take all information into account about the outcomes of policies elsewhere (regardless of the characteristics of the sources of information) and use that information to revise their prior beliefs (Meseguer, 2005, p. 75).

Rational choice explanations of international diffusion imply that knowledge about policy models and norms that have been adopted elsewhere enhance the ability of leaders to effectively maximize their interests; such

knowledge expands the range of policy alternatives from which leaders make selections based on a careful cost-benefit analysis.

Rational learning in the case of mass publics may conform to either of two processes. First, if migrants introduce new behavioral and attitudinal alternatives that non-migrants find, through trial and error, to be more effective pathways for achieving their interests than those they knew of previously, then non-migrants should adopt these innovations if they are rational. More often, however, rational learning at the level of mass publics is less straightforward. Citizens, unlike leaders, may not be purposefully seeking solutions to problems in order to learn. They may have only a casual interest in politics, yet their interpersonal conversations about diverse topics may incidentally lead to political learning. Furthermore, rather than carefully assessing the merits of the various political behaviors and beliefs from which they may choose, rational citizens, at the level of the mass public, may utilize inferential shortcuts to make rational choices at a lower cost.

Mass publics, unlike political leaders, utilize inferential shortcuts because they do not have the time, expertise, interest, or resources (or professional obligation for that matter) to make decisions about politics according to the strict postulates advanced by pure rational choice theorists. Unlike political leaders, whose job it is to make high impact policy decisions alone or in small numbers, the contribution that each individual citizen makes to political outcomes is nearly insignificant; however, mass publics may produce key outcomes as an aggregate. It is thus irrational for average citizens to obtain the information and expertise required to carefully assess the costs and benefits of each political decision they make (Downs, 1957). Such intense efforts are senseless in light of the constraints on citizens' time and expertise, and in light of their infinitesimal contribution to political outcomes.

Social interactions permit ordinary citizens to make rational choices more efficiently. Rather than carefully analyze all available options, citizens may follow

the cues of people they trust, whose knowledge of politics is superior, or with whom they share common interests, in order to navigate a complicated political world (Brady & Sniderman, 1985; Downs, 1957; Huckfeldt, 2001; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998; Popkin, 1991). For example, they may follow the lead of highly regarded and trusted peers or more specialized political actors such as political parties. Disagreement, debate, and persuasion contribute to expanding actors' knowledge of the options available to them and expose them to arguments concerning which option represents the best path for reaching their objectives. This decision-making strategy produces interest-maximizing outcomes if individual decision makers engage in discussions with diverse interlocutors; if they are capable of identifying knowledgeable individuals who share their interests; and, if they are more likely to draw information from these discussants (Huckfeldt, 2001).

There is evidence that many of the qualities possessed by the "opinion leaders" that rational choice theorists portray are overrepresented among migrants. Migrants are relatively more educated and skilled than those who stay behind (Macrcel & Cornelius, 2001). They tend to be the fittest member of their household, selected to migrate from the household (by non-migrants) precisely for this reason (Taylor, 1987). Significantly, migrants possess these qualities regardless of whether they return to Mexico or not. Some studies find that return migrants are self-selected for having fared relatively less well than they expected; they suggest that return migrants are negatively self-selected with respect to migrants who stay in the U.S. (Cuecuecha, 2006; Herzog & Schlottmann, 1983; Reyes, 1997). However, this should not be misunderstood to signify that returnees are systematically less skilled and capable of fulfilling their interests than non-migrants. To the contrary, studies show that returnees fare better economically over time than people who never migrated at all (Coulon & Piracha, 2005).

Migrants' international experiences should strengthen their position as relatively more fit than non-migrants. Regardless of their background in Mexico, migrants learn new political attitudes and behaviors in the U.S.[7] For example they learn of more forms of participation by which they can hold leaders accountable or express their political preferences than their non-migrant co-nationals learn in Mexico because living abroad exposes them to an even greater diversity of practices and strategies. In short, both migrants who return to Mexico, and those who stay in the U.S., are ideal candidates for rational non-migrants to learn from or simply emulate.[8]

If migrants continue to engage their friends and family who remain back home, either when they return permanently or through cross-border communications; if the content of their communications includes accounts of social life in the U.S., including its politics; and, if Mexicans who stay in their country of origin have an interest in improving their democracy, then rational choice points to two possible outcomes. First, we should expect non-migrants to embrace the political beliefs and actions reported by migrants if these appear to be viable and effective in Mexico too. An alternate possibility is that non-migrants who communicate with Mexicans residing in the U.S. will embrace the political beliefs and behaviors that their migrant co-nationals claim are effective, without themselves carefully assessing their merits. With respect to return migrants, we would expect them to import into Mexico any of the beliefs and values they learned abroad that they know (based on empirical evidence) will help them meet their objectives and interests in Mexico.

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[7] I explore this assertion in depth in Chapters 3 and 4.

[8] Note that migrants' leadership role is not contingent on their *cross-border* movement; however. It does not derive from the specific nation-states to which they migrate, the nature of relations between their home and host states, or citizens' perceptions of these factors. Their leadership qualities are due to their individual attributes, fully independent of their social surroundings.

Note that it is perfectly rational to reject U.S.-based practices and beliefs if these are incompatible with Mexican political institutions—if they do not work in the context of the home country. However, the failure to adopt beliefs and behaviors proven to be highly effective in Mexico (i.e., more so than the existing ones) is inconsistent with rational choice theory. The adoption of beliefs, but not behaviors and vice versa is also inconsistent with the approach, which sees such dissonance as irrational; rational choice theory holds that behaviors follow from attitudes (Eagly & Chaiken, 1998).

Rational choice expectations are not consistent with the findings I present in this study. First, rational choice theory argues that beliefs and behaviors should be consistent, with beliefs contributing to the reasoning process in which rational actors engage to make decisions. But my research finds that beliefs and behaviors do not co-vary. Communication with friends and family abroad leads non-migrants to participate in politics significantly more, but such ties have a minimal impact on beliefs. In contrast, having migrated to the U.S. and returned to Mexico strengthens democratic attitudes, but returnees either participate less or at the same levels as their co-nationals without migration experiences.

Furthermore, migrants do not consistently play the role of “opinion leaders” as I proposed earlier. Non-migrants perceive migrants who remain abroad, but not migrants who have returned, as people worth following. They snub returnees even though empirically they possess many of the qualities of individuals who influence others via social transactions. The difference between migrants and non-migrants is thus largely a matter of perceptions. Non-migrants perceive those who remain in the U.S. as more worthy of emulating, regardless of whether they are in fact more knowledgeable and capable of realizing their goals and interests. This contradictory perception leads non-migrants to respond differently to migrants and non-migrants, even when the political information being transmitted is almost identical. A migrant’s location either in Mexico or the U.S. is thus the primary factor that influences their status as so-called opinion

leaders. This process does not conform to rational theories of social learning at all.

Return migrants' failure to import new political behaviors could be rational if the foreign practices failed to produce results in Mexico. But there is little evidence for this argument. Returnees leave U.S. practices behind not because they find, through trial and error, that they do not work in their home country. Rather they respond to a Mexican context characterized by weak social support for the innovations that return migrants import. The lack of social support is rooted in non-migrants' ambivalent sentiments towards the U.S.

The diffusion of political beliefs and behaviors from the U.S. to Mexico via-migrants therefore does not follow a rational choice logic. Return migrants' failure to import behaviors is not due to their limited effectiveness in Mexico, but rather to social constraints grounded in anti-Americanism in Mexico. Non-migrants appear to consider migrants who remain abroad opinion leaders worth following because they are members of a country they both admire—a country to which they want to move. They do not consider returnees worth emulating although migrants who return to Mexico also possess knowledge, skills, and information worth following, non-migrants reject the foreign ideas that returnees introduce into their country because they originate in a country whose interference in Mexico they resent and whose treatment of Mexico and Mexicans they loathe. Non-migrants therefore differentiate "irrationally" between migrants at home and migrants abroad.

2.3.3 Bounded Rationality Approaches

Scholars who argue that actors are boundedly rational also embrace individual, micro-level, interest-based explanations for leaders' adoption of foreign models; however, they claim that cognitive psychological propensities limit the extent to which leaders make decisions according to purely rational postulates (Weyland, 1996). Contrary to what rational choice theory predicts,

bounded rationality claims that politicians do not carefully analyze all incoming information because they are cognitive misers, or they do not have time to evaluate the costs and benefits of each available policy option. A common result of this type of decision-making is that leaders embrace high profile policies that were crafted in another country to address a foreign problem. Such policies may be sub-optimal for resolving the problems that domestic leaders face in their own country.

Rather than conduct thorough and balanced evaluations of whether and how each policy available to them may contribute to resolving problems, leaders rely on economical cognitive heuristics (Elkins & Simmons, 2005; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Kahnemann & Tversky, 1979; Kahnemann, Slovick, & Tversky, 1982; Weyland, 2007). For example, leaders may use the "availability" heuristic, which "refers to people's tendency to place excessive importance on information that—for logically accidental reasons—has special immediacy, strikingness, and impact, that grabs their attention," (Weyland, 2007; p. 47). The prominence of a nation-state may make its models and principles highly available. (Elkins & Simmons, 2005). For example, Latin American countries may emulate the U.S. presidential model because that country has the most prominent (and thus available) presidential system in the region. Reference groups provide another cue to busy leaders. Elkins and Simmons (2005) note that "imitating similar individuals is one of the simplest and most effective cognitive heuristics in the calculation of utilities" (p. 45). This signifies that leaders are more likely to adopt policy models enacted in countries that are similar to theirs culturally, geographically, economically, historically or otherwise. Finally, the representativeness heuristic causes leaders to overestimate the extent to which patterns observed in a small sample are representative of the whole population," (Weyland, 2007, p. 48). Put differently, leaders draw overly optimistic conclusions about how a policy that succeeded in other countries will effectively resolve their own country's problems.

Cognitive shortcuts serve decision makers in various contexts, but a model's availability and representativeness or whether it has been adopted by a member of a potential adopter's reference group does not necessarily make it worth emulating. Relying on this type of shortcut can help actors to identify policies and models quickly, but not necessarily effectively.

With respect to mass publics, bounded rationality argues that individuals at the level of mass publics make systematically biased choices as a result of their reliance on cognitive shortcuts—including social conversations with opinion leaders. Interpersonal relations may not help ordinary individuals optimize their interests as traditional rational choice theorists predict for numerous reasons. One problem is that citizens may unwittingly follow political leaders who do not make rational decisions. Though some scholars argue that leaders are the most likely case for rational action due to the potential consequences of their individual decisions (Fiorina, 1996), there is evidence to the contrary. To the extent that leaders fail to make rational choices, the choices of their followers will be biased, too.

Another factor that limits the potential of social interactions to produce rational choices is that citizens may not effectively identify knowledgeable interlocutors among members of their social network (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995). Individuals may misperceive interlocutors with whom they disagree as lacking expertise (Huckfeldt, 2001; Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995). If individuals are conflict-averse, they may fully avoid having political discussions with those who do not share their political views. This is problematic because it means social discussions will not produce a balanced flow of information from which individuals can make optimal choices. Similarly, there is evidence that potential adopters may overvalue information acquired from those with similar levels of education, status, religion, and so forth, because they interpret these personal attributes as indicators of common interests (Lodge, Taber, & Galonsky, 1999; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; Rogers, 1995). But similarities such as skin color,

gender or nationality may serve as poor indicators of common interests; and an interlocutor with common interests is not necessarily an "expert" worthy of following.

The literature on social learning has not explored whether interlocutors' nation-state origins[9] influence the likelihood that potential adopters will take notice of them. Do qualities about the political entity from which informants and/or information hail influence the probability that mass publics will employ misleading cognitive heuristics as do policy leaders? For instance, does a transmitters' origin in the U.S. make his political beliefs and ideas more representative? Although the research on social learning does not explicitly address these questions, we can draw on it to develop a reasonable set of expectations about what bounded rationality implies for migrant-led international diffusion.

The U.S. is the most important country in the world from the Mexican perspective. It is the giant neighbor with whom Mexico shares a contentious northern border nearly two thousand miles long. Mexico's economy is highly dependent on the U.S. More than 80 percent of Mexican exports flow to that country, and U.S. bound exports account for more than a quarter of Mexico's GDP. Mexicans receive more U.S. news and media coverage than from any other country. This coverage leads them to admire (among other things) the judicial system of the U.S., its electoral processes, and its peaceful changes in leadership. The literature on bounded rationality suggests that due to human cognitive limitations, non-migrant Mexicans in search of novel civic engagement strategies would be more likely to look to the U.S. for examples than to other countries, even in the absence of migration.

Migration makes American forms of civic engagement even more available to Mexican citizens by introducing them directly into their homes. The fact that over 10 million Mexican-born nationals live in the U.S. increases that

[9] When I say origins or national origins in this section, I mean the locations in which an individual developed the political beliefs and behaviors that they then share with others.

country's availability to Mexicans who never migrate. Migration permits information about the U.S. to reach Mexicans via trusted individuals; people who stay behind have a link to the U.S. via individuals similar to themselves or from the same reference group (e.g., family, colleagues at work or school, people from the same small town). Indeed migrants probably share more attributes with their friends in Mexico than do other potential providers of foreign information, such as the media, consumer products, international non-governmental organizations, missionaries, etc. Few other vectors of foreign information fit the definition of a reference group as do migrants.

The economic, military and democratic strength of the U.S. enhances its representativeness. The success of the U.S., alone is probably enough to convince migrants that the country is worth emulating; in addition, non-migrants may further idealize the U.S. economic and political system if they observe that their family and friends have achieved many of their objectives via migration to the north. We should therefore observe non-migrants overwhelmingly adopting U.S. models or principles—so to speak—without carefully considering their merit, and regardless of the personal attributes of the individuals from whom they learned of the new practices and beliefs.

Bounded rationality also implies that returnees should be highly likely to import both U.S. political beliefs and behaviors in light of their direct experience with (and positive impression of) the social, economic, and political goods these produce for American citizens. Because migrants lived within the U.S. democracy, that country's model should be most available and representative to them. We should expect returnees who are interested in improving Mexico's democracy to draw on the American model with relatively little effort precisely because it is the well-functioning democracy with which they are most familiar.

Surprisingly, however, I find that non-migrants do not welcome the new political beliefs and behaviors that returnees introduce into Mexico, precisely because they perceive these as a form of U.S. interference into Mexican affairs.

Mexican migrants' re-entry into Mexico symbolizes the physical entry of U.S. interests in to Mexico to the extent that the beliefs and behaviors of returnees have changed to reflect dominant practices in the U.S. Again, while non-migrants admire the U.S., its economy and institutions, they reject that country's involvement in Mexican domestic affairs because they mistrust U.S. intentions and believe the U.S. is not concerned about Mexico's best interests. Non-migrants direct this mistrust towards returnees, particularly those eager to change how "things are done" in Mexico, and those who return with U.S. dollars. The outcome contradicts the predictions of bounded rationality. Rather than embrace the political beliefs and behaviors of their immediate, more powerful and successful neighbor to the north, non-migrants reject the U.S.-based innovations that returnees import into Mexico. Their resentment of the dominant U.S. overrides that country's representativeness and availability, particularly when it enters their home directly.

Implicitly, their acceptance of the innovations that U.S.-based migrants transmit via long-distance cross-border communications is not due to the availability, prominence or representativeness of the U.S., otherwise, migrants would also embrace the innovations that returnees transmit. Moreover, since both returnees and U.S. based migrants are the friends and kin of non-migrants, their acceptance is not because one group is more similar to non-migrants than another. Indeed, the similarity heuristic suggests that non-migrants would be particularly responsive to return migrants located in their own home as compared to migrants located in the distant U.S. Taken together, these findings are inconsistent with bounded rationality.

2.4 A New Theory of Migrant-Led International Diffusion

Migrant-driven international diffusion is structured by the intersubjective beliefs that Mexicans hold regarding Mexico-U.S. relations migration's place within those relations. These beliefs can best be characterized as anti-American,

yet they are highly ambivalent. It is this ambivalence that accounts for the strength of long-distance trans-state social transactions between migrants and non-migrants as a channel of diffusion as well as for the diminished power of face-to-face transactions between returnees and their co-nationals.

Collectively held attitudes towards the U.S. among Mexicans living in Mexico cause the social status of migrants to differ "irrationally" depending on their location either in the U.S. or Mexico. Non-migrants hold migrants abroad in high regard; they evoke empathy, admiration, interest and pride among non-migrants. Migrants abroad therefore communicate with non-migrants in a receptive social context; non-migrants' attitudes towards them encourages them to share their U.S. experiences. In contrast, non-migrants see returnees with frustration and disappointment; relations between returnees and non-migrants give rise to feelings of alienation and resentment. Returning to a social context in which such attitudes are the norm inhibits returnees from sharing their new political beliefs and discourages them from persisting in adapting foreign practices to the local context. In short, due to the prevailing anti-Americanism in Mexico, an American political innovation conveyed from abroad is more meaningful to potential adopters than one that is conveyed face-to-face. There is greater demand and acceptance for new political ideas from migrants abroad; and this in turn encourages their transmission.

Where do collective understandings about U.S.-Mexico relations and migration's role within it come from? Wendt's (1999) concept of role identities suggests that some of the intersubjectively held ideas and beliefs that prevail in a given state are constituted by its relationship with other states. State-to-state relationships, membership in regional organizations, and other forms of international relations constitute role identities and shared perceptions of a foreign entity. This is true both at the level of mass publics and elites. Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that perceptions of states also affect beliefs about foreigners from that state.

Mexican attitudes toward the U.S. reflect a historically frustrated bilateral political and economic relationship. Unwelcome U.S. involvement in Mexico's domestic affairs has been a thorny issue since the mid nineteenth century, when the U.S. took more than half of Mexico's territory. Popular resentment of American military, political and economic involvement in Mexico, including the tacit U.S. support for the long-ruling Mexican dictator, Porfirio Díaz, and its intermittent, but notable, ownership of key Mexican assets, underpin many of Mexico's post-revolutionary ideals. Over the past fifteen years NAFTA has attenuated anti-American sentiments by facilitating unprecedented levels of economic and cultural integration between the two countries. Nonetheless, only 21 percent of Mexicans believe the trade agreement has helped (as opposed to hurt) them personally, and a plurality believes that the cultural impact of the U.S. on Mexico has been unfavorable (CIDAC-Zogby, 2006). Moreover, some of the core elements of popular nationalism enshrined in the 1917 Constitution persist, including widespread—and growing—opposition to allowing U.S. investment in the Mexican energy sector (González & Minushkin, 2006), and strong objections to the presence of U.S. law enforcement officers within Mexico to help fight crime (CIDAC-Zogby, 2006).

Mexicans' attitudes about migration fully reflect this ambivalence. For instance, 73 percent of Mexicans believe Americans are either racist or very racist, and 63 percent consider the U.S. is wealthy because it exploits other countries. Yet 45 percent claim that their lives would improve if they migrated illegally to the U.S. (CIDAC-Zogby, 2006). One-third of Mexicans say they would be willing to move to the U.S. if they could, even though 57 percent feel disdain or indifference towards the country and 53 percent feel distrust (González & Minushkin, 2006). Even more strikingly, asked if they would support a U.S. plan, similar to the Marshall Plan, to help Mexico's development in exchange for stronger controls on illegal migration, only 29 percent of Mexicans agreed (CIDAC-Zogby, 2006). Correspondingly, the majority (65%) of Mexicans

indicated their refusal to exchange greater U.S. access to investment in petroleum and gas for more flexible migration policies (CIDAC-Zogby, 2006). Mexico's dependence on migration to the north thus contributes to a broader incongruous set of attitudes toward the U.S. On one hand, Mexicans perceive entry into the U.S. as a promising way to improve their lives; on the other, they are fiercely nationalist and protective of their sovereignty—especially with respect to the U.S.

Though they have recently softened, attitudes towards migrants themselves have been even more critical for much of Mexico's history. Between the late 19th century and the 1940s, when the Mexican government sought to attract home its citizens who remained in the territories it had to cede to the U.S., Mexican emigrants to the north were seen as traitors (Durand, 2004). From WWII until the 1980s, the Mexican government had no clear policy toward migration or its migrants, but undocumented migration swelled. During this time, the popular term "pocho" emerged to refer to Mexican migrants or their children who belong neither to the U.S. nor Mexico. "Pochos" typically speak poor Spanish and are derided by Mexicans for having weak connections to their roots even as they remain on the margins of American society.

Both official policy and popular opinion appears to have changed since the 1980s. The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act allowed millions of undocumented immigrants to obtain U.S. citizenship. Additionally, the neoliberal economic reforms initiated by Miguel de la Madrid in the 1980s set in motion a process of regional economic integration; one of the unofficial, yet most significant consequences of this integration has been the growth of migrant remittances—cash that migrants send from their host country to their country of origin. Each of these contributed to a new era in which the Mexican government has actively sought to redefine their relationship with their nationals abroad (Durand, 2004; Smith, R, 2003). Particularly under the Fox administration, it appeared as if migrants had gone from traitors to heroes after 100 years

(Durand, 2004). The extent to which this new perception rests on migrants' ability to send money and leverage Mexicans' interests vis-à-vis the U.S. government suggests that the heroes are migrants who remain abroad. Indeed, an individual who has returned home permanently is no longer a migrant in the eyes of the Mexican state, but simply a Mexican citizen.

There are no public opinion studies available to gauge the potentially different perceptions that non-migrants in Mexico hold of migrants in the United States versus migrants who have returned to Mexico. However this study finds evidence to support that perceptions of migrants differ depending on whether they are at home or abroad. Abroad they are heroes, while at home they are not. The perception rests in part on the money that migrants send home; these funds stop flowing as soon as migrants return. Additionally, having a migrant friend or family member in the U.S. represents a link to that country and the opportunities it offers; the friend is a symbolic link to a better possibility, even if it remains unfulfilled. This link is broken when migrants return; the utility of that individual, so to speak, therefore declines. Finally, migrants who stay abroad are seen as particularly fit. They can navigate U.S. culture and society and succeed in the world's strongest economy. This perception holds regardless of the empirical facts concerning specific migrants.

In contrast, a migrant's return calls into question his or her level of fitness. Return migrants are overwhelmingly perceived as less successful, regardless of what they truly achieved abroad. Shared beliefs about migrants, which rest on wider ambivalent attitudes toward the U.S. and bilateral relations between the U.S. and Mexico, therefore impact evaluations of the information that migrants convey. Messages conveyed from migrants who remain abroad are considered to be from more knowledgeable individuals capable of successfully meeting their objectives, while messages from individuals who have returned are not. Migrants abroad are therefore perceived as better guides from whom to learn behavior.

The distinction between migrants at home and abroad, underlies the paradoxical strength of long-distance communication as a path for diffusion in other ways too. We intuitively think of the interpersonal ties between migrants living abroad and non-migrants living in the home country as 'weak', compared with face-to-face ties. Granovetter's assertion, in his influential article "The Strength of Weak Ties", that, "the strength of a tie is a (probably linear) combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize each tie" (1973, p. 1361) would confirm this conjecture. However, long-distance ties between migrants abroad and their friends and kin in Mexico are stronger than ties between returnees and their co-nationals who never leave.

Widely held beliefs regarding the risks involved in crossing the border into the U.S. and the challenges of maintaining oneself in that country cause those who stay behind to worry about migrants. The Mexican national press's tendency to principally cover migrants' negative experiences abroad such as deaths, arrests, exploitation and discrimination, exacerbate these concerns. Shared perceptions about migrants who cross the border thus strengthen the emotional intensity of long-distance, trans-state social transactions. When migrants return, they are no longer a subject of concern and are expected to meet their obligations, as does everyone else in the home country.

Distance also increases the intimacy of ties between migrants and non-migrants. For instance, because phone calls from migrants are occasional, as opposed to daily events, family and friends carefully attend to them; they value and often retell the information that migrants share. Furthermore, since migrants are physically removed from the anti-American norms of the home locality, they express themselves more openly and freely—or intimately—than they might back home. Their physical absence from such "local" norms, combined with their elevated status has the effect of freeing them and enhancing their will to express alternative ideas and practices. In contrast, migrants who physically cross the

border to resettle in Mexico must navigate the dominant beliefs they find back home, either defying or adapting to them; this weakens intimacy.

Finally, the reciprocal services that characterize long-distance cross-border ties are noteworthy. Research shows that migration is a collective survival strategy in which migrants fulfill certain functions and household members who stay behind perform others (Cohen, 2001; Conway & Cohen, 1998; Massey, Alarcón, Durand, & González, 1987; Warnes, 1992). Migrants' stays abroad are thus a unique time during which household members on both sides of the border support each other mutually and are especially responsive to one another. Again, a migrant's homecoming contributes to weakening these reciprocal obligations.

In short, external migrant suppliers communicate across borders from a liberating normative context, while internal migrant suppliers (migrants who have returned home) communicate face-to-face, but under social constraints. At the same time, the risks and sacrifices that migrants undertake both alone and on behalf of the family make non-migrants particularly attentive to non-migrants. This dynamic explains the paradoxical strength of long-distance ties.

Highly ambivalent beliefs about migrants lead non-migrants to evaluate them differently, depending on whether they are located at home or abroad. These beliefs make it relatively easier for foreign innovations transmitted from abroad to find a fit in Mexico, as compared with those imported personally by migrants when they resettle there.

Many returnees come home with the expectation that they may improve life in their country or locality of origin if they can successfully implement what they learned abroad. Their efforts often fail because they are unable to fit the innovation in question into their home country context; that is, they are unable to localize the innovation. The concept of localization sees international diffusion as a process involving both transnational agents as proponents of change, but also domestically rooted agents as active adopters (Acharya, 2004). This signifies that adopters "do more than simply reject or accept foreign innovations, rather, they

actively contribute to reinterpreting and re-representing foreign ideas in order to develop significant congruence between them and local beliefs and practices" (Acharya, 2004, p. 244-245).

Returnees are poor localizers because they become easily frustrated and disappointed by the incongruity they observe between their idealized recollection of how the practice functioned in the U.S. and the process or outcome it produces in Mexico (if the opportunity to implement the innovation arises). More importantly, returnees' emphasis on how the practice in question functions in the U.S. hinders diffusion precisely because it activates Mexican nationalism. Non-migrants snub the energized and optimistic co-nationals who they perceive as lauding U.S. political practices—or worse as traitors against Mexican traditions. Return migrants thus serve as optimal targets against which to direct anti-American sentiments. Their failure to appreciate the importance of adapting foreign political practices and attitudes to local circumstances and the anti-American social context to which they return leads them to believe that change is not possible at home. Rather than graft small changes onto existing practices and beliefs or reframe the innovation as other than American, returnees tend to abandon the diffusion effort altogether.

Quite the opposite, non-migrants can implement foreign innovations of which they learn from migrants residing abroad with greater ease than can returnees. The reason is that non-migrant adopters have never witnessed or experienced the innovation first hand in its native context. Moreover, the migrant herself is not present to supervise and criticize the manner in which the innovation has been implemented. The surprising result is that non-migrants receiving information from a distance can more effectively "localize" or find congruence between foreign and local ideas precisely because they do not have an idealized model against which to compare their interpretation and reconstruction of the innovation; the absence of specific expectations makes them less likely to abandon efforts to import change. For this reason, non-

migrants who change their attitudes or behavior in response to information transmitted by migrants abroad are not seen as traitors who simply emulate foreigners. Additionally, changes among people with migrant kin abroad are perceived as part of a broader adaptation to the absence of a key household leader.

The constructivist perspective also provides a viable account for my findings with respect to political attitudes. Concretely, return migrants retain their "foreign" attitudes, because these are not subject to social pressures as long as migrants keep them close. Attitudes can be held privately; therefore nobody has to know what an individual truly believes. In contrast, political behavior intrinsically involves public action, it cannot be kept private. Actors who want to hide their true behavioral intentions have no other choice than to avoid action altogether or act in ways that do not reflect their attitudes. Individuals can simultaneously hold inconsistent beliefs and behaviors. Collectively held beliefs which hold that U.S. intervention in Mexico's domestic affairs is undesirable underlie this outcome, consistent with constructivist broadest claim concerning the significance of intersubjectively held beliefs. Such beliefs do not apply to migrants located abroad, since such transmitters are not perceived as introducing the claims directly into Mexico. Nonetheless, migrants abroad do no appear to transmit beliefs in isolation, because the short duration and infrequency of their long-distance communication with non-migrants leads them to prioritize other topics of conversation.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter puts forth a new theory of migrant driven international diffusion based on the critical case of Mexico-U.S. migration. It argues that a constructivist explanation provides the most compelling account for why migrant-led international diffusion produces the counterintuitive outcomes we observe. Neither rational choice nor bounded rationality approaches to the study of

diffusion or social learning help to explain the patterns by which international migrants contribute to the diffusion of political beliefs and behaviors. We cannot reconcile either of these approaches with the fact that return migrants face a constraint on the diffusion of behaviors and beliefs that is absent in the case of diffusion via long-distance communication between U.S.-based migrants and their friends and family who continue living in Mexico. The two rational approaches are also inconsistent with the finding that foreign political behaviors diffuse across international borders among mass publics with greater ease than do attitudes.

The proposed theory shows that international diffusion at the level of mass publics is unique, and follows a distinct logic. Although this chapter argues that a constructivist approach best explains migrant-led international diffusion, the theory I advance contains some important variations on conventional constructivist approaches to international diffusion. Most importantly, the study highlights that collectively held beliefs among potential adopters about the country in which an object of diffusion originates can critically influence international diffusion processes. Attitudes about foreign countries, and their place in international, regional or bilateral relations can range from highly positive to strongly negative, or they can be ambivalent. In the latter two cases, popular negative views of a foreign country may be sufficiently powerful to override the availability, similarity and representativeness heuristics. Such views could preclude the adoption of behaviors that could help individuals to improve the quality of Mexico's democracy. Finally, intersubjective beliefs about a country may be sufficiently negative or ambivalent that they interfere with the flow of otherwise normatively desirable political behavioral and ideational changes from more to less democratic countries.

Existing constructivist accounts of international diffusion do not consider the possibility that shared resentment of a foreign country could either condition or fully prevent the diffusion of foreign norms among mass publics. Yet this is

possible not only in the case of high migrant producing countries, but in the case of countries currently seeking to deepen their regional integration to include the creation of new collective identities, such as the E.U.

CHAPTER 3: CHANGES IN POLITICAL BELIEFS AND BEHAVIOR, SOME OBSERVABLE OUTCOMES OF MIGRANT-LED DIFFUSION

3.1 Introduction

Does migration lead to the diffusion of democratic values and behavioral patterns? What outcomes does it produce? Do its outcomes conform to the causal logic that rational choice, rationally bounded, or constructivist scholars advance? This chapter draws on the results of Desencanto Ciudadano en México to provide a set of empirical observations that begin to address these questions.

In theory, four basic conditions may be necessary for migrants to contribute to the diffusion of democratic citizenship: 1) migrants must travel to a more advanced democracy; 2) migrants must adapt politically and learn new political beliefs and behaviors as a result of living in that democracy; 3) there must exist one or more pathways through which migrants can transmit the new ideas, beliefs, and practices to their friends and kin who do not migrate; and 4) citizens in the country of origin must have some level of interest in the full range of political practices and beliefs that contribute to deepening democracy. Do these conditions exist in the case of Mexico-U.S. migration? Are they sufficient to produce diffusion?

This chapter represents a first cut at assessing two paths through which migrants may diffuse political beliefs and behaviors from the United States to Mexico: migrant returns and long-distance cross-border social transactions. In the first case, migrants may diffuse the behaviors and beliefs they learned in the U.S. when they return to Mexico and share with their co-nationals their personal experiences abroad, including the political behaviors and beliefs they observed or embrace. In the second, migrants who remain abroad may channel new beliefs and behaviors to their co-nationals who remain in Mexico via cross-border communication, such as phone calls, letters, Internet communication, and temporary visits.

The statistical analysis presented in this chapter assesses just one step of return migrants' potential role in the diffusion process: whether they introduce new beliefs and behaviors into their country of origin. The large-N data drawn from the Desencanto survey are not adequate to assess whether non-migrants "learn" from what return migrants import; nor do they allow me to assess whether returnees actively share with others the innovations they may have obtained abroad. Determining the extent to which returnees import these innovations following their stay in the U.S.—quite apart from assessing whether they share them—is valuable in and of itself because returnees themselves must hold new, more democratic beliefs and participate more politically in order to serve as vectors of international diffusion. The analysis thus gives us a sense of the maximum levels of diffusion returnees may generate.

The analysis evaluates the effect of long-distance cross-border social transactions more precisely. The survey data allow me to assess whether the political beliefs and behaviors of Mexican who report communicating with migrants living in the U.S. differ from those of Mexicans without such ties. However, my assessment of the effect of long-distance cross-border social transactions is based only on non-migrants' reports. The survey did not gather data from migrants based in the U.S., so this chapter does not study migrants' own accounts of their role as agents of diffusion from abroad.

The most salient empirical finding this chapter reports is that long-distance cross-border ties serve as a stronger channel for the diffusion of foreign political behaviors than do migrant returns to the homeland. Conversely, it appears that returns might contribute to the diffusion of beliefs while cross-border social transactions generally do not.[10]

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[10] Note, I say that returnees might contribute to the diffusion of beliefs because the statistical analysis only provides evidence of migrants' propensity to import beliefs, not the degree to which they share foreign beliefs with their co-nationals in Mexico. Furthermore, the present analysis does not measure whether non-migrants learn from return migrants. These questions are addressed in chapters four and five.

Individuals who have migrated and returned do not reveal any behavioral changes as a result of having lived in the U.S., yet the experience strengthens returnees' tolerance of political and social differences, and increases their demand for observance of rights by Mexican government authorities. Non-migrants probably do not learn new political behaviors from returnees, because the latter do not import them. We cannot conclude from the statistical analysis, alone, that return migrants' retention of foreign political beliefs contributes to diffusion; I explore this question further based on qualitative evidence in subsequent chapters.

On the other hand, non-migrants who communicate with migrant friends or family residing in the United States have significantly higher political participation rates, strongly suggesting that cross-border social transactions contribute to the diffusion of political behaviors. Although the analysis finds that cross-border social transactions make non-migrant Mexicans more critical of their own democracy, the impact of this diffusion pathway on political beliefs is otherwise insignificant.

The optimal conditions for migrant-led international diffusion exist in the case of U.S.-Mexico migration. There are transmitters in one country with innovations of great interest to receivers in another; there are clear channels for these innovations to pass from the former to the latter. This chapter finds that these conditions do not give rise to diffusion in the ways that we might expect. The two types of trans-state social transactions (long-distance cross-border communication and returns) do not have uniform effects. Beliefs and behaviors do not co-vary; and long-distance cross-border communications do not simply produce the same effects with a lesser magnitude than do returns.

The statistical analysis, alone, does not provide sufficient evidence to characterize the theoretical nature of migrant-led international diffusion. However, it intimates that rational choice and bounded rationality fail to provide compelling accounts and leaves open the validity of a constructivist approach.

3.2 Conditions for Diffusion in the Case of Mexico

In theory, there exist the sufficient conditions for the diffusion of democratic attitudes and behavior via migrants to obtain in the case of U.S.-Mexico migration. Migrants travel to a more advanced democracy where they adapt politically and learn new beliefs and behaviors. Mexican citizens who remain in Mexico have a strong interest in improving their democracy. Finally, migrants and non-migrants engage in trans-state social transactions that facilitate the transfer of beliefs and practices from the U.S. to Mexico. This section provides evidence for each of these claims.

3.2.1 Migrants Travel to More Democratic Host Countries

Migrants tend to emigrate from authoritarian countries or developing democracies such as those of Central America, Northern Africa, South Asia and Eastern Europe to more the more advanced democracies of Europe and North America for various reasons (including the association of democracy with economic development). Table 3.1 lists the principal destination countries of migrants from countries around the world that produce high volumes of migrants. Freedom House scores for political freedom and civil liberties are noted in parentheses are noted in parentheses next to each country. Well over 75 percent of the migrants from these typical emigrant source countries move from a less to a more democratic country. Mexican migrants are no exception. More than eighty percent of emigrants from that country move to the United States, while nearly all others migrate to Canada or Spain.

This study focuses on Mexican migration to the U.S. Although Mexico's democracy has grown significantly over the past decade, there remains a sufficiently large gap between that country's level of democracy and its northern neighbor to help motivate diffusion from north to south. The U.S. consistently ranks higher than Mexico on indices that assess the level of democracy (including Freedom House and Polity IV) and Americans are more likely to

democratic forms of civic engagement, including both its attitudinal and behavioral dimensions.

Table 3.1: Levels of Democracy in Migrants' Home and Host Countries

Country of Origin & Freedom House Scores (2007)	Top Destination Countries (2005) & Freedom House Scores (2007)
Albania (3/3)	Greece (1/2), Italy (1/1), Macedonia FYR (3/3), United States (1/1), Germany (1/1), Canada (1/1), France (1/1), United Kingdom (1/1).
Macedonia, FYR (3/3)	Germany (1/1), Switzerland (1/1), Australia (1/1), Italy (1/1), Turkey (3/3), United States (1/1), Austria (1/1), Slovenia (1/1), Croatia (2/2), France (1/1).
Serbia and Montenegro (3/2)†	Germany (1/1), Austria (1/1), Switzerland (1/1), United States (1/1), Turkey (3/3), Croatia (2/2), Sweden (1/1), Italy (1/1), Canada (1/1), Australia (1/1).
Morocco (5/4)	France (1/1), Spain (1/1), Italy (1/1), Israel (1/2), Netherlands (1/1), Germany (1/1), Belgium (1/1), United States (1/1), Canada (1/1), Saudi Arabia (7/6).
Turkey (3/3)	Germany (1/1), France (1/1), Netherlands (1/1), Austria (1/1), United States (1/1), Bulgaria (1/2), Greece (1/2), Switzerland, United Kingdom.
Jamaica (2/3)	United States (1/1), United Kingdom (1/1), Canada (1/1), Germany (1/1)
El Salvador (2/3)	United States (1/1), Canada (1/1), Guatemala (3/4), Costa Rica (1/1), Australia (1/1), Belize (1/2), Mexico (2/3), Spain (1/1), Panama (1/2).
Nicaragua (3/3)	Costa Rica (1/1), United States (1/1), Canada (1/1), Panama (1/2), Guatemala (3/4), Spain (1/1), Mexico (2/3), El Salvador (2/3)
Mexico (2/3)	United States (1/1), Canada (1/1), Spain (1/1)

† 2005 Freedom House Scores for Serbia and Montenegro.
Sources: D. Ratha and D. Xu (2008). *Migration and Remittance Factbook 2008*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1199807908806/World.pdf; Freedom in the World 2007. Freedom House. http://www.freedomhouse.org /template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=334&year=2007

Attitudinally, Americans are more tolerant of political, religious, ethnic and sexual diversity than Mexicans. Tolerance is a fundamental attitude among

citizens of well-functioning democracies and a focus of this study. In the 1999-2000 WVS, 80 percent of U.S. citizens listed "tolerance and respect for other people" as an important value for children to learn, compared to 71 percent of Mexicans. Both countries are strongly religious, but no single Christian denomination in the U.S. approaches the dominance the Catholic Church enjoys in Mexico. Although Mexico is officially a secular state, local authorities often lend official sanction to Catholic ceremonies and sometimes persecute members of religious minorities. WVS data show that 24 percent of Mexicans would not want evangelical Protestants as neighbors, and 17 percent would not want Muslims next door, compared to 11 percent in the U.S.

Though discrimination and hate crimes against gays and lesbians occur in both countries, Mexicans are significantly less tolerant of that community. Nearly 45 percent of Mexicans would not want a homosexual living next door, compared to 23 percent of U.S. citizens. When asked to locate themselves on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means homosexuality is "never justifiable" and 10 "always justifiable", U.S. citizens average 4.8 and Mexicans, 3.6 (differences are significant at the 95 percent confidence level). Race relations do not have as important a place in Mexican political discourse as in American. Nonetheless (or perhaps as a result), on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that ethnic diversity "erodes a country's unity" and 10 means that ethnic diversity "enriches my life" Americans average 7.6 and Mexicans 3.6 (differences are significant at the 95 percent confidence interval)[11]. More notably, well over twice as many Mexicans than Americans place themselves on the lowest extreme of that scale.

Government respect for individual rights, another aspect of democracy I explore in this chapter, is also weaker in Mexico than in the U.S. Despite a recent wave of reforms, Mexico's justice system fails to provide justice for the majority of its citizens. According to Human Rights Watch (2006), over 40 percent of

[11] These data draw from the 2005 Mexico sample and the 2006 U.S. sample of the World Values Survey.

prisoners in Mexico have never been convicted of a crime and suspected criminals are held in pretrial detention for months and years while they await their trial. The Mexican government also has a poor record with regard to respect to the right to free speech. Reporters without Borders (2008) claims that Mexico is the most dangerous country in Latin America for reporters.

Behaviorally, a wide range of forms of political participation is more prevalent in the U.S. than in Mexico (see e.g., Klesner, 2003; Tuner & Elordi, 2001). Data from the 2005-2006 round of the World Values Survey (WVS) reveal that 63 percent in the U.S. as opposed to 21 percent in Mexico, reported having recently signed a petition, and 19 percent of Americans had joined a boycott compared with 3 percent of Mexicans. 59 percent of Americans claimed to be very or somewhat interested in politics, compared to only 34 percent of Mexicans. WVS data indicate that Mexicans out-participate their American counterparts only with respect to mass demonstrations.

These gaps in the democratic beliefs and behaviors of the U.S. and Mexico are significant because if democratic diffusion should occur at the level of mass publics at all, it is most likely in situations where there are important differences between the political experiences transmitters (migrants living abroad or return migrants) and potential adopters (individuals living in the country of origin). The former should be exposed to significantly more democratic contexts than the latter. Otherwise, “When two countries are equally democratic or nondemocratic … emulation is a nonissue” (Brinks & Coppedge, 2006, p. 467).

3.2.2 Migrants Adapt Politically and Learn in their Host Country

There is ample empirical evidence that migrants embrace new political beliefs and behaviors in their more democratic host country (Armony, Barriga, & Schugurensky, 2004; Bean, Brown, & Rumbaut, 2006; Black, Niemi, & Powell, 1987; Camp, 2001, 2003; De la Garza & Yetim, 2003). In the case of Mexico, De la Garza and Yetim (2003) find that exposure to “the United States influences the

beliefs, values, and attitudes toward democracy of Mexican Americans—meaning individuals of Mexican origin who regardless of citizenship or immigrant status reside in the United States—so that their views differ from those of Mexicans who reside in Mexico" (p. 82). The views of Mexican Americans tend to fall squarely between those of Mexicans in Mexico and Americans without Mexican origins. Camp (2003) finds that Mexican Americans begin to adopt the prevailing American view of democracy within less than five years of moving to the U.S.

Though explaining why migrants adopt host country political beliefs and behaviors is outside of the scope of this project, a brief review of the salient explanations is warranted. Some scholars argue that democratic learning occurs as a result of direct experience in well-functioning democracies (Dalton, 1994; Diamond, 1994, 1999; Finkel, Humphries, & Opp, 2001; Mishler & Rose, 2007). Studies that advance this argument focus mostly on changes in the political rights, rules and procedures that occur within peoples own countries of citizenship and residence. Migration scholars extend this framework to account for the changes that follow an individual's move from one country and its political regime to another (see e.g., De la Garza & Yetim, 2003).

Migrants' experiences with their host countries' democratic political institutions clearly differ from those of individuals whose own country of citizenship has undergone a democratic transition. Immigration status—meaning whether migrants are authorized to live in the host country and the extent to which they may engage the host country's political and economic institutions—constrains the range of democratic experiences that migrants may access. For instance, naturalized U.S. citizens are not eligible to become President or Vice President of their new country, and undocumented or "irregular" immigrants do not have the right to vote.

Skeptics may justifiably question whether migrants' marginal presence in their host country is compatible with institutional learning. However, despite

widespread beliefs to the contrary, most states that receive large numbers of migrants, particularly liberal democracies such as the U.S., permit all immigrants to engage their host country's political process quite freely and extensively (Guiraudon, 1998; Hammar, 1990; Joppke, 2001; Layton-Henry, 1990; Plascencia, Freeman, & Setzler, 2003; Varsanyi, 2005, 2006). Regardless of their legal status, migrants have many opportunities to learn and adopt new political beliefs and practices as a result of their extensive rights to interact with host country institutions.

Explanations of migrant political learning extend beyond institutional theories of democratic socialization. As rational actors, migrants may simply emulate those whom they perceive as more knowledgeable and capable of meeting their interests in the U.S., that is, Americans. Migrants may be responding to the cues that more politically incorporated immigrants and American citizens around them offer for how to behave in order to get ahead in the new country. This type of "learning" is quite distinct from that proposed by institutional theorists, but produces similar results. Both are consistent with Diamond's conclusion that "experience with democracy and alternative regimes, and how well a formally democratic regime functions to deliver the "political goods" of democracy, have sizable independent effects on political attitudes and values" (1999, p. 192). The two explanations assume that migrants have significant social contact with the host country's society, including both its institutions and people; the host country does not have to sanction the presence of migrants within its territory for them to learn new political beliefs and behaviors.

Regardless of whether their presence in the host country is legally documented, foreign-born migrants observe how politics and society work in their more democratic host countries, operate under that country's institutions and economy, and interact with its citizens as well as other more politically-incorporated migrants. For instance, a survey of Latino immigrants in the United

States conducted in 2004 indicates that 44 percent of non-citizen immigrants reported volunteering for either a church or religious group, school or tutoring program, neighborhood, business or community group, or organizations representing their particular nationality, ethnic or racial group (Pew Hispanic Center and Kaiser Family Foundation, 2004). Research also shows that non-citizens join labor unions and act collectively to improve working conditions in migrant-dominated industries (Apostolidis, 2005; Fitzgerald, 2004; Repak, 1995, Varsanyi, 2005).

Both undocumented migrants and legal permanent residents may also engage their host country's political institutions directly. Non-citizens in the U.S. cannot vote, but they can and do participate in other ways that are not conditioned upon their immigration status (Bada, Fox, & Selee, 2006; Barreto & Muñoz, 2003; Leal, 2002; Varsanyi, 2005; Verba, Schlotzman & Brady, 1995). In 2004, a full 18 percent of non-citizen Latinos reported that they had either attended a public meeting or demonstration in the community where they live, contacted an elected official, contributed money to a candidate running for public office, attended a political party meeting or function, or worked as a volunteer or for pay for a political candidate (Pew Hispanic Center and Kaiser Family Foundation, 2004). According to the Latino National Political Survey of 1989-90 over 6 percent of non-citizens had signed a petition, and over 4 percent had written to a politician or attended a public meeting (Leal, 2002, p. 361). Non-citizens have even become involved in electoral politics "through their local candidate's endorsement process, by attending campaign rallies, and particularly, via participation in ''get out the vote'' (GOTV) drives" (Varsanyi, 2005: p. 783). As the massive 2006 pro-immigrant rallies in major U.S. cities revealed, non-citizens can organize social movements and protest public policies in marches or assemblies. Additionally, legal permanent residents have peen permitted to enlist in the U.S. armed since the Revolutionary War; and about 8,000 enlist each year (Hattiangadi, Quester, Lee, Lien, & MacLeod, 2005). In

2004, nearly 70,000 non-citizens served in the U.S. armed forces, making up about almost 5 percent of the active-duty force (Stock, 2006).

In addition to having opportunities to learn the political beliefs and behaviors of their most democratic host country through observation and practice, the economic wellbeing and efficiency of most migrants' host countries constitute powerful incentives for migrants to emulate what they observe there. Public opinion polls show that Mexicans admire the United States more than any Latin American country, particularly that country's wealth and democracy (González & Minushkin, 2006). It is not unusual for migrants to ruminate on and discuss among themselves what makes the host country relatively more prosperous than their country of origin. As a consequence, migrants, overall, learn sufficiently during their time abroad to represent an important potential supply of new ideas for people who have not migrated.

3.2.3 Trans-State Social Transactions as Information Pathways

This project explores two potential pathways through which individual migrants may transmit to non-migrants the political beliefs and behaviors they learn in the U.S: returns and long-distance cross-border communication. The first pathway involves migrants (including naturalized citizens) who return to Mexico and share face-to-face with their co-nationals the ideas, beliefs, and practices they learned during their time away. The second involves immigrants who settle in the host country, yet sustain social contact with people who stay in the home country. Both of these processes are forms of trans-state social transactions that can serve as channels for the international diffusion of information.

Migrant returns can indirectly expose millions of Mexicans to American social and political life. They represent an opportunity for non-migrant Mexicans to learn about U.S. political practices and values from people who experienced them first hand. As informants of foreign phenomena, returnees are exceptional because they are part of non-migrants' referent group; returnees share with the

people of their community of origin a common social and economic background and similar concerns about their future in Mexico. Returnees can use familiar language and local metaphors to explain to others face-to-face their observations and experiences abroad. In theory, migrants who return to Mexico, as compared with the mass media or international NGOs, are “insiders”—members of their local community whose perspectives are dependable.

Return migration from the U.S. has remained persistently high for decades. Jasso and Rosenzweig (1982) estimated that close to 50 percent of all migrants who entered the United States in 1971 had returned to their countries of origin by 1979. Estimates of Mexican return rates based on data from the same time period found that nearly half of migrants returned to Mexico within a year (Reyes & Mameesh, 2002). More recently, Reyes, Johnson and Van Swearingen (2002) found, based on Mexico’s 2000 census that 7 percent of those who emigrated to the U.S. two years prior to the survey returned to Mexico within the first six months and 11 percent had returned within a year (2002). Escobar Latapí and Martin (2006) report that, between 1997 and 2002, the percentage of migrants who returned to Mexico after three years was about 46. Of course, many immigrants return following longer stays as well.

A large number of migrants do not return home at all, opting to settle permanently in the host country instead. Of these, many remain in contact with friends and family who remain in the home country via telephone, the Internet and letters; temporary visits to the homeland; investment or remittances. The fact that such transactions are not face-to-face and the expense of long-distance communication could limit the range of subjects migrants wish to raise or have time discuss with non-migrants; these constraints could also diminish the quality of communication. Still, long-distance cross-border social transactions permit non-migrants to learn about foreign beliefs and practices from members of their referent group who they hold in high regard. There is evidence that the content of cross-border communication includes information about both American and

Mexican politics, including differences between the political practices and values of the two countries.[12] Based on the 2006 Mexican Expatriate Study, McCann, Cornelius, and Leal (2007), find that the percentage of Mexicans living in the U.S. who claimed to follow the 2006 Mexican elections was equal to or greater than the percentage living in Mexico (p. 153). More significantly, between 15 and 20 percent of immigrants reported discussing Mexican politics with friends and family at least a few times per week (p. 154).

The intensity of long-distance cross-border communication varies. Waldinger (2008) finds that about one-in-ten Latino immigrants engages in communication, return visits, and remittances, while 63 percent engage in at least one of these activities. A survey conducted by the Inter-American Dialogue in 2003-2004, which assesses the frequency of contact between immigrants in the U.S. and people back home, reports that 28 percent of Mexicans travel home at least once a year, 73 percent make calls to relatives in Mexico at least once a week, and 82 percent of those phone calls last more than twenty minutes (Orozco, Lowell, Bump, & Fedewa, 2005). These data suggest that cross-border communication is sustained and significant.

3.2.4 Non-Migrants as Adopters

The democratization process that preceded Mexico's historic 2000 presidential elections involved the gradual dissolution of the corporatist apparatus that underpinned the PRI's dominance (Collier, 1992; Teichman, 1992, 1997). Prior to the 1980s, Mexicans channeled their demands to leaders via corporatist organizations centrally managed from the top down by the ruling party (see e.g., Collier & Collier, 1991). The PRI's corporate structure grew to encompass not only peasants and workers, but also the military, and the growing

[12] This dissertation provides additional evidence concerning the content of long-distance cross-border social transactions in Chapter 5.

urban middle class. For decades, sustained economic growth permitted the PRI to address popular demands and maintain legitimacy by channeling participation—including the claims of dissidents and leaders— into mass organizations through patronage, social spending and cooptation. The debt crisis of the 1970s and 80s and neoliberal economic policies adopted in the 90s made it more difficult for the ruling party to afford these practices and in turn contributed to disrupting well-established patterns of state-society relations (Greene, 2007).

As PRI-sanctioned corporatist channels broke down, citizens began to seek other ways to express their needs to the government or to meet them autonomously. Most notably, citizens' organizations emerged both inside and outside of PRI-sanctioned channels with a view to increasing citizen participation, pressuring government officials through mass mobilizations, running candidates for local office, advocating for specific legislative initiatives, monitoring elections, and promoting human rights (Aguayo Quezada, 1998; Collier, 1999; Foweraker, 1993; Harvey, 1994, 1998; Shefner, 2001; Tavera, 1999). This move from participation via corporatism to civic participation via other more democratic means from occurred alongside the institutional changes that ultimately led to Mexico's democratic transition and culminated with Vicente Fox's historic victory.

Although Mexico's transition to an electoral democracy is widely viewed as successful, elections, alone, have not sufficed to effectively channel citizen demands and hold leaders accountable. Elections have failed to address the critical problems associated with rapid urbanization, domestic and international migration, increasing crime rates, corruption, persistently weak rates of economic growth, and worsening public health and education services.

These problems have sharpened citizens' claims, yet levels of civic engagement in Mexico remain relatively low. Mexicans have fairly low levels of social trust; they show little faith in democratic ideals, and moderate confidence in political institutions (Norris, 2002). Participatory behavior is also limited. In 2006, only 10 percent of Mexican citizens reported attending an open town

meeting, a lower percentage of citizens than seven other Latin American countries, including the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Peru, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Haiti, and El Salvador (Parás & Coleman, 2006). Mexico has little participation in protest politics and demonstrations (Norris, 2002). Likewise the rate of informal participation through the community to resolve a local problem is about 30 percent, surpassing only those of Bolivia, Panama, and Nicaragua in Latin America (Parás & Coleman, 2006).

At the same time, Mexicans have a growing interest in improving the quality of their democracy. Mexico's citizens have a predominantly normative understanding of democracy (Parás & Coleman, 2006). They are highly critical of their own political system, yet they aspire to live in a democracy characterized by freedom of speech, liberty, equality, the right to choose one's leaders, and an effective system of elections (Moreno & Méndez, 2003, Norris, 2002; Parás & Coleman, 2006).

3.3 Evaluating Migrant-Driven Democratic Diffusion: Data and Methods

Migrants who absorb new democratic beliefs and behaviors in the host country subsequently transfer them to people in their country of origin via two pathways: returns and long-distance cross-border communications. Are these trans-state social transactions sufficient to set diffusion among "ordinary citizens" in motion? Put differently, do these transactions contribute to changes in the political beliefs and behaviors of those who stay behind? If so, does the manner in which they influence change conform to the expectations that rational choice, bounded rationality, or constructivist approaches generate?

To reprise, rational choice theory suggests that these conditions are sufficient as long as the foreign beliefs and behaviors are effective in the context of Mexican political institutions. Non-migrants will embrace the information sent by migrants currently living abroad, because migrants' personal attributes indicate that, on average, they are relatively more knowledgeable and reliable

individuals with whom non-migrants close to them share interests. The information, advice, and ideas they share via social interactions are therefore worthy of following as a means to meet one's interests. Return migrants, in turn, will import those practices and beliefs of their more democratic neighbors that they consider effective. Having seen that civic engagement produces democratic goods in the U.S., they will be eager to import and replicate this in their home country. Moreover, returnees should be particularly persuasive because they are especially well placed to adapt foreign practices and ideas to Mexican specificities. Only if rational migrants believe that U.S. style political beliefs and behaviors are infeasible in the Mexican context will they reject importation. In this case, we would not expect non-migrants communicating with friends and family to adopt the foreign innovations either.

According to bounded rationality, migrants make it possible for non-migrants residing in Mexico to have "easy access" to information about American political behaviors and beliefs. We should expect returnees to be strongly influenced by their experience abroad, precisely because nothing is more compelling than firsthand experience with a well functioning democracy. Their impression of how effectively some beliefs and behaviors produce the goods of democracy should persuade them that the U.S. model is worth emulating; it will limit their (already weak) incentives for exploring the modes of participation in other countries. Social transactions between migrants who have or continue living in the U.S. and Mexican who have never left Mexico make American style democracy particularly available, relative to other countries, because nearly all Mexican emigrants move to the U.S. The fact that the beliefs and behaviors originate in the more economically and politically powerful U.S. should be sufficient to make them attractive to potential adopters. Because individuals tend to be cognitively lazy, these factors will encourage non-migrant Mexicans to embrace the beliefs and behaviors of which they learn regardless of their proven

merits in the Mexican context; they will adopt without careful consideration under the assumption that they will work in Mexico too.

Constructivists envision the international diffusion of democratic norms and models from more advanced, industrialized democracies (or international organizations in which such countries exercise significant power) to less-developed ones. They predict that returnees and migrants who stay in the U.S. and fully embrace American political beliefs and values will actively work to spread them at home. Their conviction that these new beliefs and practices conform to a set of normatively superior, more democratic values will not waver, even when they introduce them into the Mexican context. In other words, even if the foreign political attitudes and practices do not appear to be effective in Mexico, migrants will persistently practice them simply because they believe in their underlying ideas. For the same reason, both types of migrants will seek to transform the beliefs and behaviors of their co-nationals who have not migrated.

How do the outcomes produced by migrant-driven international diffusion in the case of Mexico compare to the theoretical expectations that each of these approaches suggests? Are there outcomes that these approaches fail to clarify?

3.3.1 Research Method

This section evaluates whether trans-state social transactions affect the political attitudes and behaviors of Mexican citizens living in Mexico. Specifically, I explore the effects of such transactions effects on three political attitudes (or beliefs): tolerance, satisfaction with Mexico's democracy and evaluations of government respect for rights; and four behaviors: voting, individual non-electoral political activity, participation in organizations, and unobtrusive forms of protest. I estimate a separate model for each of the seven attitudes and behaviors. I observe differences in these attitudes and behaviors between people who have not migrated, but have friends and family living in the U.S.; individuals who have

returned after living in the U.S. as migrants; and individuals with no ties to migration at all.

I evaluate the hypotheses using multi-level linear and logistic regressions. Multi-level models are used when data are structured into two or more levels, or units of analysis. In this case a multi-level model is appropriate because I evaluate both individual-level (individual migrant returns and individuals' communication with friends and family abroad) and aggregate-level variables (municipal-level migration flows). For a detailed explanation of the data structure and models, consult Appendix A.

Most of the data for this statistical analysis come from Desencanto Ciudadano en México. (See Appendix A for details on sample and data structure.) I also draw on publicly available data collected in 2000 by Mexico's National Institute of Geographic Statistics and Information (INEGI) and the country's National Population Council (Conapo).

Ideally, determining whether migrants adopt and transmit political beliefs and practices would involve a dual-sited panel survey of migrants taken before they leave the country of origin, during their stay in the host country, and after their return (Fitzgerald, 2006; Glick-Schiller & Levitt, 2004). As many scholars have argued, we measure change most effectively by observing outcomes over time (Diggle, Heagerty, Liang, & Zeger, 2002). Additionally, because I focus on a process involving social relationships, it would be ideal to follow specific cross-border interactions between migrants and non-migrants. The first strategy is nearly impossible to implement in practice, because migration decisions are contingent and highly unpredictable. Respondents might never engage in some or any of these international movements, or each decision might take years to undertake. Another challenge facing both strategies is that most migration from Mexico to the U.S. is clandestine; this makes it difficult to 'follow' migrants over time as they move across borders and to participate in their social lives on both sides of the border. The second method privileges the examination of small

samples, and precludes obtaining a national random sample of individual respondents, but one of my goals is to understand the significance and magnitude of migrant-led international diffusion at the national level.

This chapter adopts the best possible approach given these limitations. It observes differences in political beliefs and behavior in a single setting—the country of origin—across the distinct groups of interest. I ask individuals who have migrated and returned about the international aspects of their lives and their current practices and beliefs in Mexico. I draw on information about long-distance cross-border relations that non-migrants living in Mexico provide. The analysis measures change cross-sectionally, at a fixed point in time by comparing groups with distinct migration experiences.

3.3.2 Dependent Variables: Political Attitudes and Behaviors

The analysis examines the effects of trans-state social transactions on political attitudes and behaviors observable among Mexican nationals living in Mexico. I focus on attitudes widely considered "essential" among mass publics in order for democracy to flourish and endure. The behaviors I assess include individual and collective political participation that attempts to influence public decision-making and hold leaders accountable.

Attitudes. The attitudes I examine include tolerance, satisfaction with democracy, and evaluations of the government's respect for rights. Tolerance is perhaps the most fundamental requisite of democracy. It is also an attitude that is relatively weak among Mexican citizens as compared with Americans. Democracies allow and protect political differences and other disagreements among citizens (Dahl 1971, Huntington 1984). A healthy practice of tolerance among citizens abets official tolerance. Conversely, when intolerant citizens translate their prejudices into law or seize power themselves, the result is often violent suppression of dissent. My operationalization of tolerance comprises three facets: politics, religion, and sexual orientation. Respondents were asked to

agree or disagree on a five-point scale with the statements that “a democracy guarantees the right for all social groups to protest peacefully”, “government policy should reflect the religious beliefs of the majority” (tolerant citizens disagreed with this statement), and “gays and lesbians have the right to organize public marches.” The overall tolerance score averaged the answers to these three items.

This project also considers “critical citizens” vital to a healthy democracy (Norris, 1999). Citizen satisfaction with democracy represents an evaluation of public institutions, officials and their performance. Satisfaction does not have to be high in order for democracy to flourish. In fact critical citizens may be essential to holding leaders accountable and improving a country’s democratic institutions. Indeed established democracies abound with citizens who at times condemn policies, politicians, organizations, and laws quite vociferously but never waver in their support of democratic principles. To measure satisfaction with democracy, I use an item commonly used in cross-national public opinion work, “How satisfied are you with democracy in [Mexico]?” The five response categories range from “not at all” to “very”, with a neutral midpoint. This item is a summary indicator of overall satisfaction that comprehends a wide range of democracy’s constituent elements, including incumbents, policy outputs, political and economic performance, and democratic institutions and principles (Clarke, Dutt, & Kornberg, 1993).

Assessments of how well a government protects the political and social rights of its citizens are one important component of satisfaction with democracy, and also reflect citizens’ underlying commitment to tolerance. The issue is particularly important to the case of Mexico, where organizations such as Reporters without Borders (RSF), Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (HRW) have recently intensified their criticism of Mexico’s human rights record despite the country’s transition to an electoral democracy.

For assessments of government adherence to political and human rights standards, I include two survey items that asked respondents to agree or disagree, also on a five-point scale, with the statements that the federal government and state governments “respect people’s rights”. These items correlated at .77, so I took their average as an indicator of respondents’ general assessment of how rights are faring under Mexican democracy.

Behaviors. I examine four types of political behaviors (participation): voting, individual non-electoral political activity, participation in organizations, and protest. There is a marked difference in the degree to which Americans and Mexicans engage in each of these actions; Mexican participation rates are consistently lower. This is significant given that greater participation contributes to improving the quality of democracy by strengthening representative linkages between citizens and policy-makers and holding the latter accountable for their decisions. Democracy is more likely to thrive when citizens are well informed about issues of the day, are interested in politics, and participate actively in the political process (Almond & Verba, 1989; Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993).

Although modern democracies offer and require “a variety of competitive processes and channels for the expression of interests and values” (Karl & Schmitter, 1991, p. 78), most conceptions of democracy concur that the sine qua non of political participation is voting. Schumpeter argued that structured, regular voting was sufficient to make peaceful competition among leaders possible (1943). Rousseau argued that electoral participation, alone, could ensure that the benefits and burdens of policy outcomes would be equally shared; only if everyone voted could we ensure that “political equality is made effective in the decision-making assembly” (Pateman, 1976: p. 23). There are numerous conditions that can render elections insufficient to peacefully channel the public’s interest into leadership and policy choices. However imperfect electoral processes may be, voting is the only form of participation that is absolutely necessary and can also be sufficient for the realization of just and equitable

political competition. The indicator of electoral participation I use in this study is a dummy variable that accounts for individuals' self-reported participation in the 2000 presidential elections and 2003 mid-term elections. Respondents received a 1 on this indicator if they claimed to have participated in either of these elections.

In addition to voting, individuals have several non-electoral means at their disposal to seek resolution of private problems, communicate their preferences to policy-makers, and influence fellow citizens. The indicator I use for such individual, non-electoral political activity is a dummy variable scored as 1 if a citizen engaged in at least one of these activities in the three years prior to the survey: signed a complaint, wrote a letter to the editor, called in to a political radio or TV program, wrote the president or another elected authority, handed out political flyers, or put up a campaign sign at their house.

Citizens also organize groups to advance interests they hold in common. Some are explicitly political, others not, but even participation in non-political groups gives citizens self-confidence and organizational skills that may be readily transferred to the political arena (Putnam, 1995). Respondents received a value of 1 on this organizational participation dummy variable if, at the time of the survey, they participated, at least "occasionally", in parties or other political associations, human rights groups, civic organizations, unions, cooperatives, or peasant, religious, professional, neighborhood, women's, or environmental organizations.

Frequently, citizens perceive that channeling demands through traditional representative institutions fails to get results, and they turn to more contentious forms of making claims on the political system. This study contemplates two: participation in marches or sit-ins. A respondent who undertook either of these actions in the three years before the survey received a score of 1 on the protest indicator.

3.3.3 Independent Variables: Trans-State Social Transactions

The Desencanto Ciudadano survey provides measures for the two migration-led paths of diffusion of interest: 1) a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent ever lived in the U.S.[13] 2) a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent communicates with friends or family who reside outside of Mexico.

Over six percent of respondents reported having lived in the U.S. and returned. Of these, most had stayed two years or more in the U.S. The most recent emigration had occurred within the last five years for nearly sixty percent of our sample. Returnees reported having a wide variety of experiences in the host country conducive to learning new political behaviors. Most notably, a full 43 percent either attended public school or had an immediate relative who was attending public school during the time that they were away, and 38 percent of returnees claimed to have utilized public libraries. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 below summarize these experiences.

Nearly half of the sample has friends or family outside of Mexico; of this, 93 percent (44 percent of the total sample) communicates with their migrant relations at least once a year. The mean frequency of communication is about once per month. 24 percent talk about politics, and 17 percent receive remittances. 109 respondents who reported speaking to friends and family

[13] I am confident that the survey effectively measures return migration. Migration takes many forms, including low- and high-skilled labor, forced, temporary, and permanent migration. It is possible that individuals who lived abroad and returned may not consider themselves migrants. For example, if asked, high-skilled individuals who resided in the U.S. for a four-year period of employment or education may not claim to have migrated; yet they fall into the theoretic purview of this study's subjects. By asking whether respondents "lived" outside of Mexico instead of whether they "migrated" to another country, I accounted more fully for the population of interest. Indeed, all respondents who indicated that they had resided in the U.S. had done so for no less than one year, a lapse of time that can hardly be confused with, say, an extended vacation.

abroad were men, while a full 177 were female.[14] About 40 percent of those reporting that they kept in contact with migrants abroad had completed secondary or some high school, while 16 percent had completed high school or studied beyond that level.

Table 3.2: Migrant Participation in U.S. Organizations

Type of Organization	% Who Participated
Church Organizations	23
Parent Organizations	3
Migrant Clubs (e.g., Hometown Associations)	9
Political or Citizen Organization	3
Neighborhood Organizations	3

Table 3.3: Returnees Use of U.S. Public Services

Type of Service	% Who Participated
Public Transportation	73
Public Library	38
Medical Services	68
Parks	70
Government Social Support	15
Self or Family Member Attended U.S. Public School	43

[14] Despite this difference, sex (an interaction term including the sex of the responded and the dummy indicating that they communicated with friends and family abroad) did not produce any statistically differences between with the respect to the outcomes I explore below.

The independent variables I evaluate are not mutually exclusive. Respondents may have lived in the U.S. and have family or friends in the U.S (11 percent), for example. However, by including each of them in the regression model, I isolate the effects of each type of migration experience.

3.3.4 Control Variables

There are other critical determinants of attitudes and behavior. To ensure that the effects of trans-state social transactions are not confounded with those of other possible causes, the models I test contain a number of control variables. These include two migration-driven factors, other international forces that may compete with migration as sources of international democratic diffusion, and various personal attributes and municipal-level characteristics known to influence political attitudes and behavior.

I control for two migration-driven phenomena. The first is remittances, or money sent from migrants abroad to family members back home. There is evidence to suggest that remittances affect the political behavior and attitudes of their recipients. However, these cash flows do not effect change by way of international diffusion. Rather, they represent a material resource that strengthens individuals vis-à-vis powerful state actors, encouraging them to vote for opposition parties (Merino, 2005; Kurtz, 2004), or hold local leaders accountable (Burgess, 2005). Remittances could also influence the political behavior of those who receive them via endogenous democratization if they reproduce the effects of modernization on a small scale by increasing receiving households' purchasing power, expenditures on education and health, and general standard of living (Boix & Stokes, 2003). Given the possibility that remittances might affect the outcomes of interests through processes quite distinct from diffusion, the model includes a control variable for those who receive money from migrants abroad. I estimate the yearly amount (in thousand-peso

units) by multiplying the frequency with which respondents reported receiving remittances times the average amount received per transfer.

The second migration-related control variable accounts for aggregate levels of migration in respondents' communities. This control is important because individuals who have neither migrated and returned nor have friends and family abroad may nonetheless be susceptible to foreign influences as a result of migration if they live in an area where migration is prevalent. Assessing whether diffusion via such indirect ties to migration occurs is certainly of interest, but not the central objective of this chapter. The model thus includes the Migration Intensity Index to control for the extent to which the entire municipality in which a respondent resides is affected by international migration. Mexico's National Population Council (Conapo) developed this index with data from the 1995-2000 Mexican census (Conapo, 2002a). It contains a factor score that projects four key municipal-level indicators of international migration onto a single, continuous index: 1) percentage of households who receive remittances, 2) percentage of households with one or more members residing outside of Mexico, 3) percentage of households with one or more members who have returned within the last five years after migrating internationally within the last five years, and 4) percentage of households with one or more members who have returned within the last five years after migrating internationally more than five years ago. The index ranges from -.87 to 2.58 with a median of -.40 in the sample.

The model includes two variables (aggregate- and individual-level, respectively) representing international forces other than migration that may give rise to changes in attitudes and behavior: 1) border residence, a dummy variable coded 1 if the municipality in which a respondent lives lies on the U.S.-Mexico border and 2) media access, a factor score summarizing how often respondents watch TV, listen to the radio, and read newspapers. Living on the border (de la Garza & Yetim, 2003) and consuming news and entertainment (Held, McGrew,

Goldblatt, & Perraton, 1999) both expose Mexicans, including those with no migration experience, to value systems of other countries—especially the United States, which dominates international news coverage in Mexico.

I include four personal attributes shown by existing research to influence the outcomes of interest: gender, age, education, and income. There is empirical evidence that age and gender influence attitudes and behavior, too. In Mexico (and other new democracies), older survey respondents are more participative and tend to be less critical of their country's democracy, since they have direct memories of the prior political regime. Gender shapes attitudes and behaviors to the extent that it conditions access to politics, including information and discussions about politics and decision-making in the political system itself. Individual resources, including income and education, influence both political attitudes and behaviors. As a material resource, income may shape an individual's ability to influence public decisions, and people with higher incomes may have more time to participate politically. Additionally, higher income earners may be more satisfied with democracy simply because they are relatively more satisfied with their lives. Education gives citizens both the cognitive skills and knowledge that enable them to participate meaningfully in politics.

Furthermore, the model contains two aggregate level control variables: the population of the municipality in which respondents reside and a municipal-level index of economic marginalization (Conapo, 2002b). Each of these might also exert effects on political attitudes and behavior. Urban populations are typically more informed and politically active, and are likelier to participate in civic organizations and protests. In contrast, marginalized municipalities have fewer resources to participate politically and their opportunities for learning about democracy are constrained. They are characterized by weak infrastructure, poor roads, and limited communications. Some municipalities do not have telephone communications at all, and many of the most marginalized municipalities have no secondary schools.

3.4 Migrant-Led International Diffusion: Results and Discussion

The results for each model appear in Tables 3.4 and 3.5. I find that in the case of return migrants, absorption and retention of U.S. culture moderately affected attitudes. Returnees are more tolerant and more critical of the Mexican government's record on rights than their counterparts who have never lived in another country; but the analysis indicated that having migrated and returned is not associated with changes in political behaviors.

In contrast, long-distance cross-border communication had a strong impact on political participation. Mexicans who communicate with migrants in the U.S. were much more politically engaged than those who do not know anyone living outside the country; they were more likely to have voted, more involved in individual political activity as well as civic organizations, and protest more. With respect to attitudes, however, cross-border communications had only a limited impact on the attitudes of non-migrants who communicated with friends or family living in the U.S.; specifically, they reduced satisfaction with Mexico's democracy among non-migrants. I offer more detailed interpretations of these results below.

The results suggest that communication between migrants and non-migrants produce more diverse and differentiated patterns of diffusion than expected. Moreover, although the statistical analysis, alone, is inconclusive, it strongly suggests that rational choice and bounded rationality do not account for the patterns by which migrants diffuse political beliefs and behavior. The utility of constructivism remains in question; however the results indicate that behavioral and attitudinal norms do not flow unidirectionally from the more democratic U.S. to less democratic Mexico as most constructivists would predict. Finally, these results are surprising because they indicate that the two types of trans-state social transactions (long-distance cross-border communication and returns) do not have uniform effects.

Table 3.4 Multi-Level Linear Regressions of Belief Indicators on Migration Variables

(Cells Contain Parameters, SEs, and p-values)

	Tolerance	Satisfaction with Democracy	Evaluation of Govt. Respect for Rights
Migrated to U.S. and Returned	.263**	-.063	-.527**
	0.107	.227	.194
	(.015)	(.782)	(.007)
Communicates with	.022	-.314**	-.097
Migrant Friends or Family	.052	0.109	.093
	(.672)	(.004)	(.299)
Municipal Migration Intensity Index	.053	.076	-.017
	.060	.091	.076
	(.377)	(.407)	(.819)
Total Annual Remittances Received	.004	.000	-.006
(in thousands of pesos)	.003	.006	.005
	(.185)	(.954)	(.202)
Media Access	.125**	.156*	-.057
	.048	.101	.086
	.009	(.122)	-0.509
Sex	-.07	.170	.124
(Male = 1)	.051	.107	.092
	(.170)	(.112)	(.177)
Age	-.001	-.005	.002
	.002	.004	.003
	(.431)	(.183)	(.607)
Education	.023**	-.002	-.018
(in years of schooling)	.007	.015	.013
	(.002)	(.914)	(.180)
Income	.026	-.076	-.033
(in thousands of pesos)	.024	.048	.041
	(.280)	(.117)	(.418)
Population of Municipality	.000	-.001	-.002**
(in 10,000 inhabitants)	.001	.001	.001
	(.976)	(.467)	(.019)
Municipal marginalization index	-.053	-.139**	-.059
	.046	.071	.059
	(.249)	(.048)	(.322)
Municipality borders U.S. (dummy)	-.043	.141	.146
	.146	.210	.175
	(.771)	(.503)	(.403)
Constant	3.33	3.27	3.02
	.126	.248	.211
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
N	567	567	567
R2	.132	.037	.050
Log likelihood	---	---	---
Wald(12)	65	21.95	28.60
Pr(X2)	.000	.038	.004
Rho	.130	.013	.007

**Statistically significant at p<.05 level; * statistically significant at p<.10 level.

Table 3.5 Multi-Level Logistic Regressions of Participation Indicators on Migration Variables

(Cells Contain Parameters, SEs, and p-values)

	Indiv. Non-Electoral Participation	Retrospective Vote (2000-2003)	Participation in organized protest	Participation in Organizations
Migrated to U.S. and Returned	-0.738	-0.813	.202	-.714
	0.683	.528	.609	.453
	(0.280)	(.123)	(.740)	(.115)
Communicates with	.888**	0.519*	.937**	.408*
Migrant Friends or Family	.304	0.294	.379	.216
	(.003)	(.078)	(.013)	(.060)
Municipal Migration Intensity Index	.281	0.025	.307	.560**
	.298	0.23	.267	.240
	(.346)	(.914)	(.250)	(.019)
Annual Remittances Received	.009	.012	.002	-.035
(in thousands of pesos)	.012	.001	.000	.023
	(.463)	(.271)	(.939)	(.133)
Media Access	.853**	.799**	1.136**	.665**
	.322	.244	.408	.207
	(.008)	(.001)	(.005)	(.001)
Sex	-.061	.034	.664*	-.262
(Male = 1)	.298	.280	.353	.213
	(.837)	(.902)	(.060)	(.217)
Age	.015	.027**	.026**	.027**
	0.011	.01	.012	.008
	(.168)	(.005)	(.034)	(.000)
Education	-.001	.09**	.046	.008
(in years of schooling)	.044	.040	.051	.031
	(.975)	(.025)	(.361)	(.787)
Income	.76**	-.079	.000	.077
(in thousands of pesos)	.000	.126	.000	.100
	(.042)	(.530)	(.722)	(.443)
Population of Municipality	.007**	-.003	-.001	-.002
(in 10,000 inhabitants)	.004	.003	.004	.003
	(.046)	(.190)	(.833)	(.534)
Municipal marginalization index	.276	.127	.424	.232
	.242	.174	.212	.182
	(.255)	(.463)	(.046)	(.202)
Municipality borders U.S. (dummy)	.430	.652	.337	.900
	.698	.529	.732	.578
	(.537)	(.218)	(.645)	(.119)
Constant	-3.844	.504	-4.75	-1.307
	.765	.619	.909	.539
	(.000)	(.416)	(.000)	(.015)
N	617	567	615	560
Log likelihood	-192.4	-202.17	-130.93	-344.59
Wald(12)	28.93	38.4	26.23	37.18
Pr(X2)	.004	.000	.001	.000
Rho	.178	.000	.041	.164

**Statistically significant at p<.05 level; * statistically significant at p<.10 level.

3.4.1 Effects of Emigrating and Returning

Having lived abroad and returned made respondents more tolerant of different religions, political views, and sexual orientations. The process led to an average difference of .262 on the five-point tolerance scale, equivalent to 7 percent of the dependent variable's range. Holding all other variables at their means, those who lived abroad had a mean tolerance score of 3.4 (the midpoint is 3), compared to 3.33 for those who had not. Similarly, returnees were generally less sanguine about Mexican federal and state governments' observance of rights, averaging .527 less on the rights scale (13 percent of the scale's range) than their counterparts who have never lived outside Mexico. Return migrants' average score was 2.48, a negative evaluation of the government's performance in this area, while the mean for those who never left fell right around 3.01, reflecting a more ambivalent attitude.

3.4.2 Effects of Long-Distance Cross-Border Communication

Communication with migrants in the U.S. greatly raised individuals' proclivity toward democratic participation. The log odds ratio of having voted in either the 2000 or 2003 elections was .519, meaning that the odds of having voted in either the 2000 or 2003 elections were 1.7 times higher among individuals engaged in this type of trans-state social transaction than in its absence. Additionally, the log odds ratio of engaging in some form of individual, non-electoral political participation was 0.888, meaning that the odds of this form of political participation were nearly two and a half times higher (2.43) for this group than for those who do not speak with family or friends abroad. If all other variables are held at their means, the friends and relatives of migrants had a 10.9 percent probability of participating non-electorally, compared to 4.8 percent.

The log odds ratio that respondents who communicate with family and friends abroad participate in at least one civic organization was .408, meaning

that the odds were one and a half times higher (1.51) than those for respondents who do not engage in such communication. The former group had a .47 chance of participating and the latter, a .37 probability. Additionally, the log odds ratio of participating in an organized protest was 0.937. This signifies that holding all other variables constant at their means, being in touch with friends and family abroad accounted for a 156 percent increase in the probability of participation in organized political protest.

Social transactions with someone in the U.S. also changed political attitudes. Those in touch with family or friends abroad were less satisfied with Mexican democracy than those who were not in contact with Mexicans living outside the country. On average, the former group scored .314 less on the five-point satisfaction scale (nearly 8 percent of the scale's range) than the latter. The mean scores for the two groups (holding all other variables constant at their means) were 2.94, below the midpoint of 3, and 3.26, respectively.

3.4.3 Rational Choice, Bounded Rationality, or Constructivism?

Does rational choice, bounded rationality, or constructivism help us understand these outcomes? This section evaluates the results with respect to each of these theoretical approaches discussed in Chapter 2. My objective is to determine whether the theoretical perspectives support the empirical outcomes that the statistical analysis generates. I begin with rational choice and conclude with constructivism, assessing the validity of each perspective with respect to returns and cross-border communication in turn. Because the present large-N analysis is insufficient to fully evaluate the nature of migrant-led international diffusion, I limit the discussion to eliminating rival explanations and identifying aspects about migrant-led international diffusion in the case of Mexico cannot be understood without further qualitative research. Chapters 4 and 5 aim to address these gaps in our understanding.

Rational Choice Theory. When rational migrants resettle in Mexico they should continue to practice the beliefs and behaviors they learned in the U.S., if they believe such actions and beliefs are also valuable and effective in Mexico. Alternatively, rational return migrants could fail to import new beliefs and behaviors if they did not learn any during their time in the U.S. Finally while rational choice purists would hold that inconsistent beliefs and behaviors are irrational, most rational choice scholars would argue that there are conditions under which rational actors can hold beliefs that do not conform to their actions.

We require significant additional data to determine whether migrant-led international diffusion conforms to rational choice theory, because the statistical analysis produces a mixed set of results. These show that returnees do not import new political behaviors at all. They also indicate that the political beliefs of returnees differ from those of Mexicans who have never migrated.

We lack conclusive evidence concerning whether the failure to import behaviors is due to their ineffectiveness or because migrants did not learn while abroad. The fact that returnees did obtain new political beliefs suggests that, on average, significant learning did take place in the U.S., however. The analysis does not provide sufficient information to determine whether returnees' importation of beliefs is a rational decision. But, given that rational choice is highly utilitarian, it is difficult to envision how the importation of beliefs without corresponding behaviors could be rational.

The rational explanation for the inconsistency between behaviors and beliefs is that individuals want to protect their status as people who are seen as worth emulating. Individuals (members of the mass public) turn to persons they perceive as knowledgeable, skilled and successful in order to make decisions about politics. Another key attribute individuals look for in selecting "opinion leaders" is that they be individuals with whom they share values and objectives. We saw earlier that migrants are both self selected and selected from the household precisely because they possess these qualities.

A return migrant who imports and diffuses foreign values and behaviors could place their role as an “opinion leader” at risk. To prevent such consequences rational returnees could publicly downplay their new beliefs and behaviors. They privately hold their new attitudes after crossing the border into Mexico and avoid engaging in new political behaviors entirely. We would expect such migrants to return to their pre-migration patterns of civic engagement to maintain their social status as “opinion leaders”.

Qualitative research should focus on examining why returnees fail to import new political behaviors even as they import beliefs. Do returnees fail to learn new behaviors while abroad? Or do they abandon their new behaviors when they return home? How do returnees’ political beliefs and behaviors change as they move back from to the U.S. and back into Mexico? Furthermore, the qualitative research must assess whether returnees transmit to non-migrants their new beliefs they obtained in the U.S. and evaluate how non-migrants respond to the innovations that returnees introduce.

Turning to non-migrants who communicate with friends or family living in the U.S., we find that they became significantly more participative, but experience limited attitudinal changes. The result could be consistent with a rational choice logic if the reasons that underlie the results are: (1) that U.S.-based migrants transmit participatory behaviors to non-migrants in Mexico because they believe they can be effective in Mexico, and (2) that non-migrants follow the lead of migrants abroad because they perceive the latter as highly knowledgeable, capable and successful individuals with whom they share core interests.

If both conditions hold, then the limited attitudinal changes observed among non-migrants with cross-border social ties is puzzling. If the reason underlying this outcome is simply that migrants in the U.S. choose not to share with non-migrants the political beliefs of Americans, then we cannot reject rational choice theory. Explaining beliefs might simply be too complicated from a

distance, for instance. However if non-migrants' consciously reject the beliefs that migrants convey while simultaneously embracing the behaviors, then the inconsistency suggests that the diffusion process does not follow a rational choice logic.

We require additional evidence to determine whether U.S.-based migrants to transmit information concerning both American political beliefs and behaviors, and to explain their motivations for transmitting. The statistical evidence is insufficient to assess how non-migrants respond to the innovations that returnees introduce as compared to those transmitted by U.S.-based migrants. Qualitative research should assess why non-migrants embrace foreign political behaviors as effective democratic participation strategies, while returnees fail to import and diffuse new behaviors. If we are to accept a rational choice explanation, we must identify what motivates non-migrants who engage in cross-border communication to participate more; and we must reconcile these findings with data explaining returnees' failure to increase their rates of participation.

Bounded Rationality. The results of the statistical analysis are inconsistent with bounded rationality. The approach suggests that returnees should be highly likely to import U.S. political beliefs and behaviors since those are the examples of effective democratic civic engagement with which they are most familiar. For returnees with an interest in improving their country's democracy, the American model should be not only the most available, but also the most compelling. Return migrants' direct experience with U.S. political and economic products should be sufficient to have persuaded them that they can also serve to improve the quality of democracy in Mexico. Furthermore, we would expect non-migrants to encourage returnees to share with them the political practices and attitudes they learned abroad. To do so would represent a highly economical strategy, on the part of non-migrants, for resolving a domestic political problem with relatively little cognitive effort.

Another finding that is at odds with bounded rationality is that returnees import only beliefs, while non-migrants principally learn behaviors. Bounded rationality does not offer a coherent account for this uneven outcome. On one hand, it is possible that returnees learn behaviors with greater ease than they do attitudes; the former are more amenable to simple emulation. But this logic jars with returnees' proclivity for importing beliefs; if anything, we would expect this group to import easily replicable behaviors.

Constructivism. Assessing whether constructivism is a useful approach for explaining migrant-driven diffusion is more challenging. In so far as constructivists see democratic norms and models flowing from more advanced, industrialized democracies (or international organizations in which such countries exercise significant power) to less-developed ones, the findings in this chapter seem to be inconsistent with the approach. However, as I explained in Chapter 2, there exists a growing body of scholars that argues that beliefs held intersubjectively at the local level can stop or modify "superior" foreign norms that flow into a country. The statistical findings leave open the possibility that migrant-led international diffusion follows this type of constructivist logic. We need qualitative data to determine whether collectively held ideas about what is appropriate are at work at all, and if so, to specify the specific nature of these intersubjective beliefs.

Because returnees do not import American political behaviors—meaning that their own actions do not change to reflect whatever new behaviors they may have embraced or observed abroad—we cannot conclude that shared beliefs about democracy in the U.S. were powerful enough to overcome the beliefs and behaviors that migrants previously held. Their failure to introduce new political behaviors into Mexico also signifies that the norms and beliefs that underlie U.S. political practices were not compelling enough to persuade returnees to proselytize them in their home country. The outcomes I uncover, based on the statistical analysis with respect to returnees' political behaviors, therefore clearly

challenge the dominant constructivist perspective on international diffusion, which sees democracy flowing from more to less advanced democracies in a uniform and unidirectional pattern.

It is possible that returnees' failure to import behaviors is nonetheless attributable to the presence of shared beliefs in Mexico that conflict with American norms of democratic citizenship enough to discourage returnees from introducing them into their home country. If so, then a less conventional interpretation of constructivism might well account for the forces that drive migrant-led diffusion. Qualitative evidence that explores why migrants do not import new political behaviors (if they learned any at all) is necessary to flesh out this possibility. Furthermore, this type of explanation requires that we better understand the collective beliefs in Mexico that could be influencing the diffusion process.

After they re-enter Mexico, returnees do appear to retain the more democratic values they embraced in the U.S. This finding could be consistent with the prevailing constructivist understanding of diffusion if we find that migrants chose to retain these values because they consider them normatively superior. Even if returnees actively promote foreign political beliefs, non-migrant Mexican citizens may reject externally provided innovations if they do not conform to their local practices and norms. For instance, if local norms include hostility towards minorities and acceptance of violations of their rights, migrants may be unable to affect change with respect to tolerance for religious, sexual and political differences either via return migrants or via long-distance cross-border transactions. Thus any conclusions concerning the pertinence of constructivism merits an exploration of non-migrants' responses to the foreign understandings of democracy that return migrants introduce. We need more evidence to assess whether returnees' commitment to their new beliefs also leads them to actively persuade people back home of their inherent value. This is not possible with the

large-N data I collected via the Desencanto survey, because the survey does not ask returnees about their interactions with non-migrants.

Based on the statistical analysis alone, I do not conclude that long-distance cross-border ties between migrants who remain in the U.S. and non-migrants unambiguously contribute to diffusion in ways consistent with constructivist theory, either. Such social transactions strongly influence political behaviors, while weakly influencing democratic attitudes. It is possible that the information that stayers transmit about political life in the U.S. contribute to modifying non-migrants shared understandings and beliefs about democracy among non-migrants, and that these, in turn, influence changes in their participatory behavior; but the fact that those ideas do not also influence democratic attitudes is puzzling. Again, if we are to accept a constructivist explanation, additional data is required to identify a coherent set of intersubjective beliefs that account for the paradoxical and uneven nature of the results observed based on the statistical analysis.

Taken together, the evidence that the large-N statistical analysis produced with respect to both returns and cross-border social transactions suggests that we cannot rule out a constructivist explanation of migrant-led international diffusion. Nonetheless, the findings suggest that migrant-driven diffusion does not conform to the patterns of conventional constructivist arguments, which see ideas flowing from international structures to domestic actors, and from advanced to less developed democracies. However, it is possible that local intersubjective beliefs condition the outcomes I observe in other, more varied ways.

3.4.4 Unexpected Uneven Results

The results are unexpectedly uneven on two dimensions. First, and most importantly, it is somewhat counterintuitive that long-distance cross-border communications do not simply produce the same effects as returns, but with a lesser magnitude. Second, it is puzzling that beliefs and behaviors do not co-

vary. These observations are significant beyond our evaluations of what theoretical approach best characterizes the diffusion process.

Returns and long-distance cross-border communication do not uniformly affect any one dependent variable. Returns give rise to changes in precisely those outcomes that cross-border communication does not, and vice versa. This result challenges the assumption that long-distance cross-border ties and social links between returnees involve the same type of social transaction with different degrees of intensity. Under this assumption, we would expect that if migration should contribute to strengthening democratic beliefs and behaviors in the home country at all, then these effects should be strongest as a result of return migration. This is to be expected since returnees experienced political life in the U.S. firsthand and can share their observations and experiences in that country with family and friends in Mexico face-to-face when they return. It is therefore surprising that communication with friends and family abroad leads to greater political participation, while having emigrated and returned does not. A full account of migrant-led international diffusion warrants further exploration of this paradoxical finding.

Migration does not appear to affect uniform changes in both political beliefs and behaviors. This is in contrast with the long-standing proposition that attitudes influence behavior. The outcome signifies that rational choice theory, in its strictest sense, does not adequately account for the migrant-led diffusion process; otherwise attitudes would accurately reflect beliefs, intentions would accurately reflect attitudes, and behaviors would accurately reflect intentions (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1977). That is, individuals' attitudes would underpin their utility-maximizing behavior. Moreover, as attitudes change, so would behaviors, since attitudes comprise some of the new information that shapes an individual's reasoned decision about his actions (Eagly & Chaiken, 1998).

Political behavior scholars have also observed that attitudes and behaviors do not necessarily co-vary, however (Ajzen, & Fishbein, 1977; Krysan,

1998; Wicker, 1969). One explanation for their dissonance is that the processes by which attitudes and behaviors change could involve modifications in one prior to the other; nonetheless, because people are naturally averse to having dissonant beliefs and behavior, the two will become aligned over time (Festinger, 1964). Another possibility is that that the attitudes that underlie the democratic behaviors I evaluate require significantly less effort to learn than do the more abstract beliefs about democracy I explore.

3.5 Conclusion

The optimal conditions for migrant-led international diffusion are in place in the case of the U.S. and Mexico. However, observations of the political beliefs and behaviors of Mexicans who have emigrated to the U.S. and then returned permanently to Mexico, and of non-migrant Mexicans who communicate with their co-nationals living abroad, indicate that diffusion does not produce the expected outcomes. Trans-state social transactions linking migrants with new beliefs and behaviors to non-migrants with an interest in improving the quality of their democracy are insufficient to produce diffusion uniformly. Though further evidence is necessary, the large-N statistical analysis, despite being a first-cut at understanding migrant-led international diffusion suggests that none of the approaches unambiguously account for the results; however, we need additional evidence to rule out rational choice explanations, and it is possible that shared beliefs shape these outcomes in a fashion consistent with constructivism's broad tenets, but inconsistent with its dominant view of norms as flowing from political entities that are located higher up in the international hierarchy—so to speak—to those that are located at lower levels (Risse, 2007).

We must explore these various puzzles in greater depth. Some next steps are to utilize qualitative data to explore differences between what return migrants and U.S.-based migrants learn in the U.S. The following chapters evaluate return migrants' motivations for importing new political beliefs, while leaving new

political behaviors behind. If they fail to learn behaviors, why do they learn beliefs? If they face constraints on behavior when they re-enter Mexico, why do these constraints not affect the importation of beliefs? Alternatively, if migrants have evidence that U.S. behaviors are ineffective in Mexico, how do their understandings of the value of American political beliefs differ? Finally, how do Mexican norms and beliefs influence migrants propensity to share and hence these uneven outcomes?

Chapters 4 and 5 also examine why non-migrants who are in touch with Mexicans residing in the U.S. participate more, yet do not learn new attitudes. Do non-migrants respond to persuasive arguments in favor of foreign forms of participation provided by a trusted, more able, skilled and successful co-national living abroad, as rational choice predicts? If so, then why do they fail to embrace new political attitudes?

The uneven results suggest that we should pay more attention to the object and international context of diffusion. Specifically, we should consider the possibility that beliefs versus behaviors travel across borders in different ways. Additionally, although returns and long-distance cross-border transactions appear to be two sides of the same coin, the findings suggest that we should take their differences seriously. Does the fact that one set of migrants communicates from within Mexico while another transmits from outside matter? The findings suggest that long-distance social transactions consistently produce one set of effects, while returns uniformly give rise to another. It is possible that a migrants' location, either at home in Mexico or abroad in the U.S. is therefore a key variable that sets in motion two distinct diffusion processes.

CHAPTER 4: RETURN MIGRANTS, THE WEAKEST LINK

4.1 Introduction

The large-N statistical analysis presented in Chapter 3 indicates that Mexicans who return permanently to Mexico after emigrating to the U.S. import the more democratic beliefs they learned and embraced in the U.S.; however, they do not import new political behaviors. The result is puzzling in various respects. First, it implies that the three conditions thought to impel migrant-led international diffusion: (1) the presence of Mexican migrants capable of transmitting to Mexico the democratic beliefs and behaviors they learned in the U.S.; (2) the demand for a higher quality of democracy among Mexicans living in Mexico; and, (3) the ongoing trans-state social transactions between migrants and non-migrants that serve as channels through which migrants' transmit their new experiences with democracy, are not sufficient to uniformly change the political beliefs and behaviors of returnees. Second, the changes in (or absence of) political beliefs and behaviors to which emigrating and then returning gives rise seem to be inconsistent with the expectations generated by rational choice, bounded rationality, and constructivism.

We cannot fully comprehend how returnees contribute to the diffusion of American political beliefs and behaviors based on the statistical analysis alone, however, because the data set it employs lacks information both about returnees' interactions with non-migrant Mexicans and about how non-migrants receive returnees and any foreign ideas they convey. We require observations of a different nature to understand if migrants fail to import to Mexico the political behaviors they learn in the U.S. because they know such actions will be ineffective in the context of the country of origin, or if another force (e.g., shame, disinterest, fear) motivates their decision. Additional data can also help us determine whether returnees impart to their friends and family in Mexico the new beliefs that they import, and, if not, what stops them.

To address these questions, this chapter draws on a set of in-depth interviews with return migrants, non-migrants who are in contact with returnees, and the local leaders of various municipalities from which large numbers of individuals emigrate. The core objective is to find the best explanation for the surprising results observed among returnees, and to systematically eliminate rival accounts. I begin by evaluating whether returnees simply do not learn new democratic beliefs and behaviors while they are abroad. I find that migrants who return from the U.S. to Mexico generally learn both American political beliefs and behaviors, and therefore reject the possibility that a systematic failure to learn new beliefs and behaviors is the underlying reason why returnee political participation is no different or less intense than that of Mexicans who have never left Mexico.

Subsequently, I assess why returnees nonetheless leave the behaviors they learn at the border. Is the decision consistent with either rational choice or constructivist theoretical perspectives? Chapter 3 found that rational choice, bounded rationality, and constructivism do not clearly account for migrant-driven diffusion. This tentative conclusion is based solely on what we can infer from the large-N statistical analysis. The qualitative field work that I report in this chapter reveals that return migrants fail to diffuse political beliefs and behaviors for reasons that conform to a modified constructivist argument.

Although returnees who learn new behaviors in the U.S. are generally interested in improving the quality of democracy in Mexico and believe that American-style participation could effectively contribute to this end, they do not effectively introduce these innovations in their home communities. Their failure to do so is neither because the foreign practices and beliefs are incompatible with the laws and rules that govern political participation in Mexico nor because they are dangerously costly. Instead, the forces that hinder them are the shared attitudes of non-migrants towards migrants who return from the U.S.

Non-migrant Mexicans have a somewhat negative view of return migrants. They are perceived as relatively unproductive and having an exaggerated sense of their own importance as a result of the resources they gained abroad. Non-migrants believe that the U.S. experience “changes people” for the worse, making them think they can resolve any problem on their own now, particularly if they were able to save and bring home dollars. Most non-migrants do not want to attend to returnees once they are no longer in danger, at a distance, alone, or sending home remittances; they believe returnees ought to adapt to their situation at home again. Even without considering what their co-nationals have to share, non-migrants consider that migrants who return no longer offer any unique pathway to improving their lives.

These attitudes reflect the more general sentiments that Mexicans feel toward the U.S. and U.S.-Mexico relations. Specifically, they reflect Mexico’s documented tradition of defining itself in comparison with other states and cultures—particularly its dominant neighbor to the north (Fuentes, 1994; Morris, 2001, 2005; Paz, 1990; Ramos, 1963; Selee, 2005). This comparative self-definition causes Mexicans to see themselves and their country as weak, and leads them to feel schadenfreude whenever they see Americans or their country suffer. Rejecting migrants thus represents a way to reject the U.S.

The final substantive section of the chapter explores the conditions that make such soft constraints strong behavioral deterrents for returnees. I find that returnees lack the will to implement the behaviors they observed and learned abroad because they overestimate the extent to which the U.S. has a uniquely ideal context within which democratic participation produces effective outcomes, and because having migrated internationally attenuates returnees’ sense of membership in their Mexican community of origin. Together, these qualities dampen migrants’ will to engage in new forms of participation in their home communities once they run into rather limited forms of resistance.

In sum, migrants learn both new political beliefs and behaviors abroad, and they believe these forms of civic engagement could be effective in their home country. The reason migrants fail to import behaviors is not that they fail to learn any in the U.S. Nor is it because migrants believe such innovations would not contribute to strengthening the quality of democracy in Mexico. The obstacle to migrant-led international diffusion therefore does not arise from a rational choice logic. Instead, "soft" ideational constraints interfere with diffusion. Non-migrants' attitudes towards return migrants, and the latters' attitudinal response to the ideation context they re-enter impedes them from introducing the political beliefs and behaviors of the U.S. into Mexico. These findings are consistent with constructivism to the extent that they emphasize intersubjective beliefs and ideas about social life, while downplaying rational calculations that link causes and effects. However the intersubjective ideas at work concern migrants themselves, not the specific ideas about politics they have to share.

4.2 Data and Methods

In addition to the data obtained via the Desencanto Ciudadano en México survey, which I describe in Chapter 3, this chapter draws on information obtained via in-depth interviews of return migrants living in Mexico, friends and family of returnees and leaders of municipalities from which large numbers of people emigrate. I employ two distinct research methods: (1) fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative qualitative Analysis; (2) multi-level logistic and linear regressions.

4.2.1 Small-N Data

This chapter draws on information obtained from 99 semi-structured, in-depth interviews conducted in various states of Mexico throughout 2008. The interviews involve three different samples: 31 return migrants; 47 people who know returnees; and 18 leaders of communities to which large volumes of migrants return.

Small-N research is often utilized to explore macro-social phenomena for which only a limited number of cases exist. Return migrants and their friends and family are not limited in Mexico; however small-N research is appropriate for numerous reasons. First, creating two separate regionally or nationally random samples (one of return migrants and another of friends and family of migrants) that we could analyze with probabilistic statistical methods is practically impossible, because such individuals are difficult to identify. Data concerning the migrants who have resettled in Mexico after migrating is elusive, if not non-existent. Our knowledge of who returns, to what locations and for how long is extremely limited. Filling this lacuna would constitute a massive research project in and of itself. Second, conducting in-depth unstructured interviews with a nationally random sample of at least 100 each, of returnees, friends and family of returnees, and local leaders (in addition to the groups I interviewed for the analysis in Chapter 5) would be prohibitively expensive and time consuming. Finally, small-N research permits researchers to document actors' stories in greater detail, and this, in turn, helps us to explain processes more effectively.

In making broader inferences based on a small number of observations, careful sample selection is essential. Case selection "has the same twin objectives as random sampling; that is, one desires (1) a representative sample and (2) useful variation on the dimensions of theoretical interest" (Seawright and Gerring, 2008, p.3). By purposively selecting cases in light of the theoretical questions that interest us, we can enhance our ability to make inferences based on a small number of cases. I employed two distinct approaches to selecting interview respondents: the diverse case and extreme case methods. The former involves selecting as diverse a sample as possible along both independent and dependent variables of theoretical interest. In the latter cases are selected because they possess key theoretical characteristics that are well above or below the mean. I used the diverse case strategy to select returnee respondents

and their friends and family, and the extreme case approach to select the leaders.

My goal with respect to return migrants was to create a sample that was diverse along three dimensions: the personal attributes of respondents (age, education, English language skills, sex, and income); the conditions of their migration (immigration status, how they entered the country, whether they had a job lined up prior to arriving, the duration of their stay, etc.); and, the situation to which they returned (urban/rural, community with many return migrants/community with few, employed/unemployed, etc.). These dimensions may be associated with migrants' propensity to learn and adopt new political beliefs and behaviors in the U.S. (Bean, Brown, & Rumbaut, 2006); they contain characteristics that can contribute to their ongoing personal interest in Mexico and its politics (McCann, Cornelius, & Leal, 2007); and they may condition their capability to import changes. I also sought to ensure variation in the individual and community-level situations to which migrants return, because these may condition both migrants' levels of interest in importing change to their sending community and the receptiveness of non-migrants towards migrants. For example, a community from which few people emigrate might be more interested in the information a migrant provides because migration itself will be more of a novelty to them. This in turn may encourage migrants to import or share what they learned abroad, rather than discouraging them. See Appendix B for specific characteristics about the return migrants who participated in the in-depth interviews.

With respect to friends and family, I used paired samples where possible. In other words, I interviewed the friends and families of the return migrant respondents. However, I moved beyond using a paired sample in order to increase diversity on those dimensions known to influence individuals' political beliefs and participation in Mexico such as age, education, income, type of employment, and interest in politics. This simultaneously involved accounting for

diverse forms of relationships, meaning that the sample included spouses, parents, siblings and adult sons and daughters of migrants, as well as friends. Relational diversity is important in and of itself because the diffusion process between migrants and friends and family members could differ, depending on the nature of the relationship. For example, a wife may be more responsive to her migrant husband than vice versa; a brother more responsive than a father; or a former employer less responsive than a former employee. See Appendix B for details about the sample.

To select leaders I used the extreme case method, and selected individuals based on their membership in municipalities with migration intensity index levels that are well above the mean of each state.[15] I spoke with 18 leaders from four municipalities, three in the state of Tlaxcala (Tlaxcala, Nanacamilpa and Atlangatepec), and one in Puebla (San Diego la Meza Tochimiltzingo). The first three municipalities have populations of 15,000 or less; communities in this population range produce a disproportionate number of migrants and are underrepresented in the sample taken for the Desencanto survey. Except for the leaders from Tlaxcala, who worked for the state government, all of the leaders I interviewed held positions at the municipal level. My objective was to speak to leaders of communities from localities where migration is a fundamental part of everyday life—communities whose leaders had undoubtedly had the opportunity to interact with returnees whose civic engagement had increased as a result of having emigrated.

Interviews were structured, but open. I utilized two distinct questionnaires to guide the interviews (the scripts are in Appendix E), but deviated from their format as necessary, particularly if the returnee respondent was eager to share useful, but unsolicited information.

[15] Chapter 3 explains the migration intensity index in greater detail.

The questionnaire designed for return migrants inquired about their experiences abroad with a view to gauging engagement in activities that lead to learning the political beliefs and behaviors of Americans. It also inquired about migrants' reintegration into their country of origin, including their political participation and beliefs, from right after returning to Mexico up to the present. What factors about the home country context encouraged them to put into practice and reaffirm new, "foreign" beliefs and behaviors, and what did they find discouraging?

The semi-structured interviews with people who know returnees, as well as with community leaders, aimed to assess non-migrants' attitudes towards migration and migrants and to characterize their relationships with the latter. One goal was to gauge whether non-migrants consider migration and migrants beneficial to their household, community, or Mexico in general. For example, I asked them to share with me the challenges and opportunities they believe return migrants bring to their community. Another objective was to determine if non-migrants discriminate between different "types" of migrants. For instance, did they consider the immigration status of migrants important (whether their presence in the U.S. is undocumented, if they are legal permanent residents or have become citizens)? Were their views towards migrants close to them different from their views of "others"? Did they perceive migrants abroad as compared with returnees in a different light?

All respondents were over the age of 18 and either Mexican citizens or born in Mexico to Mexican citizen parents. I conducted all 99 interviews in Spanish, 88 face-to-face, and 11 by electronic mail. Face-to-face interviews lasted from 45 minutes to two hours. Unless respondents objected, I conducted face-to-face interviews outside their home, in a neutral locality such as a park, and away from other household members or co-workers.

Interviews via electronic correspondence were implemented via a written questionnaire (the same questionnaire that guided my face-to-face interviews). I

sent respondents follow up questions to clarify their written answers as necessary. Respondents took about 45 minutes to complete the written interviews.

4.2.2 Large-N Data

Chapter 3 describes the information that the Desencanto survey gathered in some detail; here, I describe only the aspects of the dataset that are pertinent to this chapter. Return migrants comprised about 6 percent of the random national sample that participated in the survey. 85 percent of returnee participants had lived in the U.S. for two or more years. Overall, return migrants had engaged in a wide variety of experiences in the U.S. from which they could learn new political beliefs and behaviors.

4.2.3 Methods

This chapter employs two methods of analysis: qualitative comparative analysis and multi-level linear and logistic regression analysis.

Qualitative Comparative Analysis. I use qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) as put forth by Charles Ragin in *Fuzzy Set Social Science* (2000) and *Redesigning Social Inquiry* (2008) to evaluate data I obtained through in-depth field interviews. Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) is an analytical technique that uses Boolean algebra to determine which causal combinations (or configurations), among all of those that are theoretically possible, are either necessary or sufficient to cause a given outcome. QCA helps make the qualitative analysis of a relatively small number of non-random cases more systematic.

The key distinction between QCA and linear regressions is that the former uses a set theoretic, rather than correlational, logic. The approach is not probabilistic; however, the inferences I make based on this research method are quite compelling in view of the strategy I used to select the interview respondents

from whom I obtained data. The findings are all the more convincing if we consider them in light of evidence obtained via the large-N statistical techniques.

QCA can be used to analyze both crisp and fuzzy sets. This chapter evaluates data that has been converted into both types of sets. Crisp sets are simply conventional sets in which the degree of membership in a set can be either zero or one. An object is either in or out of a set. Fuzzy sets can be utilized to evaluate the same relationships that traditional "crisp" sets assess, such as membership, intersection and union. However, fuzzy sets allow various degrees of membership within a set. Rather than limit membership scores to zero or one, fuzzy sets also allow membership scores to range anywhere in between. Developing a fuzzy data set requires researchers to determine membership scores carefully, evaluating each case with respect to a concretely defined set (Ragin, 2000, 2006, and 2008). For instance, with the crisp set "Migrants who Stayed in the U.S. Two Years", an individual who stayed 22 months would be scored zero, exactly like an individual who stayed 8 months. In making that same set fuzzy, we can assign to the first a score of 0.6 and the second a score of zero. Fuzzy sets thus allow us to account for borderline cases that do not clearly fall in or out of a set. The approach is useful for coding data obtained qualitatively because rather than requiring researchers to fit research findings into strict binary sets or categorical variables; it encourages us to account for as much diversity as we observed (provided of course that it is theoretically useful).

Statistical analysis. This chapter runs multi-level linear and logistic regressions similar to those in Chapter 3. I modify the model to account for the findings I obtain via fs/QCA. Specifically, because I find that living in the U.S. more than two years is a necessary condition for learning, I rerun the multi-level linear and logistic regressions to ensure that a return migrant's duration in the U.S. does not account for the surprising results reported in Chapter 3.

4.3 Do Returnees Simply Fail to Learn Abroad?

Chapter 3 finds that returnees fail to import political behaviors. There are a number of reasons why this may be true. One possibility we should consider is that return migrants simply do not learn and embrace any new behaviors during their time abroad. This could be the case, for example, if as the literature suggests, the individual attributes of return migrants are not conducive to learning or if one of the factors driving decisions to return is migrants' negative experience in the U.S. This section shows empirically that return migrants do learn new, more democratic political behaviors. It finds that the conditions that lead migrants to learn abroad are diverse and can include qualities not typically associated with a propensity to incorporate politically, such as poor English language skills and undocumented immigration status.

Some scholars suggest that return migrants are negatively selected, meaning that those whose experience in the U.S. does not meet their expectations are more likely to return (Herzog & Schlottmann, 1983), while those who get ahead in the U.S. stay. They argue that returnees tend to be those individuals who struggled most to adapt to the host country, be it for cultural reasons (they may simply dislike life in the U.S.) or because they did not find a stable source of employment. If true, this would imply that returnees are also least likely to have had the sort of experience in the U.S. that is conducive to democratic learning.

Additionally, the experiences in the U.S. of migrants with this particular set of characteristics may have been consistently negative since such individuals are least likely to receive a universally warm welcome (Fetzer, 2000; Huntington, 2004; Sniderman, Hagendoorn, & Prior, 2004; O'Rourke & Sinnott, 2004). The attitudes of host country nationals and institutional policies towards migrants who are poorly equipped and disposed to adapt to the host country could weaken the probability that migrants embrace their attitudes and behaviors they observe there.

Empirical evidence indicating a negative selection bias among return migrants is inconclusive (see, e.g., Coulon & Piracha, 2005; Gitter, Gitter, & Southgate, 2008).[16] Additionally, as we saw in Chapter 3, all migrants have significant opportunities to engage the U.S. political system. In contrast to the conventional wisdom, there is ample evidence to challenge the claim that the presence in the U.S. of migrants who posses the qualities that have been observed among returnees (limited English, undocumented, poor skills) is politically marginal. Nonetheless, given the salience of theories concerning negative selection among return migrants, we must verify empirically that this group's failure to import behaviors into Mexico is not a consequence of their failure to learn any.

This section employs a fuzzy data set that I developed based on the 31 in-depth field interviews I conducted with return migrants to determine what conditions are necessary and sufficient for migrants to learn. Specifically, to assess necessity I utilize the fs/QCA 2.0 software developed by Ragin, Drass, and Davey (2006) to explore whether membership in any of the following causal fuzzy sets: "Stayed Two Years or More"; "Regularly Interacted with Americans"; "Fluent English Speaker"; and, "Documented Immigrant" is a subset of the outcome "Embraced U.S. Political Beliefs and Behaviors". To assess sufficiency, I utilize the Truth Table Algorithm in fs/QCA to evaluate the causal combinations of conditions of which "Embraced U.S. Political Beliefs and Behaviors" is a subset.

With fuzzy sets, researchers can organize data obtained via in-depth qualitative interviews by assigning to each respondent a value indicating the degree to which she is a member of the sets in question. Respondents may

[16] There is evidence that migrants return if they save sufficient dollars to set in motion a long-term dream at home, such as a small business or the construction of a dream home. Additionally, scholars show that economic opportunities in the specific locality from which a migrant hails also strongly influence the likelihood of returning.

receive scores on conditions of interest, ranging from zero to one, with one indicating full membership and zero full non-membership. Note that these are not categorical divisions; rather they indicate degrees of membership in a set. The number of possible scores between 0 and 1 is infinite. In theory we can employ as many intervals as necessary to account for the diverse degrees of membership in a set that we observe in our cases; however, it is useful to divide the range into five or seven intervals. For instance in a five value set a respondent can receive a score of 0, .25, .5, .75, or 1, with .5 indicating borderline cases.

For example, a migrant may have a 0.25 membership in the set “Fluent English Speaker” if she understands only sufficient English to carry out her job duties and the most necessary daily tasks, while an individual, who writes, speaks and reads English proficiently would have full membership (1.0), and an individual with absolutely no ability to read, write, speak, or comprehend spoken English would have full non-membership (0.0). Membership scores greater than .5 indicate that a case is more in than out of the set, whereas scores close to 1.0 indicate that a case is mostly in, and scores close to 0.0 indicate that a case is mostly out. For an overview of the use of fuzzy sets in social science research, see *Fuzzy Set Social Science* (Ragin, 2000).

Here, I develop an original fuzzy data set based on the in-depth interviews I conducted with return migrants. Appendix C summarizes the definition of full-membership in each fuzzy set, the values that I could assign to a respondent with respect to each set, and the criteria for assessing membership.

Taken together, the average fuzzy set membership score of the 31 cases in the outcome “Embraced U.S. Political Beliefs and Behaviors” was .64, indicating that migrants generally learned at least one belief or behavior essential to democracy; however, twelve individuals scored .83 or 1, indicating that about 40 percent of the returnees I interviewed learned both a new political belief and a behavior.

What types of new behaviors do return migrants embrace? Table 4.1, below, contains some examples of the forms of political behaviors that migrants reported introducing into Mexico after returning. They are the strongest possible evidence of behavioral learning, because they involve real actions that returnees reportedly took in their home country—actions returnees claim they probably would not have taken prior to migrating. The examples are classified into participation in organizations, collective action, and individual participation, consistent with the dependent variables I explored in chapter 3 (I exclude voting, because responses do not yield interesting stories). I quote some responses directly and paraphrase others.

Table 4.1: Political Behaviors Returnees Import and Practice in Mexico

Type of Participation	Example Drawn from In-depth Field Interview
Participation in Organizations	Helped found two NGOs to combat poverty, specifically to help women. Started a new women's football (soccer) club. "I tried to start an Alcoholics Anonymous club here. There are many drunks here. I belonged to AA there. I tried to explain to the people here about the problems with alcohol, especially to the young people."
Collective action	Routinely takes people to clean up streets and the town in general. Tried to pave street collectively with neighbors. Initiated and almost completed paving two roads. "I proposed to the neighbors that we work together to make things better—to change street lighting, the quality of streets and those things, rather than ask the government." "At first, when I came back, I tried to work with other migrants to improve the annual municipal fair. We obtained private sponsors (new idea brought from outside) to make it bigger and nicer. We made rules to make it cleaner and more organized (new idea brought from outside)."
Individual participation	Volunteered to translate into English the signs and information posted in the local archeology museum. Has run for office two times and won, never thought of participating before, now believes that if you want change you have to do it yourself. "I suggest to people that they not throw their trash in the street, I tell them to use a trash bin or recycle."

The examples below represent responses to one of the following questions: "Do you now do things regularly to help improve your community that

you did not do before you emigrated?"; "Did you adopt any new habits while you lived in the U.S.?"; or, "Do you participate more or less in your community than you did prior to emigrating?" (If this question was misunderstood, it was reworded as "Do you do more or less to help your community since you returned?"). We can see that returnees' attempts to do something to improve their home communities through means other than electoral participation are significant and diverse. The most notable change appears to be their interest in organizing people either into formal groups with long-term objectives or simply to work collectively on one project—to resolve community problems quite apart from the government.

In sum, based on in-depth interviews with a relatively small, non-random sample of return migrants, I find that this type of migrant learns new, more participative forms of political behaviors abroad. The findings reported in Chapter 3 may nonetheless reflect returnees' systematic failure to embrace new beliefs and behaviors; indeed the sample is representative at the national level.

I therefore use the fuzzy data set drawn from interviews with returnees to ascertain the results obtained statistically. First, I use fs/QCA software to determine whether there exist any conditions necessary or sufficient for the outcome "Embraced U.S. Political Beliefs and Behaviors" to obtain. Subsequently, I assess whether incorporating the findings produced by the fuzzy set analysis into the multi-level regression models presented in Chapter 3 gives rise to a different set of outcomes. I explain this process in detail below.

Causal necessity means that a condition must be present in all instances of the outcome. Conversely, the absence of the condition means that the outcome will not obtain. A necessary condition is not inevitably also sufficient, however; a necessary causal condition may be in place, yet we may not observe the outcome of interest. Set theory permits us to evaluate necessity quite effectively. Whenever a causal condition is necessary (but not sufficient for the outcome) the fuzzy set membership scores of the outcome should be a subset of

the fuzzy set membership scores in the causal condition. That is, the former should be less than or equal to the latter. This subset relationship can be represented graphically on an x (causal condition) y (outcome) plot in which all observations fall below or on the diagonal, i.e., $x \geq y$.

I use fs/QCA to analyze whether strong membership in any of the following sets is causally necessary to produce the outcome "Embraced U.S. Political Beliefs and Behaviors": (1) "Stayed Two Years or More"; (2) "Interacted Regularly with Americans"; (3) "Fluent English Speaker"; (4) "Documented Immigrant"; and (5) "Highly Educated". The results indicate that strong membership in the set of migrants who stayed in the U.S. at least two years is causally necessary for return migrants to have learned new, more democratic political beliefs and behaviors as migrants in the U.S.

Figure 4.1 illustrates the relationship between "Stayed 2 Years or More" and "Embraced U.S. Beliefs and Behaviors." Not all of the observations fall below the diagonal, because in this case, the subset relation has a consistency score of 0.83. Consistency indicates the degree to which membership in the outcome is a subset of membership in the causal condition.[17] In contrast to the formal definition of necessity, this subset relationship obtains in 83 percent of outcomes as opposed to all of them. This level of consistency is not earth shattering, but it is high enough to warrant our attention.[18]

Figure 4.1 also notes that the subset relation has a coverage score of 0.69. Coverage indicates the proportion of cases in which the necessary condition leads to the outcome. The indicator permits us to distinguish between trivial conditions—meaning those that are "strongly present in most cases,

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[17] Note, with crisp sets, consistency is simply the proportion of cases with a given cause (or combination of causes). Perfect consistency generates a score of 1. With fuzzy sets, the measure of consistency is: Consistency $(Y_i \leq X_i) = \Sigma(\min(X_i, Y_i))/\Sigma(Y_i)$ (Ragin, 2006).

[18] Ragin (2006) notes that researchers should be very cautious in making claims about subset relations with consistency scores below .75.

whether or not these cases display the outcome," and non-trivial necessary conditions, meaning conditions that are strongly present mostly in cases that display the outcome (Ragin, 2006, p. 12).



Figure 4.1 Necessary Condition for "Embraced U.S. Beliefs and Behaviors"

(Fuzzy scores have been slightly modified so that readers can see the multiple cases with similar scores on both conditions)

A coverage score of 0.69 indicates fairly high coverage. We can confidently conclude that remaining in the U.S. two years or more appears to be a non-trivial necessary condition for embracing U.S. political beliefs and behaviors. The analysis revealed that membership in the outcome of interest was a highly consistent subset of joint membership in the causal conditions "Stayed Two Years or More" and each of the other fuzzy sets. The coverage of each of these joint causes was quite low, however. There was no evidence that

membership in the other sets is causally necessary for migrants to embrace U.S. beliefs and behaviors.

Figure 4.1 also notes that the subset relation has a coverage score of 0.69. Coverage indicates the proportion of cases in which the necessary condition leads to the outcome. The indicator permits us to distinguish between trivial conditions—meaning those that are "strongly present in most cases, whether or not these cases display the outcome," and non-trivial necessary conditions, meaning conditions that are strongly present mostly in cases that display the outcome (Ragin, 2006, p. 12). A coverage score of 0.69 indicates fairly high coverage. We can confidently conclude that remaining in the U.S. two years or more appears to be a non-trivial necessary condition for embracing U.S. political beliefs and behaviors. The analysis revealed that membership in the outcome of interest was a highly consistent subset of joint membership in the causal conditions "Stayed Two Years or More" and each of the other fuzzy sets. The coverage of each of these joint causes was quite low, however. There was no evidence that membership in the other sets is causally necessary for migrants to embrace U.S. beliefs and behaviors.

The finding produced by the analysis of causal necessity using fuzzy sets implies the following: If the results of the statistical analysis in Chapter 3 are due to migrants' failure to learn, then controlling for the time that returnees spent abroad should filter out most of the learners from the non-learners. The model I tested contains a dummy variable indicating whether a respondent had lived in the U.S and returned; it did not account for the duration of a migrant's stay. I therefore substituted the original dummy variable with another indicating whether a migrant had lived in the U.S. for two or more years and then returned. The results are reported in Appendix D. The results do not substantively change. Returns continue to represent a weak path for the diffusion of new political behaviors, and cross-border communications a strong one; however, this model finds that both pathways are only fair channels for the diffusion of beliefs.

Contrary to what we would expect, controlling for time abroad leads to a slight reduction in migrants' propensity to come home more tolerant.

Previous research shows that education, income, time in country and immigration status in the United States are strong correlates of immigrant political incorporation or learning (Bean, Brown, & Rumbaut, 2006; Jasso & Rosenzweig, 1992; Portes & Rumbaut, 1996; Smith & Edmonston, 1997; Yang, 1994). The above exercise suggests that most of these conditions are not necessary for migrants to learn new forms of civic engagement; however, they may be sufficient. That, is, although migrants may be able to learn new, more democratic political beliefs and behaviors in the absence of these conditions, the presence of these conditions may strongly contribute to learning.

Fs/QCA allows researchers to implement a method called a Fuzzy Truth Table Algorithm (Ragin, 2008) to assess all of the combinations of causal conditions that give rise to an outcome of interest. The algorithm transforms the fuzzy set data into a crisp set truth table, taking into account: (1) any agreement between the rows of a crisp truth table and the fuzzy set causal conditions; (2) the distribution of cases across all of the possible combinations of causal conditions; and (3) the degree to which membership in the outcome is a consistent (fuzzy) subset of the causal configurations (Ragin, 2006, p. 74).[19] It then proceeds to evaluating sufficiency by determining whether each outcome of interest is a consistent subset of the causal configuration.

Here, I evaluate all of the possible combinations of the causal conditions summarized in Appendix C to determine if any are sufficient to lead migrants to embrace U.S. political values and beliefs. Note that the dependent variable is the same as in the analysis of necessity above; it measures returnees' membership in the set of people who learned new political beliefs and behaviors while in the United States. I find that the following three causal configurations lead migrants

[19] For a more detailed explanation, see Ragin (2006, 2008).

to continue to embrace U.S. political beliefs and behaviors after they return to Mexico[20]:

- Weak membership in the set of immigrants who stayed two years or more coupled with weak membership in the set of immigrants who are highly educated. (.95)
- Strong membership in the set of immigrants who interacted with Americans coupled with weak membership in the set of immigrants who stayed two years. (.89)
- Weak membership in the set of fluent English speakers combined with strong membership in the set of documented immigrants and strong membership in the set of immigrants who stayed two years (.99)

Each of these causal combinations are highly consistent subsets of the outcome (.95, .89, .99 respectively). Consistency measures the degree to which membership in each solution term is a subset of the outcome. It signifies, for example, that the causal combination weak membership in the set of migrants who stayed two years or more, coupled with weak membership in the set of migrants who are highly educated, is a subset of the outcome "Embraced U.S. Behaviors and Beliefs" in nearly all cases.

The three causal configurations together (the set of solution terms) explain about 44.5 percent the outcome (coverage). The third solution term accounts for a full 55 percent of this coverage, the second for 25 percent and the third for 20. The last two solution terms combined therefore account for about twenty percent of the *total* outcome.

It is surprising that two of the configurations in the solution set involve weak membership in the set of migrants who stayed two years or more in the

[20] This result that I present for both of the fuzzy set assessments of sufficiency I conduct in this chapter are the intermediate solution to the Truth Table Algorithm based on fs/QCA 2.0. Fs/QCA uses a Quine-McCluskey algorithm. I selected a consistency cutoff of .95 in both analyses.

U.S. since we previously found strong membership in that set to be fairly necessary for learning to occur. The absence of a necessary condition for learning can be a sufficient condition because we have loosened the definition of a necessary condition so that it does not require 100 percent consistency. Recall that strong membership in the set of migrants who stayed in the U.S. two years of more is a necessary condition with a consistency score of 83 percent. This signifies that in about 17 percent of the cases, strong membership in the set of individuals who stayed two years or more is not necessary. Moreover, in nearly all such cases learning happened nevertheless. Put differently, in the large majority of cases, learning happens due to a 2-year stay; however, among the 17 percent for whom staying two years is not a necessary condition, weak membership in that set, combined high membership in the set of migrants who engage in frequent interaction with Americans, high membership in the set of immigrants who were legally present in the U.S., and low membership scores in the set of highly educated are sufficient for political learning to obtain.

Note that fs/QCA 2.0 calculates necessary and sufficient conditions independently. Each calculation uses a distinct algorithm for evaluating fuzzy set scores; as a result the calculations of both the coverage of necessary and sufficient conditions do not match precisely.

We can see right away that there are some surprises. The causal configuration involving both weak membership in the set of immigrants who stayed two years or more and weak membership in the set of immigrants who are highly educated seems counterintuitive. Further field research is necessary to understand the conditions under which migrants learn new political beliefs and behaviors in the U.S. Interestingly, the results suggest that there are various paths to learning. Furthermore, even though correlational studies of immigrant incorporation point to the importance of factors such as time in country, documented status, education, and English language abilities, this analysis indicates that the presence of one of these qualities may compensate for the

absence of another. This is important, since return migrants vary significantly on these personal attributes. For example, highly educated migrants stay in the U.S. illegally; non-English speaking immigrants interact with Spanish speaking Americans; documented migrants may not speak English, and so forth.

Section 4.3 started with the proposition that one reason why returnees may not import behaviors is that they differ systematically from migrants who stay in the U.S. This may be true; returnees may have learned and embraced the beliefs and behaviors of their host country to a lesser degree than migrants who stay abroad, because they are negatively selected. Nonetheless, as long as returnees learn behaviors that are new to them and to the friends and family with whom they communicate when they return home, they should be able to set diffusion in motion. The analysis I present here indicates that return migrants obtain a new perspective on the types of political actions that can lead to improving political outcomes in a democracy. These behaviors are probably new to the non-migrants with whom returnees interact back home too.

My field interviews also reveal that return migrants overwhelmingly do not consider their U.S. experience, including their interaction with U.S. institutions and authorities, to be negative. I asked interviewees two sets of questions to evaluate this issue: “How did your employers and government authorities treat you in the U.S.?” and “Do employers and government authorities in Mexico treat you better or worse than those in the U.S., or is the treatment you received from U.S. and Mexican employers and government authorities the same?” Respondents universally indicated that employers and government authorities in the U.S. treated them either the same as in Mexico or better.

Most strikingly, with respect to the treatment by government authorities, two migrants who had been deported noted that the U.S. officials who processed their deportation were more respectful towards them than the Mexican customs authorities who received them. One undocumented migrant who moved to the Virginia area was surprised that he could walk around the nation’s capital freely,

and noted that in his hometown a foreigner could not walk around without being stopped by the police. Large numbers of respondents remarked that Mexican authorities are arrogant and corrupt, and interested in filling their own pockets, whereas in the U.S., authorities are much friendlier and take service more seriously, even when dealing with undocumented migrants.

With respect to their treatment by employers, many migrants reported that they were surprised by the number of non-governmental organizations interested in offering voluntary services to migrants in the workplace. For example, one individual shared that lawyers approached him from the Mexican American Legal Defense Fund to see if he was being treated well by his employer. And others noted that members of a church group helped him and others to complete their income tax forms and to access recreational activities. Civic associations also approached migrants to offer health and safety education that served them both in the workplace and at home. Four individuals commented to the effect that the conventional wisdom concerning the racism and discrimination that migrants suffer (largely promoted by the images of migrants' lives in the U.S. that the major television networks in Mexico depict), is highly exaggerated; they noted, without prompting, that they never felt discriminated by their employer while abroad.

This section refutes the claim that the reason return migrants do not import new political behaviors is that they do not learn any during their time in the U.S. I show that whether or not migrants are negatively selected, they may nonetheless learn new beliefs and behaviors in the U.S. There is only one condition that is even fairly necessary to learn and embrace new forms of civic engagement. Moreover, if we incorporate this condition into the statistical model presented in Chapter 3, we do not observe any significant changes in the general pattern by which returnees contribute to the diffusion process. Finally, the conditions that are sufficient for migrants to embrace new practices and beliefs are fairly diverse, and can include low levels of education and English—

conditions typically observed among (perhaps negatively selected) return migrants.

I also challenge the argument that migrants cannot learn because their experience in the U.S. is consistently negative. Migrants themselves report that Americans—particularly employers and government authorities who are in the strongest position to abuse them—are generally respectful and interested in their wellbeing. In fact, the consensus is that they treat Mexicans better than do Mexican authorities and employers at home.

4.4 Crossing the Border with U.S. Political Beliefs and Behaviors

If migrants who return to Mexico generally learned both political beliefs and behaviors in the U.S., what prevents them from practicing the new behaviors after crossing the border into Mexico, where they can legally exercise their citizenship rights to their fullest possible extent? Do returnees share their new political beliefs with fellow Mexicans back home? Or does the same force that constrains their behaviors also keep them from diffusing beliefs?

4.4.1 Theoretical Framework

Chapter 3 did not offer conclusive evidence to support any of the three theoretical perspectives that scholars typically employ to explain diffusion. Nonetheless, it argued that further evidence would be needed to justify rejecting a rational choice or constructivist interpretation of the process. Each of these perspectives is associated with a widely different argument concerning the causal processes that motivate and limit individual actions and choices. Each has a different implication about the kind of forces capable of constraining returnees from diffusing in Mexico the forms of civic engagement they learned abroad.

Rational choice approaches to diffusion suggest that return migrants ought to bring home both the political beliefs and behaviors they learned in the U.S. if they have strong grounds to believe they would be effective in Mexico. Migrants should abstain from importing effective foreign beliefs only if they face material or

objective constraints such as prohibitive laws, exorbitant expenses, or a credible threat of serious physical harm or loss of liberty. Furthermore, migrants should import both behaviors and beliefs to be rationally consistent.

Rational non-migrants should embrace the innovations returnees import under two conditions. They may conclude after careful consideration that such innovations represent an optimal strategy for improving the quality of their democracy. Or, more likely, they may choose to emulate non-migrants because they consider them highly capable individuals who have a wider range of political experiences, and with whom they share interests; such individuals have often achieved their objectives.

In the constructivist perspective, returnees may not introduce and non-migrants may not receive warmly, any new beliefs and behaviors that challenge local understandings of what is appropriate. By introducing new ideas about how to participate politically, or about the principles that underpin a well-functioning democracy, returnees may elicit criticism, alienate people close to them, or even worse, become a victim of harassment by individuals who believe that their interests are under threat.[21] According to constructivism, the ultimate force behind a migrant's decision not to import innovations and a non-migrant's choice not to adopt should be that they are compelled to conform to local social norms and ideas.

The section draws on my in-depth interviews with return migrants to evaluate what happens to their political behaviors once they re-enter Mexico. It helps us understand one aspect of the migrant-led diffusion process itself, and to specify its theoretical nature. The main findings are that migrants introduce new behaviors into the communities in Mexico to which they return, but abandon these efforts shortly after arriving; additionally, although migrants import new beliefs, they fail to share these with non-migrants. The reasons for these

[21] Note that these constraints differ from those put forth by rational choice theorists because they do not involve material costs or the threat of physical harm or loss of liberty.

behaviors are akin to those advanced by constructivist scholars. Returnees opt out of transmitting innovations because their co-nationals do not support them, but this lack of support is founded on non-migrants' shared understandings that the value of individual migrants depends on whether they are located north of south of the border.

4.4.2 The Path of Beliefs

The statistical analysis I present in Chapter 3 finds that migrants import new political beliefs. The qualitative interviews provide additional evidence to support the claim that most migrants who return to Mexico also learn new behaviors when they are in the U.S. Of the 31 returnees I interviewed, 27 indicated that they learned and imported into Mexico new beliefs. Table 4.2 presents some examples of the beliefs that most migrants learned and bought back to Mexico. They are classified into three categories of beliefs: (1) tolerance; (2) political efficacy, meaning citizens' beliefs in their ability to influence the political system; and (3) support for the rule of law and justice. I reviewed the importance of tolerance in Chapter 3. Although I did not assess the latter two statistically, I consider them here because in-depth interviews offer a better approach to assessing such difficult-to-gage concepts. Moreover, the two beliefs are particularly important in the case of Mexico, where the ineffective rule of law remains a significant obstacles to improving the quality of democracy (Magaloni, 2003), and citizens' feelings of political efficacy have declined since 1997 (Holzner, 2007).

The questions I asked respondents with respect to beliefs were "Do you think your way of thinking or seeing things changed as a result of having emigrated to the U.S.? Or, do you think that they did not change at all? Explain. If you did change, have you conserved your new ways of thinking?" The questions are of a general nature. I did not prompt migrants to offer answers related to politics.

Table 4.2: Political Beliefs that Migrants Import into Mexico

Type of Behavior	Example Drawn from In-depth Field Interview
Political Efficacy	"Government and society should support private initiatives. Here in Mexico, people consider any initiative a threat." "Now I don't just let things happen or wait for the government to fix them, now I try to fix my own problems." "I learned to be more critical of government – to have more opinions about what my government is doing for me. It can be beneficial." "I learned to value service and voluntarism. I think public officials here do not understand the meaning of being a public servant." "Working as a team rather than for myself. People should organize themselves to fix things that are not working, not just worry about their own affairs and let the government take care of everything else." "I can become politically active without going through a political party. I am interested in participating in politics without joining a party." "I learned that people here need to know how to ask the government for things. We have to knock on doors to get things done. We can't always wait until the government does things."
Rule of Law and Justice	"I learned the habits of a good citizen, like respecting others and the laws." "Learned how labor rights are part of a legal system that works well and that there are many groups interested in helping laborers whose rights have been violated. People don't help each other that way here…nobody respects the law, especially employers." "The community has a role in ensuring safety, not just the police."
Tolerance	"Now I have much respect for people with physical and mental disabilities." "I learned that I can get along well with blacks, because I worked with them on the tobacco farms. I never in my live imagined that I would have black friends." "I learned that nothing [bad] happens if a country has people of different races—Blacks, Japanese." "I have seen that men and women can work the same. Now I believe there is not much of a difference between men and women." "I learned tolerance and respect for people who think differently from me…When I returned, I was surprised by the social discrimination that exists in Mexico."

Return migrants bring home significant, new, more democratic beliefs. Most interestingly, migration to the U.S. appears to enhance Mexicans' beliefs that they can influence the political system. Numerous respondents stated that they returned home believing that their potential is greater than they imagined prior to emigrating; they claimed that maximizing their potential is their own

responsibility, rather than that of the government. Others made remarks indicating that their understanding of the role of the Mexican state and their relation with it had changed. Returnees also repeatedly said that they now consider beneficial government protection of the rights of people with disabilities, as well as support for women and racial diversity. Three migrants noted that they now “see” these people around them in Mexico, whereas prior to immigrating they were invisible.

Of the 27 returnees who reported learning and importing new political values, beliefs, or attitudes from the U.S., few claimed to share them with others in Mexico. About 20 percent of returnees said that they had shared their new ideas about order and cleanliness, such as by encouraging others to put trash in the proper receptacles. They tended to encourage actions rather than engage others in discussion concerning the values, beliefs or attitudes that underpin these actions. About 50 percent of migrants reported sharing with their children the importance of respecting others. Otherwise, migrants uniformly indicated that they do not share with friends or family in Mexico the new political beliefs they learned in the U.S.

4.4.3 The Path of Behaviors

The interviews reveal that there are two behavioral trajectories among return migrants, active and inactive returnees. Figure 4.2 indicates that 52 percent of respondents reported that their political behaviors changed as a result of having lived in the U.S., while 48 percent indicated that their behaviors did not change. Note that the graph does not represent levels of participation (e.g., high and low), but rather whether or not the migrant engaged in new forms. This signifies that some highly active returnees fall in the dark gray shaded area. For example various migrants held leadership positions prior to leaving for the U.S. Such individuals generally said they conducted business as usual upon their

return. Additionally, some returnees did not engage in new forms of participation because they did not learn any.

However, as Figure 4.3 shows, among the 52 percent of returnees, a full 80 percent of those who engaged in new forms of participation also reported giving up their efforts within a couple of years of arriving in Mexico. Their participation generally either declined to pre-migration levels or even lower.



Figure 4.2: Percent of Migrants who engaged in New Forms of Political Participation After Returning to Mexico

Thus, of the 31 individuals I interviewed, only about 12 percent claimed to continue engaging in the new forms of civic engagement they learned abroad. This finding is consistent with the statistical finding that returnees do not engage in more democratic political behaviors than their non-migrant counterparts. However, the qualitative investigation reveals that returnees initially intend to introduce new behaviors, and subsequently change their mind.



Figure 4.3: Percentage of Newly Participating Migrants that Persisted in New Forms of Participation

4.5 Explaining the Failure to Persist with New Behaviors or Share Beliefs

Why do migrants engage in new political behaviors after returning from the U.S. and then quit? Why do they keep their new beliefs to themselves? Do they find that such behaviors do not represent effective strategies to achieve their political objectives? Do they run into insurmountable constraints? Are their new beliefs and behaviors incompatible with local norms and standards of appropriateness?

The interviews indicate that migrants unequivocally believed the new types of actions in which they engaged would and can still be effective. Thus, their failure to keep promoting this kind of behavior was not due rational feasibility. They also claimed that the political beliefs they learned in the U.S. are among the most valuable benefits they obtained in that country; yet most migrants chose not to share their new political beliefs. Returnees quit their new behaviors and fail to share beliefs not because they have no value of effectiveness in the Mexican context, but because they perceive a lack of social support among their co-

nationals. This lack of support is founded on a combination of resentment, mistrust, and envy towards the United States.

Table 4.3: Constraints on Continuing with New Forms of Political Behaviors

Description of Respondent	Reason for Quitting
Male, Small municipality Secondary School Age>40	"The people don't support you…Why do anything if nobody supports you?"
Male, Large municipality College, Age>40	"There was no support for my initiative, no interest in making the museum more useful and attractive to tourists, the majority of whom are Americans or foreigners better able to read English than Spanish. I am not going to insist on carrying out a voluntary act if the people in charge of the museum aren't even interested."
Male, Small municipality Secondary School Age>40	"We wanted to build a new paved road, various migrants, with our money that we saved and put together, but the government made it very difficult for us, giving us the option of building it through people's land, they expected us to ask our own people if we could put a road through their land... there were other ways…The government didn't like that we were doing things to improve the community. They thought "these people return from the North and want to change things just because they have money now. They think they know how to govern."
Male, Small municipality Secondary School Age>40	"Others think migrants are just trying to get ahead for themselves, looking out for their own interests, they can't understand why you would do something for the community…I started putting trash in my pocket when I work rather than just throwing on the ground and people said, "They changed you up there. Sure, you think since you went up there you're special, but we're here in Mexico now."
Male, Small municipality College, Age<40	"There is no support, people feel threatened by change. It is very difficult for someone who has not lived it in person [the U.S. experience] to be motivated to change."
Male, Small municipality High School, Age=40	"People take it the wrong way when you try to become involved in resolving the problems of the community. I managed to pave one road and started, but didn't finish a second, because there was no support, no unity….Even if you just make your little convenience store bigger, people start to talk because you are getting ahead. The envy of the dollar opens eyes."
Male, Small municipality Grade School, Age<40	"At first I tried to organize the people to clean up the playground and paint the school. But people are negative against change…they are not committed to your proposals…there is no government support."
Male, Small municipality, Secondary School, Age<40	"I tried to start an Alcoholics Anonymous club here. There are many drunks here. I belonged to AA there. I tried to explain to the people here about the problems with alcohol, especially to the young people" "People called me crazy. They didn't believe what I told them about the problem of alcoholism. They said "This is Mexico, if you liked it there, you should go back…People think the dollar changes people…they think migrants become too big for themselves."
Male, Medium municipality Secondary School,	"People don't support your initiatives. I tried to get people to cooperate to improve the public lighting, but nobody participated."

Description of Respondent	Reason for Quitting
Age<40	
**Female, Large municipality College, Age>40	My housekeeper told me that people around town were calling me “La Loca” [the crazy woman] because I went out to pick up trash everyday. So I started confronting people and saying, “Hi, I’m “La Loca” would you like to join me in picking up trash?”
Male, Medium municipality Secondary School, Age<40	“People here mistreat you if you try to excel or get ahead, they think migrants who bring money back use it for themselves for their own interests…People here don't understand your initiative or support you…They reject you.”
Female, Large municipality College, Age<40	“I tried to get people to report crimes to the police…People don't support you… I couldn't get people on board. They said Mexico is not like the U.S., things don’t work the same way here…People don’t even want to try.”
Male, Small municipality, Medium education, Age<40	“We tried to improve the municipal fair…My story, it is a very bitter one. People don't like the ideas that you bring home, they opine differently, they seem to like to reject your ideas because you think they are superior. They don't like that your new ideas [obtained in the U.S.] might be superior.”
**Male, Small municipality, Secondary School, Age>40	“When we tried to build a road with the money [earnings from abroad] we put together with migrants who are out there, the municipal leaders who were there [in power] at the time didn’t like it…The citizens didn’t support us either...now we are in power.”
Male, Medium municipality, Medium education, Age>40	“I tried to organize the neighbors to clean up the neighborhood, but people didn't participate…I was disillusioned by the low level of interest and participation of my neighbors.”
Male, Small municipality, Grade School, Age<40	“I helped paint the church and we upgraded the arches that are at the entrance to the town…I responded to an invitation; I didn’t do more because I wasn’t invited again.”

******These individuals persisted in their efforts, their response indicates the types of constraints they faced, but overcame. Small municipalities have a population of 15,000 or less. Medium municipalities have a population of 15-99,000. Large municipalities have a population greater than 100,000.

The right hand column of Table 4.3, below, contains quotes from 16 interviews in which respondents reported engaging in new political behaviors upon returning. The quotes represent the essence of how each respondent characterized the constraints they faced as a result of engaging in new types of political actions. The left hand column indicates the sex, education, and age of respondents as well as the size of the locality to which they return. Note that the

table also includes those respondents who persisted with their new behaviors; those Individuals are marked with an asterisk.[22]

Throughout the interviews, not a single returnee alluded to a constraint on their behaviors or beliefs consistent with a rational choice theory. They did not remark that they had learned that their new forms of participation turn out to be ineffective; nor did they indicate that their behaviors or beliefs were problematic because they challenged local laws and political institutions, or because they created a situation for themselves or their family that involved the threat of physical harm or loss of liberty. Instead, the core adverse condition that migrants reported was the lack of support from their co-nationals.

A careful analysis of each complete interview with those who initiated new forms of behaviors after returning permits us to classify into five categories the various types of "lack of support" returnees claimed to encounter as follows:

1. Lack of interest or collective action dilemma.
2. Lack of support due to suspicion or resentment of migrants' newly acquired wealth—of their acquisition of dollars.
3. General resistance to change.
4. Resistance specifically to change that originates in the U.S.
5. Perception of change as a threat.

Each individual interview may fall into more than one category. For example, the respondent who indicated that he faced resistance to his efforts to improve the local fair pointed to a lack of support due to the suspicion of local leaders of returnees who bring home dollars as well as to resistance to changes (new rules for safety) originating in the U.S.

We can use QCA to assess the degree to which the decision to abandon new behaviors is due to one or more of these types of "lack of support." Here, I

[22] For a list of reasons why some migrants did not practice new political behaviors at all, see Appendix 4-D.

coded each respondent's description of constraints on continuing their new behaviors either zero or one on each type of "lack of support" listed above, with one indicating full membership in a category and zero indicating full non-membership. I then ran the crisp set Truth Table Algorithm using the fs/QCA software.

The results indicate that three causal configurations are sufficient to give rise to nearly all (92 percent) instances of the outcome "Quit New Forms of Engagement". The membership of an individual's response in the set "General lack of interest or collective action dilemma", alone, was sufficient to discourage returnees from persisting with their new form of behavior in 46 percent of the cases. A returnee's perception that their new forms of behavior faced "Resistance specifically to change that originates in the U.S." was sufficient to cause them to quit the new actions in 38 percent of the cases. Additionally, membership in the causal configuration "Lack of support due to suspicion or resentment of migrants' newly acquired wealth—of their acquisition of dollars" combined with both "General Resistance to Change" and "Perception of change as a threat" was sufficient to give rise to about 8 percent of the cases of abandoning new political actions. Of the various forms of "lack of support", the causal combinations that fully account for the outcome "Quit New Forms of Engagement" in about half the cases are therefore related to non-migrants' attitudes towards the U.S. Non-migrants tend to resist change that originates in the north, and they are suspicious of migrants who return home with dollars and seek to use their new money to bring about change.

The reasons why returnees did not share their new beliefs were similar. In this case, migrants reported that they could hold their new beliefs, while simultaneously avoiding the frustration that their co-nationals' lack of support creates, simply by keeping the beliefs private. A few returnees claimed that they cherished their new ideas concerning political efficacy too much to risk tainting them with the unfavorable responses of non-migrants. Nearly all migrants who

had children noted that they share the values they learned abroad with them consistently, but in private, especially in family settings.

My conversations with non-migrants reveal that returnees' understandings of non-migrants' receptivity towards their new political actions and beliefs are on the mark. The majority of non-migrants show little support for the new political actions in which return migrants engage. And, their attitudes towards non-migrants range from indifferent—meaning that they feel no particular interest or enthusiasm for the migrant in question as compared to before they left for the U.S.—to alienated, frustrated, and resentful.[23]

This dissertation reviews non-migrant Mexicans' responses to two questions concerning return migrants, including both friends and family and leaders: "In your opinion do returnees mostly contribute positively to their households, communities and/or to Mexico, or is their return mostly detrimental to their household, community and/or Mexico? Why?" Second, "In your opinion, do migrants who return re-integrate and adapt themselves once again to their home country environment with ease or with difficulty? Why?"[24]

While respondents universally indicated that they were always delighted to have friends and family close to them again, they were not so sanguine about the benefits these individuals bring home. The most salient—if not the only—positive contribution that non-migrants noted time and again is that returnees have made it possible for their communities to have many large, well-built, homes. A 26 year old police officer's remark that "If you look out from here, you can see how nice all of those houses are…Those are the houses that migrants have built" is typical of many other responses. But most non-migrant Mexicans also note that this

[23] By alienated, I mean that non-migrants feel unfriendly, hostile, or indifferent towards a migrant and his or her choices and beliefs where they formerly felt attachment; by frustrated I mean that non-migrants feel discouraged by return migrants; and by resentful, I mean that non-migrants feel indignant displeasure or persistent ill will towards returnees. These definitions are drawn from www.merriam-webster.com.

[24] To see the specific wording and format of the question, please see Appendix 4-E.

represents a private gain, from which only members of the returnees' household benefit. Nearly all respondents from small to medium size municipalities (about 70 percent of all the non-migrants I interviewed, including leaders) made note of the change that returnees have made with respect to what the "homes look like" now.

Beyond this contribution, non-migrants did not consider migrants who return particularly beneficial to Mexico, its communities or specific households. About 30 percent of non-migrants were indifferent to returnees, believing that they—including those to whom they do not personally relate—neither contribute to nor serve as a detriment to their places of origin. This group of respondents believes that returnees' role back home is not much different than it was prior to their departure. They do not consider that migration makes migrants either more or less able to fit in and function effectively within the community of origin. Finally non-migrants who were indifferent to migrants that return to Mexico did not think that latter face obstacles upon their return such as the "lack of support" that returnees report.

The other seventy percent of non-migrants with whom I spoke reported that returnees import more problems than benefits. Non-migrants listed numerous reasons for holding this belief. Many claimed that migrants who return permanently to Mexico do not contribute to the place of origin and fail to adapt to life in Mexico. Non-migrants in rural areas perceive returnees as lazy, while respondents located in all types of localities complained that returnees are unwilling to accept the terms of work in Mexico; in both cases the failure of migrants to get moving as they did in the U.S. frustrates those who never left Mexico.

Another common theme I heard was that non-migrants resent returnees' ability to purchase a better quality of life in Mexico. They also resent that returnees continue to look north, even after they have decided to resettle in Mexico. For example, the perception that returnees are dissatisfied with the

country to which they ought to be loyal because they constantly compare it to the U.S. appeared to aggravate non-migrants.

Furthermore, I detected that non-migrants feel alienated from their returnee friends and kin, because they perceive them as coming home arrogant and idealistic and with an entirely new perspective on their present surroundings and future possibilities. That is, they believe that returnees come back "Americanized". Non-migrants claim that migrants who resettle in Mexico struggle to reintegrate and re-adapt precisely because of the ideas, habits or resources they obtained abroad. No single respondent alluded to the ease with which return migrants get up and move, either in their personal or work lives, even better than they did prior to leaving. Non-migrants did not report that returnees inspire and motivate them to transform their lives and communities. Instead their claims contained elements of frustration, resentment, and alienation towards returnees.

Table 4.4 below summarizes the most common problems that non-migrants mentioned with respect to the reintegration of returnees. The right column contains a description of the essence of each category. I indicate in parentheses whether each response indicates that non-migrants feel either frustrated, resentful or alienated vis-à-vis return migrants. The left column indicates the number of responses that fell into each category and the relationship that the respondents in question had to a migrant. The responses of some individuals may fall into more than one category. Note that my interlocutors often shared with me their views of returnees in general, as opposed to about a specific returnee.

Chapter 5 compares non-migrants' view of returnees to their opinions of migrants who remain in the United States in order to draw more complete and persuasive conclusions about their attitudes towards migrants in general. Nonetheless, we can see here how non-migrants' attitudes towards returnees could manifest themselves as lack of support or be construed as such.

Table 4.4: Non-Migrant Claims as to Why Returnees do not Benefit Places of Origin

Number and General Characteristics of Respondent	Nature of the Problem
Friend male (8), female (1) Father (2), Mother (3) Spouse, Female (5) Small, rural towns only.	When they return, migrants live off of the earnings they made in the U.S. They do not work. They do not do anything. They are "good for nothing" when they return. (Resentment, Frustration)
Friend, male (7), female (3) Mother (4) Spouse, Female (7) All types of localities, but especially small, rural towns.	Returnees cannot find work when they return, or they work much harder and get paid much, much less. The situation leads them to drink or spend time unproductively. (Resentment, Frustration)
Friend, Male (4) Father (4), Mother (4) Spouse, Female (5) Leaders (14) All types of localities.	Migrants bring home vices and the bad customs and values of the U.S. (Alienation, Frustration)
Friend, male (7), Female (5) Father (2) Sibling (3) Leaders (16) All types of localities.	Migrants return believing they are superior as a result of having lived in the U.S. (Alienation, Resentment)
Friend, Male (7) Mother (1), Father (4) Leaders (15) All types of localities, especially small, rural towns.	Migrants return thinking that anything can be bought—that everything can be resolved with the mighty dollar. (Resentment)
Friend, male (6), Female (2) Mother (3), Father (4) Spouse, female (4), male (1) Sibling (4) All types of localities.	Migrants return feeling idealistic and empowered. They forget how things work in Mexico and think they can and should change things here just because they understand how things work in the north. (Alienation, Resentment)
Friend, Male (4), Female (1) Mother (4) Spouse, Female (7) Sibling (5) Leaders (10) All types of localities	They complain a great deal that everything in Mexico is dysfunctional. (Alienation, Resentment)
Friend, Male (8) Spouse, Female(6) Leaders (13) All types of localities.	Returnees are focused on getting back to the U.S. The hope of migrating again attenuates their relationship to Mexico. (Alienation, Resentment)
Mother (6) Spouse, Female (8), male (1) Sibling (3) All types of localities.	Returnees become accustomed to living on their own and struggle to live in the same household with family again. (Alienation)
Friend, Male (4), Female (1) Spouse, Female (4) Sibling (2) Small, rural towns only.	Returnees are surprised by how busy their co-nationals at home are. They want friends and family to sit down and talk, but there is no free time. (Alienation)

4.6 Returnees and Mexicans' Intersubjective Beliefs about the U.S.

Non-migrants' attitudes toward returnees are embedded in a broader set of attitudes concerning the U.S. and U.S.-Mexico relations. The structure of Mexican beliefs towards the U.S. is complex, because Mexicans hold both strong positive and negative views of the U.S.; and many hold both simultaneously. Ulises Beltrán (2001), a well known scholar of political behavior, finds based on public opinion surveys that about half of the variation in Mexicans' perceptions of the U.S. fall into one or another of two dimensions, one positive and another negative. The first involves Mexicans' beliefs about how that the U.S. mistreats Mexicans and represents an ongoing threat to Mexico. In contrast, the second dimension constitutes Mexicans' assessment of the U.S. as a strong democracy that offers tremendous economic opportunities. Like numerous other Mexican scholars, Beltrán claims that ambivalent perceptions of the U.S. and perceptions are "firmly rooted in the collective consciousness" of Mexicans (2001, p. 27).

Other scholars corroborate Beltrán's claims concerning the core content of Mexicans' negative views of the U.S., albeit via different research methods. Morris (2000) analyzes images of the United States as depicted in written and illustrated responses to events such as the financial bailout that followed the 1994-1995 peso crisis, and the annual debate in the U.S. Congress concerning the now defunct drug certification process. Based on a review of various national newspapers Morris finds that "the most prominent theme illustrated in the treatment of each of the events centers on the preponderance of U.S. power and, more importantly, the abuse of that power" (p. 115). Depictions in the press of this aspect of migrants' beliefs about the U.S. encompass not only state to state relations, but also how the U.S. government treats Mexican individuals. For example, coverage in the Mexican press of capital punishment and the actions that the U.S. government takes to control the flow of undocumented migrants through its southern border depict a U.S. that does not value Mexican lives; moreover many caricatures characterize the U.S. as racist (Morris, 2000, p. 116).

Along similar lines, Morris finds that Mexicans are skeptical of U.S. intentions towards their country; they mistrust U.S. policies.

Another idea that permeates Mexicans' attitudes about the U.S. concerns its self-perception in relation to the U.S. Carlos Fuentes argues that Mexican democracy, sovereignty, nationalism and identity are defined by Mexico's relationship to the U.S. (1994). Octavio Paz famously noted that the U.S. represents an "indiscreet mirror" that reflects to Mexicans a negative image of their country—an image constructed in comparison to the U.S (1990). Paz portrays the U.S. as a giant shadow that covers the entire North American continent. Morris too, finds that Mexican editorials and cartoons depict the Mexico as weak, dependent, and violated in relation to the U.S. (p. 125). Moreover he argues that this weakness leads to a "desire to turn the tables and in a sense assume to moral authority against a powerful other" (p.129).

Chapter 5 shows in greater depth that Mexicans' attitudes towards returnees as compared to migrants who remain in the U.S. reflect Mexicans' *ambivalent* attitudes towards the U.S. quite faithfully—that is, we will see that their positive orientation towards U.S.-based migrants contrasts with their negative attitudes towards migrants who have returned home. In this chapter, we can see that non-migrants' attitudes towards returnees represent a broader interest in contributing to weakening the relative status of that country with respect to Mexico. This proclivity is part of a long Mexican tradition of defining their political identity by reference to the United States. Because return migrants come home having changed (they come home "pochos"), and excited about the new ideas they learned in the U.S., they are seen as partial members of the American community that Mexicans resent. They therefore represent ideal targets against which non-migrants can channel their frustration at being consistently in the shadow of the U.S. Although non-migrants' attitudes have some material basis, they are principally driven by intersubjective beliefs about the U.S.

4.7 Explaining the Feebleness of Returnees before "Soft" Constraints

Why do return migrants give up their new actions and keep their new beliefs private although the challenges these come up against are of such a "soft" nature? Do returnees simply lack interest or commitment to their new forms of civic engagement?

Constructivists have shown that agents of diffusion may employ a variety of strategies in order to get potential adopters to buy into the foreign ideas they seek to promote. International migrants do not appear to utilize any of such strategies. Instead, their idealization of the U.S., and frustration with Mexico, along with the ever-present possibility of emigrating again, dampens their commitment to bringing about change.

The literature on the international diffusion of principles and policies shows that foreign innovations often require a little help in order to gain acceptance among key domestic actors. Keck and Sikkink (1998), for instance, show that framing a foreign innovation to which the public in a any given country may be hostile in terms of another issue for which there is already wide acceptance can help garner support for the first innovation. Framing involves agents acting purposively and strategically to advance the principles they seek to diffuse. Similarly, Acharya (2004) finds that agents of international diffusion may bring about change if they successfully "localize" foreign principles or policies. Localization entails active domestic agents of diffusion (individuals in the potential adopting country who embrace the foreign innovation in question) helping external agents to adapt and interpret the foreign innovation in question to fit the norms and values of the adopting country.

Return migrants do not appear to employ these or any other strategies that scholars have found to help foreign ideas get a foothold in new countries. Indeed, the in-depth interviews reveal that migrants typically do not work creatively at all to overcome resistance to their ideas concerning civic

engagement.[25] For instance, the individual who tried to start an Alcoholics Anonymous organization in his hometown reported working tirelessly for a year to try to get the group running, but he did not refer to attempting to change the nature of the organization, its purpose or target audience, or any effort to enjoin non-migrant Mexicans to his project.

One individual remarked that it is simply not possible to explain the new forms of civic engagement to people who have not been to the U.S.; he argued that Mexicans whose entire experience is rooted in their country of origin simply cannot imagine what is possible and true in the U.S., and that people have to see it to understand (this comment was in reference not only to political outcomes, but also economic). The woman who claimed to encourage her co-nationals to report crimes to the police at no point offered to accompany individuals to the police or to report a crime on their behalf (modeling); she simply accepted their rejection and moved on. This pattern is surprising. We would expect migrants, as both insiders and outsiders, to be particularly well placed to convey to their own people information about the political practices and beliefs they personally experienced and observed in the U.S.

Returnees do not work actively and creatively to promote the foreign ideas they import for three reasons. First, most migrants are just ordinary members of the mass public, whose potential for spreading ideas rests principally in prosaic social interactions. They are not purposive, active agents of political change. They lack the zeal of bona-fide transnational activists; therefore they tend to back down easily before limited resistance. Their influence is inadvertent; and they transmit information via quotidian social transactions.

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[25] One possible exception may be group of return migrants who were elected to their municipal government on a joint ticket. The group's electoral success may be attributed to their ability to convince others of their merit, given their status as return migrants; however, my conversations with them indicate that they did not import new practices or beliefs *per se*.

A second factor that prevents migrants from fighting to promote their new, more democratic political beliefs and behaviors is their vilification of Mexico and idealization of the U.S. Sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 offer some examples of return migrants' attitudes towards Mexico and its non-migrants. Returnees perceive their co-nationals as disinterested and resistant to change, while progress and action orientation are among the qualities they admire about Americans. This creates a situation in which returnees come to consider Mexico less worthy of their efforts and hard work.

In addition to the disappointment they feel towards their disinterested co-nationals, returnees are also highly critical of the government of their country of origin. Every respondent made note of aspects of the U.S. that they believed would most likely never exist in Mexico, even though that country would stand to gain from them, such as a more effective rule of law, lower levels of both government and citizen corruption, and an important tradition of voluntarism among citizens. Again, their belief that these improvements are not possible in Mexico is due to their perception that the country's leaders and institutions are highly resistant to change, particularly that which appears to borrow from or emulate their neighbor to the north.

The habit of comparing Mexico to the U.S. only intensifies returnees' pessimistic views towards their country's government, especially because they tend to idealize the U.S. government. About thirty percent of respondents said they would like the Mexican government to provide public services such as universal health care and extensive free public education at levels comparable to the U.S. In fact these services are at least as generous in Mexico as they are in the U.S. (plus, the constitution guarantees both in Mexico). One migrant noted admiringly that "U.S. leaders have unquestionable authority over the people" and that the "problem in Mexico is that the government does not dominate the people". He complained that in Mexico politicians cannot act because the public has too much freedom to criticize them, whereas in the U.S. this is not the case.

Another respondent stated that although he admires the cleanliness and order in the U.S., this is principally a government-produced outcome. An example, he specified, is that the government has responsibility for keeping residential neighborhoods and peoples' front yards clean. These romanticized beliefs about the U.S. government are consistent with non-migrants' accounts (reported in Table 4.4) of why returnees struggle to adapt to their country of origin, and why they do not make positive contributions when they return home. They indicate that returnees repeatedly set the U.S. government and political system in stark contrast with the Mexican one for the purpose of disparaging it rather than contributing to its improvement.

Returnees can sustain these jaded perceptions of Mexico because the possibility of migrating again is ever-present. Returnees' perceptions of the Mexico to which they return encourage them to seek an exit; while at the same time, the possibility of emigrating again appears to embolden and intensify their belief that it is not worth their effort to try to bring about change in their home country.

I concluded each of the semi-structured interviews with returnees by asking them if they intended to move north again, and if so, why? Just one of the 31 respondents replied that they never intended to return to the U.S. This is consistent with existing research indicating that having emigrated is associated with a strong probability of moving again (Massey, 1987; Massey & Espinosa, 1997). About 60 percent of the sample (principally those who had never obtained either legal permanent residency or citizenship in the U.S.) was keen to return to the U.S. for good and with their entire families if possible[26]. More than 80 percent of those respondents with a strong interest in emigrating again said that they actively work towards this objective on an ongoing basis, such as by staying in

[26] Permanent residents and citizens generally left that option open. The ease of exit for this group makes their responses with respect to intention to migrate again difficult to assess. In general, because of their immigration status in the U.S. such migrants can emigrate again anytime.

contact with employers abroad and by following the debate on immigration policy reform. This signifies that the proportion of returnees working to overcome obstacles to emigrating (.48) is higher than those who persisted against their non-migrant co-nationals' lack of support for the new political beliefs and behaviors they brought home from abroad (.12). Migrants who return are therefore weakly committed to their home country.

It is not difficult to see how returnees' belief that Mexico and its people are highly resistant to change, coupled with their weak commitment to that country that results from a compelling exit option, would prevent returnees from purposefully promoting the ideas they learned abroad via strategies such as localization.

4.8 Conclusion

This chapter presents a rich analysis of qualitative data gathered through 99 in-depth field interviews with migrants, their kin and friends, and community leaders to complement the statistical findings presented in Chapter 3. It finds that the experiences in the U.S. of returnees, who may be negatively self-selected, are nonetheless generally compatible with learning new, more democratic political beliefs and behaviors. Nonetheless, the analysis reveals that returnees fail to engage in new political actions persistently over time after they return and do not share the beliefs they import. The chief obstacle that migrants interested in implementing new types of civic engagement face is returnees' perception of a "lack of support" from their non-migrant co-nationals. Returnees back down before this weak impediment without persistently engaging in new types of political behaviors because they are not activists; because they have jaded views of Mexico and romanticize the U.S.; and because the ever-present possibility of emigrating again attenuates their commitment to Mexico.

The findings are inconsistent with the perspectives of rational choice theorists, who understand individual choices to be driven by objective constraints

and interests. In this case, returnee and non-migrant perceptions of one another; returnees' perspectives on Mexico; and non-migrants' resistance to the U.S. influence the choices of return migrants. The "lack of support" that migrants perceive rests in large part on non-migrants' resentment of changes that initiate in the north, and changes funded by the mighty dollar; it results from a mixture of resentment, alienation, and frustration that non-migrants feel towards return migrants.

This causal story is similar to those that constructivist scholars advance in that it is driven by intersubjective beliefs; however in the case of migrant-driven diffusion I find that the more democratic beliefs and behaviors of one country do not simply transcend international borders to enter less democratic ones, as many constructivists believe. Rather, nation-state borders fundamentally and differentially shape the interests, attitudes and perceptions of the actors they contain, on one hand, and those who move beyond them, on the other.

CHAPTER 5: THE STRENGTH OF LONG-DISTANCE TIES

5.1 Introduction

Chapter 3 indicates that non-migrant Mexicans who communicate with emigrants in the U.S. are more participative than non-migrants who do not engage in such transactions. We lack evidence to attribute this outcome to the transmission of information via long-distance cross-border social transactions between migrants to their friends and kin, however. Chapter 4 found that migrants who return to their home country do not effectively diffuse the political beliefs and behaviors they learned in the U.S. because they perceive a lack of support among their co-nationals in Mexico. It argued that non-migrants' attitudes towards migrants condition the diffusion of political beliefs and behaviors via returns. In light of that conclusion, non-migrants' *adoption* of the political practices that migrants transmit abroad seems paradoxical. This chapter therefore has two objectives. The first is to show that the changes in the political behaviors of non-migrants who communicate with their friends and family living in the U.S. in fact result from international diffusion. The second is to determine whether the diffusion process set in motion by migrants who stay abroad also conforms to the modified constructivist causal logic observed among return migrants; that is, if diffusion via long-distance cross-border ties is also conditioned by the ambivalent attitudes that non-migrants hold towards emigration to the U.S. and the U.S. itself.

Diffusion is a process, not an outcome (Elkins & Simmons, 2005). Chapter 3 indicates that social transactions between non-migrants and their co-nationals abroad are associated with statistically different political behavioral outcomes. It points to observable differences between the political participation of individuals who communicate with migrants, and those who do not, for which multiple explanations are possible. This chapter provides evidence that the differences are due to social communication between migrants and non-migrants, and not to other migration-related processes. Specifically, I show that the cash remittances

that many non-migrants who communicate with friends and family abroad also receive do not create these behavioral differences. Instead non-migrants' behaviors change as a result of what they learn via communication with Mexicans who live in the U.S.

Chapters 3 and 4 rigorously explored the possibility that either rational choice theory or bounded rationality contribute to explaining migrants' decisions to import and share the innovations they picked up in the U.S. as well as non-migrants' choice to either adopt or reject these innovations. The chapters advance considerable evidence to invalidate these approaches to understanding migrant-led international diffusion. The analysis below therefore focuses on finding evidence that either confirms and clarifies or invalidates the new type of constructivist account advanced in Chapter 4. I conduct theory-driven process tracing to evaluate whether non-migrants' perceptions of migrants abroad consistently condition their receptivity to the innovations that migrants share with them; I explore how and to what degree these attitudes influence migrants' interest and willingness to share what they have learned. I find that non-migrants' attitudes and beliefs about migrants critically influence both, just as they did in the case of diffusion via migrants who return to their home country.

The same attitudinal dynamics that diminish non-migrants' receptivity towards those who return to Mexico also enhance their openness to the ideas transmitted by migrants who remain in the U.S. However, whereas returnees give rise to sentiments of resentment, alienation and frustration, migrants who stay abroad create feelings of empathy, interest, and realization. This radically different response to migrants leads non-migrants to evaluate differently the information that migrants transmit, depending on whether they are located abroad or have returned home. A migrant's location thus represents an important signal to non-migrants concerning the value and trustworthiness of the innovations that migrants have to share. This signifies that all else held constant,

non-migrants are more willing to consider the political behaviors migrants transmit from abroad, even if these are identical to those that returnees transmit.

Non-migrants' inconsistent responses to return migrants are rationally inconsistent because they are primarily rooted in the beliefs that Mexicans share concerning the U.S. They give rise to biased choices, but they are a coherent consequence of the ambivalent beliefs that Mexicans share towards the U.S. and emigration to that country.

Beliefs about emigrants reflect a broader set of incongruous consequences of Mexican migration to the United States. On one hand Mexico benefits tremendously from the movement of its people to the north. Hundreds of thousands of households depend on the earnings that migrants send from abroad (Lozano Ascencio, 2007; Taylor, Mora, Adams, & Feldman, 2005), and the more than $20 billion that migrants remit contribute to keeping Mexico's current account balance stable (Bugamelli & Paterno, 2005). Positive effects such as these stand in stark contrast to migration's significant costs. For example, the number of migrant deaths that occur along the border has increased at least tenfold since the 1990s (Cooper, 2008). In just the first six months of the fiscal year beginning October 1, 2008, the number of migrants who died in their attempt to enter the U.S. clandestinely increased a full seven percent (Rotstein, 2009). Additionally, whereas emigrants have traditionally departed from just a few regions of Mexico and comprised individuals with low job skills and education, contemporary emigration to the U.S. originates throughout Mexico (see e.g., Cornelius, Fitzgerald, & Lewin Fischer, 2008); and emigration is also progressively depriving the country of its brightest, most educated and capable people (Corchado, 2008).

To the extent that migration simultaneously both weakens and strengthens Mexico and its citizens, attitudes about migration and migrants also range from negative to positive. For example, politically, there is evidence that the collective philanthropic investments that Mexican hometown organizations make via

government matching funds programs contribute to strengthening local government accountability (Burgess, 2005). But, others have found that high aggregate levels of migration contribute to increasing levels of political disengagement (Hiskey & Goodman, 2007). Economically, numerous scholars argue that migrants' remittances can give rise to economic growth (Orozco & Welle, 2005; Taylor, 1999) or simply to reducing poverty levels (Conway & Cohen, 1998) in Mexico. Furthermore there is evidence that migration improves non-migrants' access to primary health care (Reanne, 2005; Reanne et al., 2009). However, research also shows that the international movement of people can weaken the mental health of people involved, including both migrants and those who stay in the country of origin (see, e.g., Gorges, Breslau, Su, Miller, Medina-Mora, & Aguilar-Gaxiola, 2009). Consequently, popular understandings of the migration experience simultaneously glorify it as an exceptional opportunity and condemn it as an economically necessary evil that entails subjecting oneself to suffering at home and American exploitation, racism and mistreatment abroad.

In contrast to migrants who return, stayers are generally held in high regard. From the perspective of non-migrants, stayers demonstrate not only their capacity to enter the U.S. successfully, but to confront, on an ongoing basis, the challenges they face in that country. Staying indicates the capability to adapt to U.S. social, economic and political life; it makes migrants look courageous and accomplished in the eyes of their friends and kin who remain in Mexico. As long as migrants remain in the U.S., they represent for non-migrants a direct connection to that country's wealth, power opportunities, and constant progress. Their presence across the international border and far away makes them the subject of constant interest and concern. Migrants abroad therefore do not encounter the "lack of support" that return migrants report. To the contrary, they find among their co-nationals in Mexico a receptive and cooperative audience.

5.2 Rival Explanations for Behavioral Changes: Remittances

Remittances, or money, sent from migrants abroad to family members back home, may affect the political behavior of their recipients by ways quite distinct from international diffusion. First, there is evidence that remittances represent a material resource that strengthens individuals vis-à-vis powerful state actors, encouraging them to vote for opposition parties (Merino, 2005; Kurtz, 2004), or hold local leaders accountable (Burgess, 2005). Receiving remittances could similarly influence non-migrants' propensity to participate in the various non-electoral forms of political participation, collective protest, and the social organizations I explore in this project.

Another process by which remittances could influence the political behavior of those who receive them is by producing the effects of modernization on a small scale, at the individual level. Modernization theory argues that economic development has systematic and predictable cultural, social, and political consequences that transform social structures and generate cultural changes supportive of democracy. The theory concerns macro-level political and economic changes and sees industrialization as the principal force driving change (Inglehart & Baker, 2000).

Remittances may drive an alternative form of modernization that contributes to modifying personal attitudes and values even if the structural and cultural changes associated with industrialization do not occur; the process would represent a unique path to what Klingemann and Fuchs call "individual modernization" (1995, pp. 11-13). Although the extent to which remittances contribute to productive, value-added, and employment-generating enterprises is a subject of great debate (Durand, Kandel, Parrado, & Massey, 1996; Orozco & Welle, 2005; Taylor, 1999; Woodruff & Zentento, 2001; Zárate-Hoyos, 2005), there is considerable evidence that non-migrants invest the money they receive from migrants in services such as health care and education (see e.g., Borraz, 2005; Reanne, Palma-Coca, Rauda-Esquivel, Olaiz-Fernández, Díaz-

Olavarrieta, & Acevedo-García, 2009). Additionally, international money transfers between families benefit the poor by increasing their purchasing power and standard of living, and contribute to diminishing income inequalities (Adams & Page, 2005; Taylor, Mora, Adams, & Feldman, 2005). Non-migrants who receive remittances could thus become more participative and develop more democratic attitudes and beliefs because remittances improve the material quality of their lives and make them more capable citizens.[27]

To evaluate the effects of remittances I turn to the results of the multi-level linear and logistic regression analysis presented in Chapter 3. Chapter 3 describes the data, methods and model for this analysis in detail. The models include a control variable for those who receive money from migrants abroad. The variable estimates the yearly amount of remittances that respondents receive (in thousand-peso units) by multiplying the frequency with which respondents reported receiving remittances times the average amount received per transfer. The results are in Table 3.3.

Remittances produce no statistically significant effect on any of the behavioral or attitudinal dependent variables of interest. This signifies that cash transfers from migrants to non-migrants do not have the independent effect on non-migrant beliefs and behaviors that we would expect if remittances contributed to individual modernization. The result also implies that remittances do not make their recipients more likely to challenge the government by increasing their levels of political participation.

These findings are in contrast to those reported by other scholars and to the conventional wisdom concerning the potential effects of remittances (Burgess, 2005, Kurtz, 2004; Merino, 2005). More importantly, they suggest that the effects of communication, stripped of the potential confounding effect of

[27] Here I refer indirectly to Inglehart's (1997) concept of post-material values; however Inglehart employs it to characterize the values of entire societies and he implies a significantly greater level of aggregate level socio-economic development than that which migrants may achieve.

remittances, are quite significant; in contrast, remittances, stripped of confounding factors for which scholars typically do not control (communication with immigrants, having migrated and returned, living in a community in which migration is prevalent), have no effect. Long-distance cross-border communications therefore appear to be independently responsible for significant behavioral changes among non-migrants.

5.3 Evidence of Behavioral Transmission via Cross-Border Social Transactions

International diffusion is a process by which innovations are communicated through certain channels over time across state borders (Rogers, 1995). This chapter examines one way in which migrants seem to contribute to this process: the transmission of innovations pertaining to civic engagement from migrants who live in the U.S. to non-migrants living in Mexico. The statistical results show that non-migrants who communicate with their migrant friends and family are on average more participative than are non-migrants who do not. The finding strongly suggests that diffusion occurs; nonetheless, to provide a more compelling case, I explore the process more closely, based on in-depth qualitative research. What is the nature of cross-border communication? What ideas do migrants transmit to non-migrants, and which do non-migrants embrace?

5.3.1 Data and Methods

To understand how migrants in the U.S. contribute to diffusion, this section evaluates the content of 129 in-depth field interviews that addressed these questions. I interviewed 48 individuals who communicate with migrants in the U.S. 38 of these respondents were also in close contact with returnees and comprise the sample I interviewed for the analysis in Chapter 4. Additionally, I interviewed 10 individuals who communicate with friends and family in the U.S., but are not simultaneously in close contact with returnees. I also use data

gathered through 51 interviews with migrants, including the 31 return migrants described in Chapter 4 and 20 interviews with migrants who currently live in the U.S.

I used the same script to guide my semi-structured interviews with all non-migrants. In other words, the ten additional interviews I conducted with the family and friends of migrants who live in the U.S. contained the same questions that I asked the family and friends of returnees. I conducted all interviews with the friends and family of migrants face-to-face and privately—outside of the respondent's home.

The set of questions I asked the 20 migrants who live in the U.S. were unique and are available in Appendix F. I conducted the interviews with U.S. based immigrants either by way of a written questionnaire implemented via electronic mail, or over the phone. Subsequently, I sent electronic mails with additional clarification questions as necessary. The questionnaire that structured my interviews with migrants who have returned to Mexico is in Appendix 4-E.

With regard to the sample of migrants living in the U.S., I used the diverse case selection approach. To identify migrants living in the U.S., I used various strategies. First, I relied on Clara Pérez-Méndez of Boulder, Colorado. Clara has worked with the Spanish-speaking migrant community in Boulder County for over twenty years; the trust and respect she enjoys in that community helped me to efficiently gain access to respondents. Second, I turned to my personal knowledge of migrants living in the United States and subsequently used the snowball method. Finally, I contacted various relatives of non-migrants who I interviewed in Mexico. With respect to the ten non-migrants living in Mexico who do not relate to return migrants, I identified potential respondents at the suggestion of other interviewees and used the snowball sampling method. The characteristics of the additional interview respondents from whom I obtained information are summarized in Appendix G.

5.3.2 Characterizing Long-Distance Cross-Border Communication

Immigrants who live in the U.S. and non-migrants residing in Mexico reported engaging extensively in cross-border communication. The main types of social transactions were phone calls, migrant visits to Mexico, and visits of family and friends to the United States.

19 out of the 20 U.S. based interviewees claimed that they spoke with friends and family in Mexico by phone regularly; the average frequency was once per week. 11 of 20 reported visiting home at least once per year and 2 less than once per year. Among those who travel home, three indicated that their visits home initiated only after they obtained legal residency. Seven U.S.-based respondents had not returned home since they entered the U.S., presumably because they would have to re-enter clandestinely.

Similarly, nearly all non-migrants reported regularly communicating with their migrant friends and family by phone. The average frequency was once per month. The proportion that had seen their migrant relation in person since the last time they emigrated was relatively low, however. Only 13 percent (6 of 48) had traveled to the U.S. to see their relations, and about one in five had received in Mexico a visit from their friend or family member (other than to resettle permanently).

The topics of conversation guiding these long-distance cross-border social transactions between migrants and non-migrants (in order of importance) are: (1) the wellbeing and health of the family; (2) everyday life in the U.S.; (3) future plans of both the non-migrant and his interlocutors; (4) the economic and security problems that currently plague Mexico; and, (5) U.S. immigration policy.

Migrants are principally interested in discussing the health and wellbeing of those who they leave behind. For the majority of migrants, this concern is altogether separate from and superior to worries about one another's personal or familial economic situation.

“Everyday life” is a broad subject of conversation. The category includes observations about the social, political and economic lives of migrants in the U.S. For example, migrants share with their friends and family in Mexico their personal experiences with public or private services such as education and health; they narrate the process of getting immigration documents in order; or they report their experiences as consumers. Migrants note that they prioritize talking about these other issues over talking about their job. The topic “everyday life” precludes discussions about Mexico or the U.S. writ large, such as conversations about current events or the political and economic future of each country.

The topic “future plans” includes discussions about the education, employment, migration, and family plans of both migrants and non-migrants. For example, migrants discuss their intentions to return to Mexico, their intention to marry or have children, and their plans to invest in education and training. They may also share their interests in or decisions to purchase a major asset.

Cross-border communication often concerns Mexico’s economy and the crime and drug-related violence that plague that country (security issues). The majority of migrants said that the economy of Mexico concerns them continuously because it affects the specific economic future of their immediate family members and because it influences their choice to either return to Mexico or stay in the U.S. With respect to security issues, respondents indicated that non-migrants share with them horrific stories, while interlocutors on both sides discuss and critique the policy responses of the government as well as what non-governmental actors do or can do to help alleviate the situation.

Finally, a frequent topic of conversation among undocumented immigrants and their friends and family in Mexico is U.S. immigration policy. They discuss news concerning the recent intensification of immigration control activities within the U.S. (e.g., workplace immigration raids) as opposed to simply at the border; they contemplate the construction of the new high tech fence—the so called “wall of shame”—that the U.S. government has built along the border during the past

three years; and they share their views concerning the likelihood of a major immigration reform bill.

5.3.3 The Incidental Transmission of Political Ideas

When asked, respondents indicated that discussing U.S. or Mexican politics was not a priority during their cross-border social interactions. Migrants almost universally noted that they never initiate conversations specifically about politics, nor do they instruct or coach their family and friends back home on how to think about politics or engage their political system. On the other hand, when migrants freely described the content of their discussions, they revealed that they share with their friends and kin back home a great deal of American political ideas and practices and many of their observations or understandings of political life in the U.S.

Long-distance cross-border communication is therefore rich in the content that concerns the present research; however, its transmission is incidental and unintentional. When migrants are abroad, a majority convey to their non-migrant friends and kin the new political beliefs and behaviors that they observe and even embrace in the U.S. (15 of the 20 U.S.-based immigrants that I interviewed and over half of the return migrants)—if only inadvertently. In this section, I report numerous examples of the “political” content of long-distance cross-border conversations. The content can be roughly grouped into four categories: (1) the nature of transactions with police and bureaucrats in the U.S.; (2) the importance of voluntary activities in America; (3) the level of personal responsibility that Americans assume vis-à-vis their government and the outcomes it produces; and (4) Americans’ and their government’s respect for individual and human rights.

Many migrants noted that they share with family and friends in Mexico their surprise at the relatively high level of trust citizens appear to feel towards the police and government bureaucrats, as well as the expedience and efficiency of transactions between such workers and citizens. One college educated male

immigrant noted that because they are corrupt and inefficient, “We avoid institutions such as the police in Mexico. But these are vital in the U.S. and very much part of daily life. This has changed my perception of how important these institutions are. And I now think it is our responsibility to make these institutions part of Mexico’s daily life as well.” He claimed that he tried to convey this perspective to his co-nationals at home whenever possible. Similarly, an undocumented female migrant with a primary school education shared that she tries to encourage her “parents to participate in the government services available for older people, and I tell my sisters to go to education programs that the government sponsors. In Mexico, we complain about government services a lot, but we don’t use the services to the extent that we could either.” A male migrant with a high school education said that he remarks often to non-migrants that “it is amazing how much American bureaucrats and police are at the service of the people. Of course there are the problems with the police that we see on the news and all that, but overall, the role that public servants assume in the U.S. is different; the police and the bureaucrats want to help the public, not just themselves.”

Another salient message concerns the value of volunteering. Migrants abroad tell non-migrants about how Americans work collectively—independent of the government—to help produce the social, political and economic outcomes they desire. For example, one college-educated male said that he tries to “educate people on the value of volunteering and working on behalf of their community. I tell them about the culture of help and NGOs. In Mexico we are always waiting for the government to do everything for us, we do not initiate community based programs or non-governmental projects to help one another and our communities.” Similarly, an undocumented female with a middle school education said she tells people about the “value of volunteering, how volunteering can even help improve the economy. For example, my sister here, now she takes care of kids voluntarily so that their moms can go to work. They

help each other get ahead. This never happens in Mexico; people don't volunteer to help outside the family."

A closely related area of discussion is individual civic responsibility. Migrants relate the many ways in which Americans take individual actions to contribute to their political system's effectiveness and to enhance the outcomes it produces. For instance, one undocumented woman with a middle school education noted that she tries to explain to her family in Mexico that Americans participate a great deal in the decisions of their community; that they are persistent in teaching their children ethics and the dangers of corruption; and that they are oriented towards helping to improve life in their community. Another woman who arrived in the U.S. with a primary school education, but has since completed high school, said that she tells her family about how she—not the government—took responsibility for her education. "I saved the money from my work to pay for my studies. I investigated about the opportunities and went after them. The government here [in the U.S.] provides a lot of opportunities, but individuals have to actively pursue them. In Mexico people don't take responsibility for going after their interests." Similarly, a male respondent with a Mexican college education who arrived without documents, but now resides permanently in the U.S., said, "I try to share stories that will encourage people in Mexico to get political, to get active and go after their interests rather than wait around."

The role of personal responsibility vis-à-vis corruption is also a common theme. One undocumented woman noted, "When I talk with my family about the economic and security problems in Mexico, I ask them if they give bribes…We have to change our own actions, and stop violating the rules and laws. I have learned a lot here about the value of starting change with your own actions." Another, college-educated women said she has conveyed her amazement at the seriousness and care with which Americans prepare and submit their tax returns. "Paying taxes is something that most Americans think you should do. It is

something that they are very aware of. They do it without any real coercion." Another respondent noted, "I have told my relations in Mexico about how people here know the laws; they are aware of what the law says. We need to do that too. It's something we can do to make the law more important."

Finally, migrants also convey their understanding that Americans and their government seem to make considerable efforts to respect human and individual rights. One college-educated woman said "I talk to my friends and family in Mexico about how my job here at the university is to look out for the rights of minorities and I compare the situation here to that of indigenous people and women in Mexico. A lot more can be done to protect minority rights in Mexico." Another undocumented woman with a primary education related that her adult brother has a learning disability and is not economically active as is the case for most people with disabilities in Mexico. "I am always telling my parents that it is possible for adults with disabilities to work and become more independent. They can have lives that are almost normal. They can contribute to the economy."

We can see why respondents might not consider that the comments cited above pertain to politics. By and large migrants do not converse with non-migrants about political events or institutions, candidates, elections, parties, or social movements. On the other hand, they clearly share the types of political beliefs and behaviors that I evaluate in this study—beliefs and behaviors that contribute to strengthening democracy. Migrants convey examples and express approval of the responsibilities that citizens in the U.S. democracy assume. They share their sense that relations between citizens and the state are different in the U.S. And, they relate their surprise at and admiration for Americans' commitment to individual and human rights. Furthermore, in their communications with non-migrants, Mexican immigrants in the U.S. intimate that each of these aspects of U.S. political life is worth emulating.

The observations that migrants share mingle beliefs and behaviors, making it difficult to determine whether they serve to transmit one or the other.

When asked, respondents tended to claim that migration had not fundamentally changed their beliefs. For example, some noted that they have always believed that all individuals, regardless of race or gender, should have equal rights, while others indicated that their ideas concerning citizens' theoretical responsibility to the state had not changed. However, they remarked that in the U.S. they had seen their beliefs effectively reflected in multiple aspects of everyday social, economic and political life to an extent they had previously considered impossible. "We work side by side with blacks, my kids play with blacks, and people discuss their attitudes toward race issues and homosexuality here. In Mexico we don't even discuss these things", said one undocumented female with a sixth grade education. "I am now aware that in Mexico, indigenous people are totally marginalized. I have always supported the idea that indigenous Mexicans have the same rights as any other Mexican, but now I see that so much more can be done," noted a college-educated male. Overall, respondents explained that their understanding of what citizens and government can do to make their political beliefs real had changed radically. The nature of what migrants transmit can therefore best be characterized as descriptions of actions that fulfill fundamental democratic values and beliefs.

5.4 Unexpected Changes among Mexicans Who Stay Home

The theoretical argument advanced in Chapter 4 suggests that non-migrants' attitudes towards both the U.S. and emigrants to that country could preclude the adoption of any behavioral predispositions and beliefs that U.S.-based migrants transmit. Based on that theory, one could think that non-migrants in Mexico reject the foreign ideas that U.S.-based migrants convey, even if non-migrants and Mexico in general would stand to benefit from emulating them. However, the statistical analysis in Chapter 3 indicates that non-migrants who communicate with friends and family living in the U.S. are significantly more participative than their co-nationals who do not engage in such social

transactions. Furthermore, my in-depth field interviews reveal that non-migrants who communicate with Mexicans in the U.S. embrace new political behaviors similar to those that return migrants claim to practice just after re-entering Mexico and then abandon. This paradoxical outcome indicates that non-migrants are not averse to the specific behaviors and attitudes that emanate from the U.S., but rather that they respond negatively when returnees transmit them. It is not the content of the message that is decisive, but rather the messenger.

Table 5.1 below presents some examples of the new political behaviors in which non-migrants reported engaging since their friend or family member left for the U.S., as a result of the information that their migrant relation shares with them. There are strong parallels between the new behaviors that non-migrants claim to "learn" from migrants in the U.S., on one hand, and the beliefs and behaviors that return migrants import into Mexico, on the other. To show this clearly, I have organized the examples of what non-migrants learn from Mexicans in the U.S. according to the same categories I used in Chapter 4 to characterize the beliefs and behaviors that returnees import.

Table 5.1: Non-Migrants' Adoption of Behavioral Predispositions that U.S.-based Migrants Transmit from Across the Border

Type of Participation	New Actions that Non-Migrants learn from Migrants who Stay in the U.S.
Participation in Organizations	"There are ways to get involved other than through political parties. I used to avoid politics because I don't like to meddle with the parties. But [migrant relation] has made me realize I can get involved in other ways, especially through community organizations."
Collective action	"I have learned that we can cooperate to support public works. We don't have to wait for the government to do things and then just complain if there is not enough money. We can get private money, ask for donations, get sponsors, and ask the migrants who are on the other side to help us by putting in their dollars." "Women have to get together, organize, protect their interests; we organized a group to give information to the young girls about domestic violence."
Individual participation	"My mother carries an extra plastic bag with her everywhere she goes. It's to pick up trash. She says she can't get everything and there is still a lot of trash all around, but at least she's doing her part now." "I follow local news and issues more. I think it's important to know what is going on. I didn't pay attention before. We watch CNN." "I follow international news more – I want to know what is happening in the north because our son lives there and because now our life also depends on what is going

	on outside this country. “
Political Efficacy	“I try to attend public meetings and pay attention to how things are changing. I read and become informed…I don’t let others influence decisions on my behalf so much anymore. I used to think that public affairs didn’t concern me, they just happened to me and I had to live with them. Now I see things a little differently.” “I am trying to know more about my rights—about the things that I am permitted to do and what I can’t do.”
Rule of Law and Justice	“I report crimes and even my suspicion of a crime to the police. I tell people to call the police.” “I try not to offer bribes, to teach the kids the importance of not offering bribes. They should go through the formal procedures to resolve any legal issues. But it’s hard, they are very unpractical. It takes a lot of time.”
Tolerance	“We are trying to improve the community so that people with disabilities can live better here. We made some ramps. But it’s difficult. The people don’t always understand why we should spend so much for just a few people. The problem is that there is no money.” “My husband is supporting the education of our two younger daughters now that he sees that our other daughter is coming out ahead and getting an education up there.”

The U.S.-based migrants did not report transmitting beliefs, and the statistical analysis did not reveal that non-migrants who communicate with Mexicans in the U.S. change their political beliefs. Nonetheless, as I explained earlier, both migrants and non-migrants refer to talking about and engaging in actions that are clearly motivated by beliefs that sustain effective democracies (tolerance, political efficacy, and support for the rule of law). I have placed examples of new behaviors that are associated with these beliefs accordingly.

The evidence—both statistical and qualitative—that Mexicans back home change their behaviors as a result of communicating with migrants appears to counter the argument that their shared attitudes toward both the U.S. and emigration to that country condition their receptivity to the ideas that migrants transmit. Indeed, it suggests that there exist some conditions under which non-migrants embrace the innovations that migrants share.

Under what conditions are non-migrants open to learning from migrants about how political life operates in the U.S. and then changing their own actions? Under what conditions do they snub migrants, and when do they champion them? Are non-migrants’ disparate attitudes towards migrants and the foreign

ideas they introduce into Mexico consistent with the neo-constructivist explanation I advance in Chapter 4?

5.5 The Paradox of Long-Distance Ties

Non-migrants' simultaneous rejection of returnees and acceptance of the innovations that migrant stayers transmit to Mexico can be explained by their attitudes toward the United States and immigration to the north. The paradox arises from the shared love-hate sentiments that Mexicans have toward the U.S. These ambivalent sentiments lead them to respond positively toward migrants who remain in the U.S, as opposed to their negative reaction to individuals who return to Mexico. The contradictory outcomes are therefore fully consistent with the constructivist interpretation I advance in Chapter 4.

5.5.1 Data and Methods

This section uses theory-driven, process tracing to evaluate the interviews I conducted with both non-migrants and migrants (including stayers and returnees). The objective is twofold. It evaluates how new ideas about political beliefs and behaviors flow from migrants living in the U.S. to non-migrants living in Mexico. And is explores why non-migrants embrace the foreign ideas that the friends and kin in the U.S. transmit, while they reject the same ideas when they issue from returnees.

Process tracing is a research method that requires scholars to trace the process leading to an outcome to determine whether each step along the way conforms to the expectations generated by the theory under consideration (George & Bennett, 2005). According to George and McKeown (1985), process tracing:

> attempts to uncover what stimuli the actors attend to; the decision process that makes use of these stimuli to arrive at decisions; the actual behavior that then occurs; the effect of various institutional arrangements on

> attention, processing, and behavior; and the effect of other variables of interest on attention, processing, and behavior (p. 35).

In this case, I seek to verify that diffusion via migrants abroad follows the constructivist interpretation I advanced in Chapter 4 with respect to non-diffusion by way of return migrants.

Like Qualitative Comparative Analysis, process tracing differs from research methods that rest on a correlational logic. Instead it involves evaluating systematically whether the process under examination follows the theory in question or not. The technique does not even require comparison. However, here, I employ it comparatively to show that the way in which stayers diffuse political beliefs and behaviors conforms to the same theoretical logic that explains return migrants' weak contribution to diffusion. My objective is to show that the theory accounts for diffusion from abroad as well as for non-diffusion via returnees. As a result, although the section focuses principally on the role of migrants abroad, I compare my findings with respect to this population to the findings reported in Chapter 4 to show that the explanations are consistent throughout.

5.5.2 U.S.-Based Migrant Transmission-Initial Motivations and Persistence over Time

Like return migrants, stayers are motivated to share the political beliefs and behaviors they observe and embrace in the U.S. when they think these might also function effectively in Mexico; they share information they believe could improve social, political and economic life in Mexico—including the quality of its democracy. U.S.-based respondents consistently noted that their interest in Mexico and its future had either remained the same or increased since emigrating (2 and 18, respectively); no respondent indicated that their interest had declined. The reasons include the ongoing presence of family in Mexico, the possibility of returning, and the belief that, as one migrant stated, "witnessing

how another country works makes you think about everything that might be possible in your own country, and you feel responsible."

Unlike return migrants, stayers do not start off enthusiastic about introducing into Mexico new behaviors and then quit. Among the twenty U.S.-based interviewees that reported sharing the content I summarized in Section 5.3.1, all indicated that their transmission is ongoing. More interestingly, most return migrants noted that when they were in the U.S., they shared their new political beliefs and behavioral dispositions without inhibitions; they did not stop sharing until they reentered Mexico. Why do migrants persist in their efforts to introduce foreign innovations when they remain in the U.S., rather than quit?

Chapter 4 revealed that return migrants quit their new political actions because they felt discouraged by co-nationals in Mexico who did not seem to support them. I find evidence that non-migrants' sentiments toward migrants while they remain in the U.S. are quite the contrary. Not only do U.S.-based migrants fail to perceive the discouraging lack of support reported by those who return, Mexicans in the U.S. claim that non-migrants respond to them with interest, admiration, and even joy.

Respondents universally indicated that their family and friends respond with great interest to whatever they share about life in the U.S. At the same time, they also concurred that their friends and kin in Mexico generally consider that the narratives they relate would be implausible in Mexico. One woman indicated that her family argues that Mexicans are incapable of change. Several respondents coincided in claiming that their family and friends are happy that they left Mexico. For example, one undocumented woman with a high school education said, "they [my family] congratulate me and tell me how happy they are for me that I left Mexico because there are more possibilities here." Another woman explained, "they say I should stay in the U.S…that our children will be much better off than if we return to Mexico." A male respondent with a college

education said that his long-distance interlocutors were very interested in how things work in the U.S., but generally apathetic.

Despite the pessimism that U.S.-based migrants often confronted, they remained undeterred from sharing continuously over time. The reason is that non-migrants' attitudes toward migrants who remain in the U.S. differ radically from their attitudes toward returnees. Non-migrants want to hear what migrants who are outside of Mexico have to share, because they hold these individuals in high regard. Their attitudes towards migrants at home, versus abroad, are part of a broader ambivalence that is characteristic of Mexicans' attitudes towards the U.S. and Mexico's relations with that country. Mexican economist Luis Rubio captures this ambivalence eloquently in a 2006 article entitled, "The Gulf of Mexico." He writes:

> Mexico has spent the better part of the past two centuries trying to define itself against the reflection of its powerful neighbor to the north…It has preferred ambiguity so that the responsibilities of being either a clear friend or an enemy of the United States did not impose themselves. In this way Mexico has maintained the pride of distance while still enjoying the practical benefits of propinquity (Rubio, 2006, p 1).

With respect to migrants, having a friend or family member who resides in the U.S. implies significant practical benefits. At the same time, it costs little to assert national pride and sovereignty by keeping return migrants at a distance.

Table 5.2 below specifies the types of supportive attitudes that non-migrants expressed in their interviews. The left column indicates whether the attitude was most prevalent with respect to U.S.-based migrants without documents permitting their presence in the United States, with such documents, or both.[28] The center column explains the source of the supportive attitude, meaning the underlying condition that causes non-migrants to have positive

[28] Here, documented migrants are those with valid visas other than tourist visas. That is, with permits for long-term stays in the U.S. such as student visas, "green-cards," and work permits such as H-1 visas.

sentiments towards migrants in the U.S., quite in contrast to their feelings towards returnees. To depict the sources of support as best as possible, I either paraphrased representative responses (these are marked in quotes) or summarized their nature succinctly in my own words. The right hand column indicates the type of supportive attitude associated with each source of support. I identified four types of attitudes: (1) Empathy; (2) Distance; (3) Opportunity/Membership; and, (4) Reciprocal obligations. I briefly explain each of these in the following paragraphs.

Empathy. The understandings that non-migrants widely share concerning the challenges that migrants face in the U.S. (compared to within Mexico) are the stuff of urban legends. Mexicans' beliefs about the U.S., Americans and bilateral relations between Mexico and the U.S. fundamentally underpin popular discourse concerning migrants' lives in the U.S. As we saw in Chapter 4, the salient negative perception of the U.S. concerns how the U.S. treats Mexico and Mexicans. 49 percent of Mexicans perceive Americans as a little bit to fully intolerant, and 73 percent believe that they are either racist or very racist (CIDAC-Zogby, 2006). For 63 percent of Mexicans, the best explanation for the wealth of the U.S. as compared to Mexico is that the U.S. exploits the riches of others (CIDAC-Zogby, 2006).

Table 5.2: Expressions of Support for Migrants in U.S.

Status of Immigrant (documented/ undocumented/ both)	Source of Supportive Attitude	Type of Supportive Attitude
Undocumented	"They work so hard out there" "They are exploited"	Empathy
Undocumented	"When they don't have work [either because they just arrived or because they are between jobs] it's so hard to stay afloat, we worry about them when there is no work."	Empathy
Both	"We know that they discriminate against our people up there."	Empathy

Undocumented	"Crossing the border is so dangerous, and now the authorities are looking for migrants at the factories and at work."	Empathy
Both	"We worry because he/she is alone out there. The family is here."	Empathy Distance
Both	"They miss home. They have to adapt to new foods, a different language, a different housing situation."	Empathy Distance
Both	Infrequent communication	Distance
Both	"The money we receive from [the migrant] has transformed our lives."	Opportunity/ Membership
Both	"He says that he is fixing his papers so that he can take us all up there. We're just waiting for him to fix the papers."	Opportunity/ Membership
Both	Pride at migrant's integration in community. Including employment, education, participation in the community, receipt of awards, acquisition of new assets, etc…	Opportunity/ Membership
Documented	Migrant is a citizen of the U.S.	Opportunity/ Membership
Undocumented	"Because of the money that [migrant] sends home, our two kids are finishing school and attending university."	Reciprocal obligations
Undocumented	"Because of the money that [migrant] sends home, we can pay for good medicines. We are not lacking for things."	Reciprocal obligations

A 2006 public opinion poll revealed that 38 percent of Mexicans feel resentment towards the U.S., this figure increased to 42 percent in the central and southeast regions of Mexico that have the longest traditions of emigration (Gonzalez & Minushkin, 2006).

Undocumented migrants are therefore seen as suffering victims. The Mexican national press feeds these perceptions by accentuating the exceptionally injurious consequences of migration such as the incidence of deaths at the border, cases of migrants who are on death row, and stories concerning the deportation of undocumented Mexican migrants who then choose to leave their children in the U.S. (i.e., the U.S. government's separation of families). Non-migrant Mexicans therefore worry a great deal about their friends and kin in the U.S. Their concerns orient them favorably towards U.S.-based

migrants, since the latter are believed to sacrifice their physical and emotional wellbeing in order to improve their personal situation and that of their family.

Distance. In this case, distance is both literal and figurative. It refers not only to the territory separating migrants and "home", but to the cultural divide that stands between the two. Distance can cause empathy, but it has another unique effect on non-migrants' attitudes towards U.S.-based migrants as well. Because cross-border, long-distance communication necessarily happens by phone, letters, the Internet, or expensive travel, this type of social transaction is relatively infrequent and unsatisfying in length as compared with the everyday transactions in which non-migrants can engage with returnees. The relative scarcity of communication between non-migrants and their co-nationals in the U.S. enhances the interlocutors' mutual attentiveness. Furthermore, distance inherently enhances the intensity of long-distance communication, since it is essential in order for migrants and non-migrants to maintain and reaffirm their long-distance cross-border relationships. Finally, the cultural dimensions of distance, such as concerns about a migrant's ability to adapt to American food, serve to further enhance non-migrants' interest in their friends and family abroad. Indeed, my interviews suggest that some migrants, because of the response they elicit, perpetuate perceptions of how difficult it is to adapt to life abroad.

Opportunity/Membership. Migrants' ongoing presence in the U.S. represents a link to both the possibilities available in the U.S. In other words, migrants create for non-migrants a form of vicarious membership in the host country—particularly for their immediate family. These possibilities are both real and imagined. Some examples of how long-distance social transactions create concrete forms of indirect membership include households that benefit materially from receiving remittances. Non-migrants in such households have indirect membership in the U.S. economy. Additionally, since family reunification is one of the key principles behind current U.S. immigration policy, having a migrant family member in the U.S. can signify the possibility of emigrating for other members of

the household; it signifies potential future membership. Even for those who migrate without documents, an individual with family or friends abroad will be more likely to emigrate for the first time than someone without such ties, because friends and family provide “insider” information on the workings of the U.S., job availability, and how to migrate (Massey, Alarcón, Durand, & González, 1987).

More symbolic forms of membership sentiments that emerge include, for instance, non-migrants’ satisfaction in the various levels of membership that their migrant relations attain in the more wealthy and powerful U.S. (e.g., job promotions, awards, marrying an American, etc.). Many family members of migrants boasted about the success of their family member in the U.S. as if it were their own personal achievement. Ironically, as migrants become more integrated in the country that most Mexicans resent, they become a source of pride and optimism for non-migrants. A migrant’s success—particularly a family member—can affect feelings of personal efficacy among non-migrants even if the migrant does not send home cash or facilitate migration. Somehow, the presence of a close relative in the U.S. makes people at home more hopeful about the future.

Ambivalent sentiments about the U.S. and U.S.-Mexico relations thus underpin non-migrants’ attitudes towards Mexicans who live in the U.S. We saw in Chapter 4 and above that the core of negative feelings towards the U.S. concerns the country’s historical place as a giant that casts its shadow over the continent and mistreats Mexicans. Such sentiments are in contrast to Mexicans’ positive sentiments towards their northern neighbor. The latter revolve around the quality of the U.S. democracy and the economic opportunity the country offers. Thus while Mexicans resent U.S. interference in their country and their perception that their northern neighbor wants to take over the world (Beltrán, Krauze, 2005), about 50 percent of respondents believe that their life would improve if they cross the border *illegally*. Similarly, while Mexicans blame U.S. interference for Mexico’s political and economic problems, they yearn to study

politics and economics in American universities. As Krauze notes, the border is thus both a scar and opportunity.

Attitudes towards migrants reflect these ambiguities. While migrants are abroad, they represent a link to these opportunities (both real and symbolic), yet they are also perceived as self sacrificing for putting up with American arrogance, discrimination and racism. Combined with the distance that separates migrants from non-migrants, these paradoxical perceptions contribute to strengthening ties between migrants and their friends and kin who stay in Mexico.

Reciprocity. Research shows that undocumented migration is often a collective economic strategy in which migrants fulfill certain functions and household members who stay behind perform others (Bustamante, Jasso, Taylor, & Legarreta, 1998; Cohen, 2001; Conway & Cohen, 1998; Massey, 1990; Massey, Goldring, & Durand, 1994; Warnes, 1992). Within this context migrants hold a special status as risk-takers that were selected from the household for their fitness to undertake the challenge of moving north. Migrants' stays in the U.S. are thus a unique time during which household members on both sides of the border support each other mutually and are especially responsive to one another.

Empathy, distance, opportunity/membership and reciprocal obligations are the attitudes that underlie the elevated social status of migrants who are in the U.S. Migrants who remain in the U.S. thus enjoy an elevated status when they are in the U.S., precisely because they are away and in the country towards which Mexicans hold such ambiguous sentiments. These attitudes make social transactions between Mexicans at home and abroad more assiduous, conscientious and compassionate as compared with social transactions between returnees and the co-nationals who receive them in their country of origin.

Significantly, these attitudes do not reflect objective differences between migrants who stay and migrants who return. Non-migrants do not respond to U.S.-based migrants with greater interest because they consistently convey

better ideas, are more effective communicators, or possess other attributes that indicate they are better leaders or more expert than returnees. In fact, stayers and returnees convey much of the same content; and returnees are capable of explaining and demonstrating face-to-face the actions they propose; but, non-migrants are more responsive to U.S.-based migrants. A migrant's location either in the U.S. or Mexico is the key variable that influences non-migrants' receptivity to the information each type of migrant shares. This finding clearly contradicts the rational approaches to social learning.

The accounts that return migrants provide about how these attitudes of their friends and family changed following their return confirm this argument. Several returnees commented to the effect that after they return, people no longer make time to speak with them. For example, one male said that after a six-year undocumented trip to the U.S., "I converse less with my family now that I am here. Being away brings the family together, but now everybody says they are very busy here." Non-migrants also shared frustration that returnees want to talk when there is much work there is to be done. They claim that their relationship with returnees weakens because they no longer work as hard as they did while they were away. However, my interviews also reveal that their communication and the effects of empathy, distance and reciprocity are strongest during the time when U.S.-based migrants are unemployed or otherwise struggling to stay afloat in the north. This signifies that the time that non-migrants make to listen to migrants differs depending on whether they are at home or abroad.

Another migrant said that while he was in the U.S. his family celebrated his narratives. They were happy for him and his achievements in the U.S. They remarked that his decision to leave Mexico to make his life in the north had been for the best, because Mexico does not afford the same level of opportunities. Nonetheless, upon his return, when he tried to provide to those individuals with the behavioral and attitudinal innovations that could help to create those

opportunities in Mexico, they accused him of being impractical, having changed and forgetting where he comes from (Mexico). When he was away, they were proud of his ability to adapt and get ahead in a country they perceive as politically and economically dominant; his success indicated to non-migrants his ability to overcome the intolerance and exploitation that they believe migrants face in the U.S. When he returned, non-migrants tagged him as a “pocho” (a derogatory term for migrants who are no longer seen as fully Mexican or American) as a result of the ways in which he had changed in the U.S.; after he returned non-migrants accused him of thinking he was better than others.

Similarly, one individual noted that migrants’ efforts to contribute collectively to improving their hometowns by investing remittances that they have pooled together are better received when the migrants are abroad than if they have returned home. The Programa 3x1 Para Migrantes, a Mexican government program that matches the funds that migrants invest collectively in public infrastructure, encourages this outcome to some degree because it requires that donations come from migrant organizations that are based in the U.S. But such organizations often do not go through this program, either because they want to avoid the bureaucratic and political process it entails, or simply because migrant funds outstrip the program’s capabilities to match funds.

A more fundamental reason for the weaker reception of collective remittances invested from within Mexico has to do with localization. Non-migrants can utilize the funds of U.S.-based migrants to implement projects that they have planned together without necessarily having to negotiate every detail with the migrant donors. Migrants may return home to help supervise the project occasionally, but they are not the principal implementers. This means there are fewer opportunities for non-migrants and migrants to clash over how the output should look. Migrants are less likely to stress to non-migrants their perception that the project simply does not look like it does in the U.S.; as a result they are less likely to become frustrated by how things are done in Mexico and to have

second thoughts about their investment. At the same time non-migrants are freer to implement the project according to the procedures and customs with which they are familiar in Mexico.

This pattern is evident in other circumstances as well. The fact that migrants' communication with non-migrants is of limited duration and their location far away from the home community insulates them from seeing the differences between Mexico and the U.S. as sharply as do returnees. Stayers are generally more optimistic about what is possible in Mexico than are returnees. They can share their new political behavioral dispositions and beliefs with non-migrants without simultaneously facing the challenges of re-integrating and adapting back into life in the home country. Moreover, because they are away, the supportive attitudes of non-migrants encourage them to share their understandings of U.S. political and social life.

In addition to being more open to the ideas that U.S.-based migrants—as opposed to returnees—convey, non-migrants can put into action the ideas they receive without having to confront the migrants' concern that the innovation actually resembles the U.S. model. Non-migrants only have to imagine in the Mexican context how the information that migrants convey could improve Mexican politics; because they have never lived under the umbrella of U.S. democracy, they cannot compare their version of the U.S. idea to the true model. As a result they are less likely to become frustrated and quit.

A key implication is that we may not observe the replications of specific behaviors. Instead, non-migrants may take action where they can and know how as a result of the broader narrative that they hear from their friends and family in the U.S. Though this process may give rise to less radical forms of change, the changes it produces are probably less likely to generate resistance and therefore more likely to persist in the long run.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter shows cross-border communication is prevalent, frequent, and rich in narratives about political life in the U.S., including its traditions of civic participation. Migrants transmit similar observations about U.S. political life that return migrants import; however they do so incidentally and unintentionally in the course of conversations about more personal concerns. Nonetheless, whereas non-migrants reject the innovations that returnees import, their communications with migrants abroad give rise to changes in their political participation.

I show that Mexicans' ambivalent attitudes towards the U.S. and emigration to that country explain non-migrants' paradoxical rejection and acceptance of foreign political ideas and practices. Long-distance channels of communication are stronger pathways for the diffusion of democratic beliefs and behaviors because non-migrants feel empathy for U.S.-based immigrants, while distance strengthens the quality of their communication, and the migration process itself creates reciprocal obligations. In contrast to relations with returnees, which non-migrants employ as an opportunity to reject the U.S., its people and customs, social ties with U.S.-based immigrants draw out Mexicans' desire to be close to their neighbor to the north.

The reasons for these paradoxical outcomes have some material basis, but non-migrants' beliefs about the negative aspects of the U.S. and Americans exceed the truth. Anti-Americanism in Mexico is what Katzenstein and Keohane (2006) classify as a bias as opposed to an opinion. The latter involve unfavorable specific judgments about the U.S and its policies, while the latter entails a systematic negative predisposition toward the U.S. that keeps individuals from fairly evaluating that country and its policies. Mexican anti-Americanism is rooted in history and ideas (Krauze, 2005), more than in concrete contemporary political events.

Migration itself strongly influences contemporary views concerning U.S.-Mexico relations and the U.S., but non-migrants' interpretation of political issues

that focus on the border, as well as their understanding of Mexicans' experiences in the U.S., are highly biased. Their biases in this respect are a result of non-migrants' systematic tendency to negatively judge the U.S.; and this, in turn, is because their historical relations with that country causes them to mistrust U.S. intentions and believe that the country and its people only seek aggrandizement at the expense of others.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

The ongoing political incorporation of millions of Mexican-born nationals in the U.S., the interest in improving the quality of democracy among Mexican citizens in their home country, and the existence of trans-state channels of communication linking these two populations—migrant returns and long-distance communication—suggest that migration could lead to the diffusion of democratic beliefs and behaviors from migrants' more democratic host countries to their countries of origin. This dissertation first explores whether Mexican migrants to the U.S. transmit to non-migrants, either when they return to Mexico or via cross-border communication, the more democratic beliefs and behaviors they learn in their host country. Then it seeks to provide a theoretical explanation for the counterintuitive outcomes that each of the two channels of diffusion produces. Chapter 2 explains the theoretical argument. Chapter 3 provides statistical evidence to suggest that migrants do indeed contribute to diffusion, but in more varied ways than we might have expected. Chapter 4 draws on in-depth interviews with migrants who have returned to Mexico and with Mexican non-migrants to explain why returnees contribute weakly to the diffusion of new political beliefs and behaviors. Finally, Chapter 5 explains analyses interviews with U.S.-based migrants, non-migrants and returnees to explain why migrants who remain in the U.S., despite their physical distance from home, contribute to changing the political behaviors of the friends and kin they leave behind in Mexico.

This chapter pulls together the evidence and arguments I presented in Chapters 3 through 5, and considers their broader implications and applicability. It begins by summarizing the main findings of the dissertation. Subsequently, I consider the implications of my research for Mexico's democracy and for North American integration. Thirdly, I consider the applicability of my theoretical

argument beyond migrants to other actors at the level of mass publics. I conclude by setting an agenda for future research.

6.1 Main Findings and Core Argument

This dissertation advances a new theory of migrant-driven international diffusion based on research conducted in the critical case of Mexico-U.S. migration. Of the three theoretical approaches that this dissertation tested—rational choice, bounded rationality, and constructivism—constructivism best accounts for the process through which migrants contribute to the diffusion of political beliefs and behaviors from their more democratic host country to their less democratic country of origin. I advance a theory that embraces constructivists' chief assertion that:

> human interaction is shaped primarily by ideational factors, not simply material ones; that the most important ideational factors are widely shared or "intersubjective" beliefs, which are not reducible to individuals; and that these shared beliefs construct the interests of purposive actors (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001, p. 391).

However, I break with constructivist research that has focused on unidirectional causality. That is, I put forth that international ideas and practices do not simply influence change on domestic actors automatically, from the outside in. Instead, domestic understandings condition diffusion processes so that the outcomes they produce are significantly more diverse and complex than we would expect.

My approach is consistent with the work of constructivists like Acharya (2004), Checkel (2001), Gurowitz (1999), Legro (1997), and Risse-Kappen (1994), who argue that domestic factors such as institutional structures, organization culture, and state identities account for the uneven impact of international norms on domestic political choices.

The core argument of this dissertation is that Mexicans' shared understandings about both the U.S., and Mexico's relationship with the U.S., fundamentally shape both non-migrants' demand for information about the forms

of civic engagement that Americans practice and migrants' own propensity to share with non-migrants what they learned abroad in this respect. My argument is similar to Gurowitz's (1999) claim that differences in how international norms affect political debates about immigration in Germany and Japan "are largely due to differences in how each state views the international society in which those norms are embedded" (p. 417). My dissertation emphasizes the importance of social beliefs concerning the bilateral relations in which diffusion is embedded.

My research finds that how Mexicans view both the U.S. and the bilateral relationship in which U.S.-Mexico migration is embedded critically shapes non-migrants' propensity to either resist or accept the American political beliefs and behavioral dispositions that migrants transmit. Mexicans' attitudes towards both the U.S. and their country's relationship with its northern neighbor principally consist of a highly ambivalent anti-Americanism. Mexico sees itself as "weak, dependent, and violated in relation to the United States" (Morris, 2000, p. 125). It sees the U.S. as "powerful, self-serving, often hypocritical in its treatment of a weak Mexico, and decidedly anti-Mexican, perhaps for racist reasons" (Morris, 2000, p. 130). Non-migrants therefore hold Mexican migrants, who they believe bear the brunt of this asymmetrical bilateral political relationship and America's alleged abuse of power, in high regard; U.S.-based migrants thus need and deserve the moral support of their co-nationals back home. Nevertheless, despite these negative perceptions of the U.S., most Mexicans would like to live there because of the opportunities and benefits they believe the country offers. And migrants afford to non-migrants close to them a form of indirect membership in the more powerful and wealthy U.S. Therefore, non-migrants openness to the political ideas transmitted by migrants who currently reside in the U.S. simultaneously reflects both Mexicans' negative understandings of the U.S. and their longing to move to the U.S.

In contrast, when returnees reenter Mexico, they are no longer the victims of U.S. power and Americans' real or imagined exploitation and discrimination of

Mexicans. At the same time, migrants who return to Mexico no longer enable their non-migrant friends and family to make both concrete and symbolic claims on membership in the U.S. Yet migrants return home with a new identity—including new political habits and beliefs—that is intimately tied to the U.S. Snubbing returnees and the political innovations they transmit thus provides non-migrants with an ideal target for expressing the defensive nationalistic aspect of their anti-Americanism.

Mexican anti-Americanism shares with many other countries in the world an ambivalent (McPherson, 2003; Naím, 2002), ambiguous (Rubio, 2006), or polyvalent (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2006) aspect that French historian Pascal Bruckner (2006) describes brilliantly. He writes:

> America: the greatest power of attraction and the greatest of repulsion. It makes our hackles rise while it places us under its spell because it incarnates modernity in its best and worse aspects with that little bit of excess and incommensurability that makes it unique…So the United States---that rotary republic, nouveau riche, without style and whose manners are a paragon of vulgarity and chintz arouses a singular adulation, even among its detractors (2006, p.11).

This form of anti-Americanism is akin to a social norm in many countries. Brucker notes that "In Europe, especially in France, anti-Americanism fundamentally structures political life and thought. In its most extreme forms, it embodies a whole way of interpreting the world" (2006, p.9).

This way of interpreting the world is sufficiently powerful to trump rational decision-making not only because receptivity is guided by beliefs as opposed to careful cost-benefit analysis or well-founded perceptions of a social interlocutor's expertise, but because it gives rise to inconsistent decisions. Chapter 4 shows systematically that returnees who try to introduce the forms of civic engagement they learned in the U.S. face a consistent lack of support from their non-migrant co-nationals. It provides evidence that mistrust of the dollar and innovations that originate in the U.S., as well as general resistance to change, underlie this lack of

support. In contrast, Chapter 5 shows that despite their pessimism, non-migrants are very interested in the information that U.S.-based migrants provide, and willing to try actions that reflect the narratives they hear.

Non-migrant receptivity to migrants abroad appears to be rooted in their high regard for the personal sacrifice they undertake in moving to a distant and alien country and their admiration of their friend's and kin's membership in the U.S. This causes them to value the same piece of information more if it flows from a Mexican abroad than if it comes from a migrant who has returned. This finding fully contrasts with the expectations to which rational choice theory points.

Mexicans' anti-Americanism also leads individual non-migrants to overcome the cognitive propensity to embrace the most available and representative foreign models as bounded rationality would predict. Bounded rationality suggests that Mexicans should embrace, first and foremost, the ideas of their immediate and powerful northern neighbor. The U.S. has a public infrastructure and democracy that most Mexicans envy. The foreign country that most ordinary Mexicans know about is the U.S. Migrants—particularly returnees—should uniformly strengthen the likelihood that Mexicans emulate U.S.-style beliefs and behaviors by introducing them in a very personal manner into millions of Mexican households. Surprisingly this study finds no evidence for that argument. To the contrary Chapter 3 shows that of the two diffusion paths I examine, face-to-face communication between returnees—insiders—and non-migrants, within non-migrants' own homes are least likely to produce change.

That a political practice or belief is common in the U.S. seems to instead trigger an affect, rather than cognitive heuristic. According to Slovic, Finucane, Peters and MacGregor (2007), affect becomes a significant causal force when "images, marked by positive and negative affective feelings, guide judgment and decision making" (p. 1335). Affect heuristics, they claim, involve "tagging" representations of objects in people's minds with varying degrees of negative or positive affective feelings. "Just as imaginability, memorability, and similarity

serve as cues for probability judgments (e.g., the availability and representativeness heuristics), affect may serve as a cue for many important judgments" (p. 1336). Mexicans appear to "tag" the U.S. with revulsion and desire at the same time. Similarly, they feel empathy and respect for migrants who are in the U.S., while they tag returnees with disparagement. When individuals use affect heuristics, they employ even less thinking and critical analysis than they do when they use cognitive heuristics; affect heuristics are the shortest of shortcuts—gut reactions, so to speak.

Constructivism and theories that stress the role of affect in decision-making are closely related. However, affect is highly individualized, whereas for constructivists "the most important ideational factors are widely shared or "intersubjective" beliefs, which are not reducible to individuals" (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001, p. 392-393). Mexicans' attitudes towards the U.S. are affective, but by and large it is not their personal experiences with the U.S. or with migrants who move between the two countries that drive their responses to the ideas that migrants transmit. The anti-Americanism that underpins their mixed receptivity is more of a national norm with deep historical roots than an individual feeling. I therefore consider a constructivism to provide a useful theoretical approach for understanding how migrants contribute to the international diffusion of democratic citizenship.

Nonetheless, my argument differs from the dominant constructivist approach to international diffusion in several respects. First, the theory I propose does not depict international beliefs and behaviors flowing automatically and unidirectionally from more to less advanced democracies. That is, I break with the notion that "hierarchies in global networks of communication" such as global North versus global South, or East and West (Risse, 2007) fundamentally structure the flow of ideas. Actors in states that are relatively weak, poor, or less democratic can also shape diffusion outcomes; they are not simply at the behest of international ideational and normative forces that flow from "above".

Furthermore, I find that state boundaries "matter"; concretely, when foreign political ideas or migrant transmitters cross state borders, non-migrants' perceptions of their meanings and values change. This finding is particularly interesting because it indicates that mass publics "enforce" international borders by stressing their symbolic significance. A growing number of constructivist scholars concur that the hands of state leaders are not tied as a result of the pressure of international norms and policy prescriptions, even though the prevailing view is that the global movement of ideas, people, goods and capital is erasing nation-state boundaries. Still, among even among the former group of constructivists, the prevailing view is that state actors seek to enforce state sovereignty because they have at their disposal various instruments of the state such as policy making power and control of the use of force, while actors at the level of mass publics increasingly seek to transcend state boundaries. My research shows that citizens also reify state boundaries; popular perceptions and shared understandings of both foreign states and their state's position vis-a-vis other states infuses the border with meanings that significantly shape the cross-border movement of ideas. Their role in asserting state sovereignty is fully independent of government efforts to this end.

For these reasons I embrace constructivism, but advance a unique version of the approach that downplays the unidirectional movement of policies from entities that are higher in the international hierarchy to those that are lower, or from the systemic level to the local. The constructivist argument I advance here stresses the power of local beliefs against the regionally dominant foreign practices and ideas. It also shows that the ideas about the vector of diffusion itself, or concerning the nation-state origins of an object of diffusion, are as important as intersubjective beliefs about the object of diffusion.

6.2 International Democratic Diffusion at the Level of Mass Publics

Prior research on democratic diffusion has focused on evaluating the proposition that democratic transitions spread like a contagious disease among neighboring countries. Based on national indicators of democracy, such as whether a country has experienced a transition to democracy, scholars have found support for the hypothesis that the emergence (or presence) of a democracy in a region of the world increases the probability that other countries in the region will also become (or remain) democratic. This project considers the theoretical implications of this finding on another aspect of democracy—democratic civic engagement. Furthermore, it focuses on individuals at the level of mass publics as vectors of diffusion.

One of the core theoretical contributions of this dissertation is therefore to shed light on the conditions under which individuals at the level of mass publics contribute to the diffusion of democracy. Given the extent to which transportation and technology have made trans-state social transactions accessible to an increasingly wide range of publics (i.e., they are no longer the exclusive realm of elites), exploring whether and how prosaic social transactions that span international borders contribute to spreading political information is empirically and theoretically valuable. For this purpose, migrants represent a specific kind of actor at the level of mass publics from which we can make wider inferences. Although migrants have some unique properties, I uncover some theoretical findings that may apply to actors other than migrants who engage in trans-state social transactions such as business professionals, exchange students, and people in different countries who interact through the Internet.

My research suggests that individuals at the level of mass publics may follow a distinct pattern in determining whether or not they accept and embrace innovations that issue from a foreign country. The reason is that international borders do more than enclose geographic units; they also contain identities and constitute relations between states.

Chapter 2 explains that there is no constructivist theory of social learning, as such; the approach has not been employed at the level of mass publics. The chapter argued that structural equivalence models of social learning nonetheless contain many of the same ideas that constructivists advance. According to the structural equivalence model of social learning, people are likely to accept the practices they observe among individuals who belong to the same "moral reference group", a group for which the adopter has deep admiration, or a group to which the individual thinks he ought to belong.[29] In this case, the border structures non-migrants' understandings of whether a migrant is a member of the American political community that they both admire and loathe. When migrants are located north of the border, they belong to a group with which non-migrants would like to be associated. When migrants cross the border back into south are no longer considered members of the U.S.; even worse, returnees are no longer considered part of the same "moral reference group" as their non-migrant co-nationals, because returnees change as a result of having lived in the U.S.

With respect to international diffusion by individuals at the level of mass publics in general, my research has two implications. First, it suggests that the borders will structure any type of political learning that occurs via trans-state social transactions. Actors must bridge these borders in order to engage in international social transactions. If a border encloses a nation-state that engages in actions or produces outcomes (or hold beliefs) that an individual believes conform to the ideals of his own community, then information flowing from across that border will strongly influence the individual in question. When the information flows from within the borders that enclose the country to which the receiver

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[29] Note that structured social communication can help rational actors maximize their interests also. If the social relationships to which an individual belongs strongly represent her interests, then following this structural cue will be an efficient means of maximizing utilities. The difference between the rational choice and constructivist interpretation is that in the latter, adopters are persuaded of the normative value of the transmitters beliefs and behaviors.

already belongs (even if the source of information is itself is foreign), then domestic social structures, such as race and ethnicity, religion, and class will prevail in shaping an individuals' receptivity to foreign ideas and information.

It is easy to see how this theory is closely linked to my findings that long-distance transmission facilitates localization, whereas face-to-face transmission in the recipient's own territory can make localization challenging. Recipients can choose and implement as they see fit the ideas they receive through long-distance cross-border communication. On the other hand, when receivers and transmitters are within the same country, they must work around any local norms that may affect relations between the transmitter and the receiver. Additionally, the transmitter will inevitably have in mind how the object of diffusion operates outside of that country or how it should operate in theory; while the receiver will tend to lament the transmitters' poor understanding of local conditions as well as his attachment to the foreign country.

In sum in the case of mass publics, diffusion does not simply erase international borders; rather, international borders fundamentally constitute and structure the diffusion process.

6.3 Implications for Mexico

The significance and implications of this dissertation for Mexico are as ambiguous as Mexicans' sentiments toward the U.S. The transmission by migrants who live in the U.S. of information concerning American political behavioral dispositions contributes to strengthening civic engagement; however, the fact that this positive outcome requires citizens to leave their country is nothing to celebrate. Additionally, the finding that non-migrants fail to support returnees suggests that migration could potentially weaken the quality of democracy in some communities to which migrants return. Finally, my findings do not bode well for proponents of a more deeply integrated North America. My findings are based on a national-level analysis in contrast to studies that focus on

how migrants who are very active in their home country or community of origin are affecting change in one or a few local communities within Mexico. Possibly for this reason, the conclusions I draw concerning migrants' effects on civic engagement in Mexico are less sanguine.

6.3.1 Implications for Mexican Democracy

As we saw in Chapter 3, there is a need for greater civic engagement within Mexico. The finding that communication between non-migrants and their friends and family abroad enhances civic engagement is therefore encouraging. This pathway for diffusion is the most widespread in Mexico. More Mexicans have a family member or close friend in the U.S. than have close relationships with returnees. Long-distance cross-border communication may thus significantly and positively affect democratic citizenship all over Mexico. Specifically, migrants abroad could contribute to strengthening individual non-electoral participation, voting turnout, participation in organized protest and participation in organizations. Though long-distance cross-border communication does not strongly affect attitudes, the evidence suggests that this type of link could make non-migrants more critical of their own democracy and increase their political efficacy as well.

On the other hand, that the departure of hundreds of thousands of migrants from their country of origin contributes to enhancing civic engagement in Mexico is troubling. It is not an outcome around which coherent and normatively acceptable policy prescriptions can be easily developed. Policies to encourage Mexico-U.S. migration would not be well received in either the U.S. or Mexico.[30] However, international organizations (IOs), non-governmental

[30]Some may consider government policies that support the exportation of a country's nationals normatively unacceptable. However, the idea underlies the development community recent emphasis on employing remittances as a development tool. Insofar as international financial organizations such as the World Band and the Inter-American Development Bank support a growing number of development programs that rely on migrant remittances, exporting migration

organizations (NGOs), and perhaps even U.S. government agencies could contribute to strengthening migrants' democratic experiences in the U.S., while simultaneously providing more opportunities for migrants to share them with non-migrants via long-distance cross-border communication. IOs, NGOs, and U.S. and Mexican government agencies could also help return migrants improve their advocacy skills so that fewer quit their new political behaviors when they confront the "soft" constraints that exist at home.

Although the findings clearly show that return migrants do not strengthen civic engagement, they do not unambiguously point to a decline in political participation as a result of migrant returns. A null finding is certainly preferable in this case. At the same time, however, Mexicans' habitual rejection of the innovations that returnees import is disconcerting. The finding signifies that non-migrants discriminate politically against a specific group of actors. Such intolerance does not contribute to strengthening democracy. My qualitative research pointed to the possibility that return migrants in such communities withdraw from public life as a result of their frustration. This is undesirable insofar as it signifies that the interests of a specific group may be underrepresented and because it points to emerging social divisions in Mexico—particularly in those communities to which many migrants return, but not enough to change the dominant social beliefs towards returnees. Above all, the prejudiced attitudes of Mexican non-migrants clearly prevent them from making rational choices that are in their best interests.

Significantly, Mexican attitudes towards the U.S. have improved. The growing intensity of regional integration and the concomitant expansion in the range of cultural, economic, political, and educational exchanges between

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has implicitly become a normatively acceptable strategy for seeking domestic improvement. Migration policy in the Philippines has institutionalized the exportation of labor since the 1970s; remittances are a pillar of the country's economy.

Mexico and the U.S. has brought Mexican beliefs about the U.S. more in sync with reality (Beltrán, 2001; Gonzalez & Minushkin, 2006, Inglehart et al., 1996). But studies also demonstrate that anti-American attitudes condition Mexicans' openness to further integration (Davis & Bartilow, 2007; Kocher & Minushkin, 2007). Furthermore, some scholars claim that government discourse concerning the U.S., the Mexico-U.S. relationship and emigration to the U.S. has in the past caused variation in the level and specific focus of Mexican anti-Americanism (Beltrán, 2001; Krauze, 2005). During the 2000-2006 presidency of Vicente Fox, for example, the Mexican federal government worked to transform government discourse with respect to both the U.S. and U.S.-Mexico migration. The effort fell flat following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, when Mexico lost its status as a priority for U.S. foreign policy.

U.S. and Mexican governments could design programs and policies that further contribute to breaking down Mexican's deeply rooted anti-Americanism, by fostering more cross-border exchanges and by changing their discourse. Additionally, both government and non-government actors could work actively to reintegrate return migrants into the society and economy of the country of origin.

6.3.2 Implications for Regional Convergence

Scholars have argued that regional economic integration and cultural convergence (including the convergence of political beliefs and behaviors) go hand in hand. One aspect of this argument that scholars rarely attempt to validate concerns how the movement of people across international borders impacts convergence. This is surprising since a rise in the cross-border movement of people is, of course, one consequence of regional integration. Moreover, if the hypothesis is that the international movement of goods, capital, music, and media products leads to cultural convergence, then we should expect this to be all the more true in the case of the international movement of living human beings capable of engaging in deliberative discussions.

In the case of the U.S. and Mexico, there is tremendous asymmetry between the political and economic power of the two countries. Most Mexicans will probably agree that they would love for Mexico to have a democracy like the U.S. and for the Mexican economy to produce as much wealth as its northern neighbor; the same cannot be said with respect to Americans' views of Mexico. Additionally, the U.S. figures intensely in the thoughts and lives of most Mexican routinely, whereas most Americans do not think much about Mexico. We would therefore expect convergence to occur as a result of political changes that flow into Mexico from the U.S., consistent with diffusion.

The timeframe for my study comes nearly fifteen years after the implementation of NAFTA and corresponds with a 50 percent increase in the rate of emigration from Mexico between 2000 and 2008. Nonetheless, I find that Mexican beliefs about the U.S. and their attitudes towards migrants represent an important barrier to the diffusion of political beliefs and behaviors. This is in contrast to the predictions of Mexican scholars like Soledad Loaeza, who claimed that Mexico's reorientation towards an open, export oriented economy would transform Mexican nationalism by forcing Mexican citizens to reconsider the anti-American aspects of their nationalism (Loaeza, 1994). This projection has not come to pass. In fact, Mexican politicians such as 2006 presidential candidate, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, have aptly revived anti-American discourse to motivate millions of Mexican voters who are disappointed by the outcomes that neoliberal economic restructuring have produced.

This conclusion does not mean that some convergence is not underway. Indeed, although there is good reason to expect that American political ways would grip Mexicans, and not vice versa, the presence of about 11.5 million foreign-born Mexicans in the U.S. also has the potential to transform American political beliefs and behaviors. It is therefore possible that the ways in which Americans and Mexicans engage civically are becoming more similar. Nonetheless, the process appears to be more subtle and complex than

unidirectional diffusion would suggest. In sum, that the political ideas and behavioral dispositions of Americans do not overwhelmingly flow south into Mexico via migrants is surprising because it challenges the conventional wisdom that NAFTA would lead to cultural convergence—meaning that it would cause Mexican political beliefs and behaviors to become more like those of Americans. It means that the hands of even the weakest actors—ordinary people living in Mexico—are not tied by international forces; they have not lost control over their local environment to the forces of globalization.

6.3.3 Methodological Contribution

Most of the research on the political effects of migration in Mexico has utilized the case study method to examine exceptional political events involving migrants. The scholarship tends to focus on cases where migrants have effectively modified local politics by running for elected office; working through hometown associations to provide public goods that the government would normally provide; or working on behalf of transnational NGOs to push for expatriate suffrage. For example, Bakker and Smith (2003) explore the political candidacy of Andrés Bermúdez for mayor of Jerez, Zacatecas to explore the extent to which migrants are transforming Mexican politics by creating opportunities for migrants to vote and compete for office in their home country's elections; they focus on how that specific campaign has contributed to Mexico's broader democratization process. Their detailed ethnographic account significantly deepens our understanding of the ways in which a relatively small number of migrants with an interest in purposefully and actively transforming their community operate, including how their activities are conditioned by state policies and how the state has responded to their initiatives.

Bakker and Smith form part of a large tradition of studies concerning transnational migration that explores what motivates migrants to be politically active in their home countries, how transnational migrants draw on both U.S. and

Mexican resources, and the extent to which they are modifying both the local economic landscape and political processes (Fitzgerald, 2004; Goldring, 2003; Rivera-Salgado, 2001; Smith, M.P. 2003; Smith, R.C., 1994 and 2006). But despite their significant contributions, such studies do not help us understand the extent to which the cases they examine are representative of migration's effects throughout Mexico.[31] Furthermore, they do not account for the effects of the more prosaic activities of "ordinary" migrants, whose political interests and involvement in home country politics is significantly less intense than that of active migrant leaders.

My project aims to uncover the effects of the more common and widespread ways in which migrants engage their home country politics. It focuses on non-purposive social transactions between migrants and non-migrants. By evaluating the most widespread and consistent type of social transactions between return migrants and migrants in the U.S., on one hand, and non-migrants located all over Mexico, on the other, I offer a unique, more nationally representative assessment of how migration is contributing the Mexico's ongoing democratization process.

6.4 Future Research

Numerous aspects of the research question that motivates this project have yet to be addressed. Additionally, the results of the project raise many new questions. This section proposes two areas for future research. These involve testing various theoretical implications of my new theory of migrant-led international diffusion both within Mexico and internationally in order to verify its validity.

To further the within-case analysis, a next step is to explore in greater depth the possibility that localities with a long and sustained tradition of migration

[31] For example, multiple studies focus on the state of Zacatecas, where an exceptional 72 percent of municipalities have a high or very high migration intensity index

respond to the ideas that both returnees and U.S.-based migrants transmit in a different manner. The reason is that anti-Americanism is probably weaker in traditional migrant sending regions with historic ties to the U.S. than in areas where emigration is a newer and more sporadic phenomenon (Bakker & Smith, 2003). We should find that attitudes towards migrants in such localities are more consistently positive; that is, we should not observe same lack of support for return migrants as we do on average nationally. If attitudes towards the U.S., Mexico's relation with the U.S., and migration's role in that bilateral relationship are not so ambivalent, then non-migrants in such regions could be less likely to make rationally inconsistent decisions regarding whether to adopt or reject the American political beliefs and behaviors that migrants transmit.

Additionally, if return migration is common enough that returnees constitute a critical mass of the local population, then the portion of the population whose views towards the U.S. have been directly impacted by an experience abroad would be significant. In this context we can expect returnees to support one another's efforts to strengthening democratic civic engagement in their community. As this process effectively brings about better political processes and outcomes, it could contribute to changing the non-migrants beliefs about returnees and the political innovations they transmit. Moreover, the process should weaken migrant and non-migrants' perceptions of the host country as a place where certain forms of democratic civic engagement are uniquely possible. Research within Mexico confirming these propositions would represent significant support for my theory, by validating one of its key theoretical implications.

Another important area for future research will be to validate the theory of migrant-led international diffusion that this dissertation advances by determining whether its theoretical implications also hold in other parts of the world.

In theory, the findings uncovered by research designs that employ the "critical case" selection method should help us to understand the broader

universe of similar cases. Chapter 1 explains that I selected the case of U.S.-Mexico migration precisely because of it represents the most likely case for observing international diffusion via migrants. Skeptics may counter that Mexico-U.S. migration and the bilateral relationship in which it is embedded is sui generis, and that I should circumscribe my claims concerning its external validity. Migration from Mexico is unique in one important respect: nearly all emigrants move to the United States. The concentration of Mexicans in a single country makes it easier to consider the aggregate impact of migrant-led international diffusion. In countries where migrants flow in comparable numbers to various countries, assessing the aggregate effect of migrant-driven diffusion on domestic politics may be more complicated; migration to some countries may have a uniformly positive effect, while the diffusion effects of migration to others may be more diverse. Other than this exception, the Mexican case provides useful insights into how migrants may contribute to diffusing political beliefs and behaviors from their more democratic host country to their less democratic home countries in cases from various regions in the world. Confirming the external validity of this study is nonetheless important. I propose three comparative cases in the following paragraphs.

The diffusion of political beliefs and behaviors that Moroccan migrants to France and Spain—the two leading destination countries for migrants from Morocco—transmit into their country of origin should conform to the theoretical framework I offer in this dissertation. In both places, the foundations are in place for diffusion to occur, since emigrants travel from a less to more democratic countries where they can learn new forms of civic engagement; there is strong demand for greater democratization in Morocco (Jamal & Tessler, 2008); and both return migration and cross-border communication are prevalent. However, Moroccan attitudes toward France and Spain are ambivalent, particularly their sentiments about the migration of their co-nationals to the two countries. A comparative study of migrant-led democratic diffusion involving both Mexico-U.S.

and Moroccan-Spain/France migration would employ the most different systems design (Przeworski & Teune, 1970) or J.S. Mill's (1843) method of agreement. This research method compares countries that differ in most respects, but are similar in terms of the key explanatory factors. Comparing these two sets of migration corridors would be valuable not only because of the similarities they share, but because of their differences as well (e.g., geographic region, immigration policy in receiving countries, culture of the home country, etc.). Furthermore exploring Moroccan migration across the Mediterranean has important policy-relevance in contemporary Europe.

Though attitudes about France in the Muslim world have improved over the last decade, Moroccan attitudes towards the country remain ambiguous. On one hand, France is Morocco's main trading partner; French is widely spoken and taught in schools; and many Moroccans consider that emulating French styles and habits indicates modernity. On the other, Islamists resent France's unshakeable influence on their country and believe that Morocco should reorient itself east and south. Similarly, critics argue that their countries historical ties to France have kept it from having a clearly defined position within the African continent, particularly in the Maghreb. Ironically, older Moroccans hold favorable views towards that country, while the sentiments of Moroccan youth tend to be hostile (Furia & Lucas, 2008). Similarly, though Morocco and Spain consider themselves allies, they appear to be of two minds with respect to one another. Concretely, bilateral relations between the two countries are privileged for geographic and historical reasons; yet the border is a focal point for contemporary disagreements related both to migration and unresolved territorial claims.

Moroccan attitudes towards emigrants who move to both countries are equivocal, and depend largely on whether migrants have returned home or remain abroad. When migrants are abroad, they are seen as victims of rising anti-Muslim sentiment, particularly following September 11, 2001 and the 2004

terrorist attacks in Madrid. Concern and empathy for migrants also rises in light of the tremendous risks that migrants undertake to arrive in Europe. According to Human Rights Watch, an estimated 10,000 Moroccans have died in their effort to cross the Mediterranean Sea into Europe during the past ten years. At the same time, migration is seen as an opportunity. Remittances accounted for nearly 10 percent of the country's GDP in 2006 (Ratha & Xu, 2008), helping to keep the balance of payments stable and contributing significantly to the welfare millions of poor families (De Haas, 2005). Additionally, the vast majority of Moroccan youth would like to move to Europe, at least in part to experience western culture (Alami, 2002).

When Moroccan migrants return, non-migrants' perception of them changes. Because migrants reenter their home country after having lived in countries where respect for civil liberties, including freedoms of speech and assembly, are robust, they struggle to adapt to the social context of their country of origin. Moreover, even now that the Moroccan government's respect for civil liberties has improved, the local population may consider associating with return migrants—particularly those who share their new ideas about democratic civic engagement—to be a liability. De Haas (2005) notes that until the 1990s, the Moroccan government attempted to discourage its migrants living in Europe from integrating into their receiving countries. He writes that:

> Through Moroccan embassies, consulates, mosques, and state-created offices for migrants, Moroccan migrants were actively discouraged from establishing independent organizations and joining trade unions or political parties. The Moroccan government also prevented migrants from organizing themselves politically and, as such from forming an opposition force from abroad. During the 1970s and 1980s, it was not unusual for political troublemakers who lived in Europe to be harassed while visiting family and friends in Morocco (2005, p. 6).

The government has since endeavored to reconcile its relationship with migrants by engaging in them in a more supportive manner. However, the

perception that return migrants are troublemakers with whom non-migrants should associate with caution probably prevails.

Attitudes towards France and Spain as well as to migration from Morocco to those countries are ambivalent in much the same way that attitudes about the U.S. and emigration to that country are in Mexico. We can therefore anticipate that political beliefs and behaviors that Moroccan migrants to France and Spain diffuse into their home country to be better received when migrants transmit them from abroad, while facing obstacles when they enter by returns. The process and outcomes should be similar to those observed in Mexico.

Another case that would permit us to employ the most different systems design involves emigration from South Korea to the U.S. This migration corridor is also embedded in the complex love-hate type of bilateral state-to-state relationships that I have described.

The U.S. is the top destination country for South Korean emigrants. Chung-in Moon (2005) argues that South Koreans' attitudes toward the U.S. oscillate between "banmi" (anti-Americanism) and "sungmi" (worship of the United States). He writes that:

> many South Koreans show a very strong pro-American attitude in person, but in public or in a group tend to switch to an anti-American tone. An interview with a forty-two-year-old housewife who participated in the candlelight protest over the death of two middle school girls underscored the essence of ambivalence embedded in contemporary [Korean] anti-Americanism, "Although I attended the candlelight protest, do not consider myself anti-American…My greatest concern is how to improve English proficiency of my son, 9th grade student, and my daughter, 6th grade. If possible, I wish I can send them to the U.S. for an early education" (p. 144).

As we can see from this case, the possibility of emigrating to the U.S. partially constitutes the complex attitudes that Koreans have towards the country.

This is manifest in the Korean government's migration policies as well. There is evidence that sentiments towards the U.S. are negative. For example, a

2002 Gallup poll found that 54 percent of Koreans either dislike the U.S. somewhat or dislike it very much (Watts, 2005). And a recent survey of rising leaders indicates that Korean politicians mostly mistrust the U.S. (Watts, 2005). Sources of anti-Americanism include: excessive dependency on the U.S., U.S. military presence on Korean Territory; U.S. interventionism in Korea's internal affairs; and differences with respect to how best to handle North Korea (Moon, 2005; Watts, 2005).

Nonetheless, the Korean government has implemented policies that aim to lure "home" ethnic Korean-Americans, meaning the U.S.-born sons and daughters of Koreans who emigrated to the U.S. For instance the "Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans", which states the degree to which ethnic Koreans can return to Korea and enjoy the full benefits of citizens, offers to Korean Americans nearly full citizenship in their country (Seol & Skrentny, 2009). The paradox is striking. The government grants to Koreans in the country whose presence and interference in their country they resent the highest level of citizenship status accorded to foreigners. International borders structure this courtship. The presence of a co-national within the borders of another country may make that individual more attractive; making such individuals part of one's own in-group represents a strategy for accessing the resources of that country or the ideals to which countries of origin aspire.

Empirical studies concerning South Koreans' attitudes towards return migrants are not available. However, the government's courtship appears to be motivated by an interest in accessing the economic wealth that Korean Americans can generate. Put differently, such policies aim to link Korea to the opportunities that Korean Americans have in the U.S. But these opportunities are in large part bounded by U.S. borders. When people move, they bring with them their productive skills, but they do not bring home the institutional context that supported their work. Korea's policy towards Korean-Americans may be strategic, but it portends frustration, if not disappointment on the part of both

returnees and non-migrants. The former may be surprised that home is not "home"; while the latter may be disappointed if their kin in the U.S. do not reproduce that countries wealth and progress in Korea, or if they contribute to importing the aspects of American culture that Koreans perceive as degenerate. Again the diffusion process and outcome should be similar to that observed in Mexico.

There is also a need to explore other cases in which both the relationship between the sending and receiving country and attitudes towards emigration differ from the Mexican case. One case that would allow us to follow Mill's method of difference involves Philippine-U.S. migration. Philippino popular opinion of the U.S. is among the highest in the world. Moreover, over the past 30 years, that country's government has institutionalized emigration, making it a pillar of its economy and creating a national "culture of migration" (Asis, 2006). The Philippino state supports the emigration of labor by placing workers in jobs and helping them to obtain visas; education (particularly higher education) throughout the country is largely oriented toward training Philippinos to fill skilled jobs for which empirical studies indicate there is demand; remittances are an explicit component of the country's fiscal policy. Most importantly, the government takes responsibility for helping migrants to reintegrate into their country of origin once they return.

Phillipino state institutions actively work to weaken the significance of the border surrounding the islands. The state thus contributes to diminishing the belief among both migrants and those who stay behind that their home country and migrants' host countries are antagonists. Migrants are positively perceived regardless of where they are located. We should therefore observe that the political beliefs and behavioral dispositions that migrants transmit to non-migrants from the more democratic host countries to which they move have a positive and significant impact on democratic citizenship at home.

These are just some examples of comparative studies that can help us to confirm or invalidate the theory I develop based on the case of U.S.-Mexico migration. Other examples could include Polish migration to Germany, Pakistani migration to the United Kingdom, and Nicaraguan migration to the U.S. The theory should hold in a large number of cases of voluntary economic migration from less to more democratic countries.

The reason this generalization is possible is that one or another of two patterns characterize economic migration from less to more democratic countries. First, a great deal of this type of migration occurs between neighboring countries, where the border is often politically charged and a focal point for bilateral relations; such borders often represent a symbolic barrier separating hope from frustration. Alternatively, economic migrants often move to countries with which their own country has legacy of asymmetrical power relationships. Such migrant producing countries have usually been diffident before the countries that receive most of their migrants.

At the same time, these comparative cases can also help us identify gaps in my new theory and draw out and test its implications. For example the within case analysis I suggest concerning high versus low migrant producing communities in Mexico, as well as the comparative analysis involving the Philippines, point to ways in which domestic views towards migrant receiving countries can change. Furthermore, each of the comparative cases allows us to explore the role of the state in helping to shape attitudes towards migrant receiving countries and migrants themselves.

Researchers should be cautious not to reinterpret the shared beliefs of citizens in each case to fit the theory. This can be a problem with all research that employs an approach that, like constructivism, emphasizes the causal importance of intersubjective beliefs or norms. In this case scholars run a great risk falling into a “unfalsifiability trap”—so to speak—precisely because anti-American (or anti-receiving country) attitudes are ambivalent and can thus be

interpreted in different ways. Comparative analysis demands that the sentiments of citizens towards migrants' receiving countries be clearly documented through both popular opinion polls and a review of how that country is represented in literature, the news, political cartoons (see e.g., Morris 2001), and other cultural expressions.

This dissertation reveals that individuals at the level of mass publics contribute to a unique form of international democratic diffusion. It highlights the need to understand other dimensions of how political principles and practices spread from one country to another and suggests that the theoretical approaches that dominate the field are incomplete.

Students should take seriously the fact that international diffusion, by definition, entails crossing state borders. This means that the study of diffusion should consider the meaning of borders carefully. What and who do the borders of two countries between which objects of diffusion move contain and exclude? What historical events contributed to defining the border that objects of diffusion must cross? To what extent is the border an important symbol for a nation's citizens? Addressing these questions will inevitably lead scholars of diffusion to make peoples' attitudes and sentiments towards borders, foreign countries, and their country's relationship with the rest of the world a causal force that they must consider.

APPENDIX A

Multilevel (Hierarchical) Models

The sample design was three-stage. The electoral section was the primary sampling unit, followed by households at the second stage and individuals at the third. Sixty-five electoral sections (equivalent to a polling precinct in the U.S.) out of around 134,000 nationwide were selected at random. Within each section, ten households were selected and one individual was chosen in each household by the last birthday method. Since data for the aggregate variables (including the Migration Intensity and Marginalization Indices) is only available at the municipal level, however, I matched each electoral section with a municipality, giving rise to a two-tiered, "nested" structure in which each individual (level one) belongs to one, and only one, municipality (level two). The sample groups 650 Mexican citizens into 56 municipalities, 48 of which were represented by ten citizens drawn from a single "electoral section". In seven municipalities, two electoral sections (20 citizens in all) had been selected into the sample and in one municipality, three electoral sections (30 citizens) were chosen.

Given this data structure, I employed a multilevel (or hierarchical) regression model for each of the seven attitudinal and behavioral indicators that constitute the dependent variables. Multilevel models correct standard errors sometimes understated by OLS regression. OLS assumes that each observation is independent and thus fails to account for the "spatial correlation" that often obtains when observations fall into geographical clusters. Multilevel models also determine if, in addition to the variability that exists across individuals, there is also variability across municipalities. These models allow us to test the hypothesis that unobserved, or unmodelled, aggregate-level factors contribute to variability in the substantive outcome I wish to explain. The intraclass correlation coefficients measure variance across municipalities as a proportion of all variance (municipalities and individuals). Denominated by "rho" in Table 3.5,

they lie between .007 and .178. Higher coefficients are consistent with a "contagion" effect among inhabitants of a given municipality: merely residing in a place influences political attitudes and behaviors.

Of the seven dependent variables, three (tolerance, satisfaction with democracy, and government respect for rights) are normally distributed and four (self-reports of voting in an election from 2000 to 2003, participation in organized protest, individual non-electoral participation, and participation in civic organizations) are binary. Normally distributed dependent variables lead to the Hierarchical Linear Model and binary dependent variables, to the Hierarchical Logit Model. I regressed each dependent variable, whether normal or binary, on the same independent variables.

In the linear case the level-one equation, representing the effects of individual-level attributes on the dependent variables, may be written as follows:

$$y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_1(RETURN)_{ij} + \beta_2(FAMILY)_{ij} + \beta_3(REMIT)_{ij} + \beta_4(MEDIA)_{ij} + \beta_5(SEX)_{ij} + \beta_6(AGE)_{ij} + \beta_7(EDUCATION)_{ij} + \beta_7(INCOME)_{ij} + u_{ij} \quad \text{(Eq. 1)}$$

where

y_{ij} is the value of the dependent variable for individual *i* in municipality *j*;

β_{0j} is the (conditional) intercept for municipality *j* when all individual-level covariates are 0;

β_1 through β_7 are population-averaged slopes (i.e., slopes averaged across all individuals in the sample) for the associated covariates;

u_{ij} is a disturbance term for individual *i* in municipality *j*; and

the individual-level covariates are those already explained in Section 4.2, "Data and Methods." (I did not use any kind of mean centering for either level-one or level-two variables).

The level-two model posits that the municipal intercept from the level-one model, β_{0j}, is the sum of an overall intercept (λ_{00}), a municipality-specific

deviation from that intercept (v_{0j}), and the effects of aggregate-level variables. (Since the municipality-specific intercepts are assumed to follow a random distribution, usually the normal, multilevel models are sometimes called "random effects" models.) The level-two model is:

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(MIGINDEX)_j + \gamma_{02}(POP)_j + \gamma_{03}(MARGINAL)_j + \gamma_{04}(BORDER)_j + v_{0j} \quad \text{(Eq. 2)}$$

where:

β_{0j} is the conditional intercept for municipality *j* from Eq. 1;

γ_{00} is the overall (conditional) intercept, when all municipal-level covariates are 0;

γ_{01} through γ_{04} are population-averaged slopes across all municipalities for the associated covariates;

v_{0j} is a municipality-specific error term for municipality *j*; and

the municipal-level covariates are those set forth above.

Substituting Eq. 2 into Eq. 1 yields the following combined, reduced form model:

$$\begin{aligned} y_{ij} = {} & \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(MIGINDEX)_j + \gamma_{02}(POP)_j + \gamma_{03}(MARGINAL)_j + \gamma_{04}(BORDER)_j \\ & + \beta_1(RETURN)_{ij} + \beta_2(FAMILY)_{ij} + \beta_3(REMIT)_{ij} + \beta_4(MEDIA)_{ij} + \beta_5(SEX)_{ij} \\ & + \beta_6(AGE)_{ij} + \beta_7(EDUCATION)_{ij} + \beta_7(INCOME)_{ij} + v_{0j} + u_{ij} \end{aligned} \quad \text{(Eq. 3)}$$

Each of the seven models estimates only one random effect, the variance of the random municipal intercepts—that is, Var(v_{0j}). At least 10 observations, and sometimes 20 or 30, are available to estimate each municipal-level intercept, and these intercepts' variance is estimated across 56 municipalities.

For the four binary dependent variables, the combined model contains the same independent variables, but the dependent variables are constrained to lie within the [0,1] interval by the logistic transformation.

APPENDIX B

Characteristics of Sample for In-depth Field Interviews

Table B-1. Return Migrants (31 respondents)

Sex	Age	Economic Migrant*	Docu-mented**	English Speaker **	Highly Educated**	Stayed 2 Years**	Interacted with Americans**	Embraced U.S. Beliefs and Behaviors**
F	54	No	1	1	1	1	1	1
M	31	No	0.8	1	1	0.8	0.75	0.67
M	33	No	0.6	1	1	1	1	1
M	27	Yes	0.4	0.25	0.25	1	0.75	0.33
F	49	Yes	0.4	0.25	0.25	0.4	0.25	0.67
M	42	Yes	0.6	0	0.5	0	0.25	0.33
M	53	Yes	0.8	0	0.25	0	0.75	0.83
M	29	Yes	0.6	0.5	0.25	0.8	0.25	0.83
M	50	Yes	0.8	0.25	0.25	0.8	1	1
M	41	Yes	0.8	0	0.25	0.8	0.25	1
M	39	Yes	0.8	0.25	0.75	0.8	0.25	0.83
M	25	Yes	0.4	0.25	0.25	1	0.75	1
M	33	Yes	0	0	0.25	0.8	0	0.17
M	40	Yes	0	0.25	0.5	1	0.25	0.67
M	31	Yes	0	0.5	0.25	1	0.25	0.67
M	35	No	0.6	0.5	1	0	0.75	0.33
M	55	Yes	0.6	0	0.5	0.8	0.75	0.83
M	59	No	1	1	1	1	1	0.83
F	56	No	1	0.75	0.75	1	1	0.67
F	39	No	0.8	1	1	1	1	0.67
M	59	No	0.8	0.75	1	1	1	0.83
M	43	Yes	0	0.25	0.75	1	0.5	0.83
M	55	Yes	0	0	0.25	1	0.25	0.5
M	39	Yes	0	0.25	0.25	0.8	0.25	0.67
M	45	No	0	0.75	1	0.8	1	0.33
M	32	No	0.8	0.75	1	1	1	0.33
F	35	No	1	0.75	1	1	1	0.33
M	32	Yes	0	0.25	0.75	0	0.75	0.67
M	29	No	1	1	1	1	1	0.33
M	39	Yes	0	.5	0.75	1	0.75	0
M	31	Yes	0	0.5	0.75	0.4	0.25	0.67

*Indicates that the individuals emigrated because of economic necessity. **These categories represent the fuzzy sets and scores described in Appendix C.

Table B-2. Characteristics of Interview Respondents: Friends and Family of Returnees

(47 Respondents)

Respondent's Relationship to Return Migrant ⇩	20 from urban municipalities (pop. >35,000		27 from small, rural municipalities (pop. < 10,000)	
	11 Female	9 Male	14 Female	13 Male
Parent	3	3	4	3
Spouse	3	0	7	1
Friend	4	5	2	7
Sibling	1	1	1	2

Table B-3. Characteristics of Interview Respondents: Leaders Who Know Returnees

(18 Respondents)

Name of Municipality	Population (from 2005 census)	Migration Intensity	Marginalization Index	Number of Municipal Leaders Interviewed from Municipality
San Diego La Meza Tochimitzingo, Puebla	1,281	Among the 7 percent of highest migrant producing municipalities in Puebla	416/2 High marginalization	6
Nanacamilpa, Tlaxcala	14,605	Among the top 10 percent of highest migrant producing municipalities in Tlaxcala	1976/ Low marginalization	4
Atlangatepec, Tlaxcala	5,449	Among the top 10 percent of highest migrant producing municipalities in Tlaxcala	1396/60 Medium Marginalization	5
Tlaxcala, Tlaxcala	73,230	Very low migration	Very Low 2417/	3

Source: Municipal Marginalization Index, 2000. Municipal Migration Intensity Index, 2002.

APPENDIX C

Table C-1. Specification of Fuzzy Sets Drawn from Return Migrant Interviews

	Criteria for Evaluating Membership
Embraced U.S. Political Behaviors and Beliefs (7 value set)	**Full Membership, Score 1:** Reported adopting at least one of the following beliefs and one of the following behaviors and importing these into Mexico (in the case of behavior respondents should indicate that they engaged in new forms of action). **Score .83:** Reported adopting and importing at least one political belief and one behavior other than those listed above. **Score .67:** Reported embracing and importing either one new political belief or one new behavior. **Score .5:** Reported embracing new political beliefs and behaviors, but did not import either into Mexico. **Score .33**: Reported adopting and importing new, more democratic beliefs or behaviors while simultaneously expressing strong anti-democratic beliefs or claiming to engage in unequivocally undemocratic forms of political participation (respondent contradicts him or herself), or reports observing beliefs and behaviors that make politics and governance effective in U.S., but did not report embracing or adopting these. **Score .17:** Claimed to embrace U.S. political beliefs and behaviors, but mostly stressed admiration for U.S. wealth and physical organization/cleanliness. **Score 0:** Did not report learning, adopting, or importing any new political beliefs or behaviors
Fluent English Speaker (5 value set)	**Full Membership, Score 1:** Speaks, reads, writes and understands both spoken and written English at a high school level. **Score .75:** Understands spoken and written English at high school level, but communicates verbally or in writing with grammatical errors not typical of a U.S. educated person. **Score .5:** Speaks and understands enough spoken and written English to engage in day-to-day transactions with locals and to carry out job. **Score .25:** Understands what Americans say to him in English at work and in necessary social transactions (e.g., on the bus, at a bank, at a health clinic). **Score 0:** Does not speak or understand any English.

	Criteria for Evaluating Membership
Regularly Interacted with Americans (5 value set)	**Full Membership, Score1:** Interacted extensively, everyday, in English with American citizens for both work and social purposes, as well as to complete routine social and administrative transactions. **Score .75:** Interacted extensively, every business day, in English with American citizens principally in the context of work and to conduct routine transactions. **Score .5:** Interacted extensively with Spanish speaking American citizens at work, but interacted with English-only speaking no more than necessary both at work and to complete administrative transactions. Most social transactions at work and at home were with fellow immigrants. **Score .25:** Received orders from English-only speaking American citizens, and interacted with Americans as necessary to complete transactions. Nearly all social transactions both at work, socially, and to complete transactions conducted with fellow migrants, including more established legal permanent residents. **Score 0:** No interaction with Americans at all.
Documented Immigrant (6 value set)	**Full Membership, Score 1:** Entered the U.S. with legal documents and became citizen **Score .8:** Entered the U.S. with legal documents to visit for tourism, study, or work (i.e., as a legal non-immigrant) and became a Legal Permanent Resident (LPR), or entered the U.S. as a non-immigrant and returned prior to expiration of permit. **Score .6:** Entered the U.S. without legal documents, but then became citizen or LPR. **Score .4:** Entered the U.S. with work permit and overstayed illegally to work; or, entered U.S. with tourist visa, but worked in U.S. during the duration of entry permit. Or entered U.S. on various occasions, most of the time with documents, but sometimes without. **Score .2:** Entered the U.S. tourist visa, worked and stayed beyond the duration of the entry permit. **Score 0:** Entered the U.S. without documents and left without adjusting status (while still illegal)
Stayed Two Years or More (4 value set)	**Full Membership, Score 1:** Stayed in the U.S. two continuous years of more. **Score .8:** Stayed in the U.S. a total of two years over several trips. **Score .4:** Stayed in the U.S. over a year. **Score 0:** Stayed in the U.S. less than a year.

	Criteria for Evaluating Membership
Educated (5 value set)	**Full Membership, Score 1:** Some formal university education or more; or performs job that requires that college level of training; or can read and write and use a computer to find, organize and convey information, strong general knowledge and well- informed on current events. **Score .75:** Some to all of high school, high school level technical training; or performs job that requires high school level education; or, reads and writes at high school level and actively uses either a computer, books, or newspapers and magazines to find information and has civic knowledge beyond that obtained locally through basic public education and day to day social and administrative transactions. **Score.5:** Finished middle school, works in a semi-skilled trade (seamstress, cobbler, etc) in job that requires that level of training; or can capable of reading newspaper and can write as necessary to achieve personal and administrative needs, not computer literate, has basic civic knowledge and knowledge (and understanding) of local current events. **Score .25:** Some primary or middle school; or can read basic materials and write to communicate basic personal messages to family and friends. Very little civic knowledge, knows about current events, but does not fully understanding them. **Score 0:** No schooling 0; or cannot read or write and very little civic knowledge or knowledge in general.

APPENDIX D

Regressions Containing Dummy Variable "Lived in U.S. 2 Years or More"

Table D-1. Multi-Level Logistic Regressions: Participation

(Cells contain parameters, SEs, and p-values)

	Individual Non-Electoral Participation	Retrospective Vote (2000-2003)	Participation in Organized Protest	Participation in Organizations
Stayed 2 Years and Returned	-0.578	-.743	-.223	-1.609
	.817	.626	.805	0.64
	(.480)	(.235)	(.775)	0.012
Communicates with	.836	.465	.934	0.431
Migrant Friends or Family	.303	.290	.378	0.215
	(.006)	(.109)	(.013)	0.045
Municipal Migration	.283	.031	.289	0.554
Intensity Index	.301	.234	.273	0.241
	(.348)	(.895)	(.290)	0.021
Total Annual Remittances	.009	-.011	.010	0.034
(in thousands of pesos)	.123	.011	.023	0.033
	(.466)	(.292)	(.967)	0.144
Media Access	.824	.807	1.1	0.661
	.325	.244	.414	0.208
	(.011)	(.001)	(.008)	0.001
Sex	-.085	.004	.658	-0.221
(Male = 1)	0.301	.280	.357	0.214
	(.778)	(.988)	(.065)	0.303
Age	.012	.027	.022	.026
	0.011	.01	.013	.008
	(.274)	(.005)	(.076)	(.001)
Education	-.003	.091	.045	.009
(in years of schooling)	.044	.040	.051	.031
	(.951)	(.023)	(.381)	(.779)
Income	.774	-.084	.000	.073
(in thousands of pesos)	.374	.126	.000	.101
	(.038)	(.506)	(.806)	(.465)
Population of Municipality	.007	-.004	-.002	-.002
(in 10,000 inhabitants)	.004	.003	.005	.003
	(.053)	(.182)	(.743)	(.527)
Municipal marginalization	.261	.126	.410	.221
	.245	.174	.217	0.183
	(.287)	(.471)	(.060)	(.227)
Municipality borders U.S.	.208	.544	.026	.884
(dummy)	.731	.527	.847	.587
	(.776)	(.302)	(.976)	(.132)
Constant	-3.71	.524	-4.57	-1.305
	.766	.618	.916	.543
	(.000)	(.396)	(.000)	(.016)

Table D-1. Multi-Level Logistic Regressions: Participation
(continued)

	Individual Non-Electoral Participation	Retrospective Vote (2000-2003)	Participation in Organized Protest	Participation in Organizations
N	616	566	614	559
Log likelihood	-191.39	-202.56	-129.46	-341
Wald(12)	26.98	37.61	23.99	39.43
Pr(X2)	.008	.000	.024	.000
Rho	.186	.000	.057	.168

**Statistically significant at p<.05 level; statistically significant at p<.10 level. Dark shaded square represents result that became statistically significant whereas previously it was not. There was no change in the direction of the coefficient.

Table D-2. Multi-Level Linear Regressions: Beliefs

(Cells contain parameters, SEs, and p-values)

	Tolerance	Satisfaction with Democracy	Evaluation of Govt. Respect for Rights
Stayed Two Years and Returned	.141	-.220	-.758**
	.130	.274	.234
	(.279)	(.423)	(.001)
Communicates with Migrant	.027	-.308**	-.103
Friends or Family	.051	.108	.092
	(.604)	(.004)	(.266)
Municipal Migration Intensity Index	.051	.075	.017
	.059	.092	.077
	(.386)	(.414)	(.822)
Total Annual Remittances	.003	.000	-.006
(in thousands of pesos)	.003	.006	.005
	(.218)	(.970)	(.233)
Media Access	.126**	.164*	-.053
	.048	.101	.086
	(.009)	(.103)	(.537)
Sex	-.077	.179*	.133
(Male = 1)	.051	.107	.092
	(.128)	(.096)	(.149)
Age	-.002	-.005	.002
	.002	.004	.003
	(.337)	(.218)	(.615)
Education	.023**	-.002	-.018
(in years of schooling)	.007	.015	.013
	(.002)	(.906)	(.183)
Income	.030	-.075	-.037
(in thousands of pesos)	.024	.049	.041
	(.224)	(.125)	(.369)
Population of Municipality	.000	-.001	-.002**
(in 10,000 inhabitants)	.000	.001	.001
	(.929)	(.482)	(.018)
Municipal marginalization index	-.052	-.138**	-.063
	.045	.071	.060
	(.248)	(.053)	(.293)
Municipality borders U.S.	-.085	.148	.108
	.146	.217	.179
	(.557)	(.495)	(.548)
Constant	3.34	3.25	3.02
	.126	.249	.211
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)

Table D-2. Multi-Level Linear Regressions: Beliefs

(continued)

	Tolerance	Satisfaction with Democracy	Evaluation of Govt. Respect for Rights
N	566	566	566
R2	.131	.038	.055
Wald(12)	63.31	22.33	31.31
Pr(X2)	.000	.034	.002
Rho	.127	.016	.009

**Statistically significant at p<.05 level; *statistically significant at p<.10 level. Dark shaded square represents result that is no longer statistically significant whereas previously it was.

APPENDIX E

Table E-1. Reasons Returnees did not Engage in New Forms of Political Behaviors

Male, Medium city, High School, Age>40	**"People here don't respect the changes migrants suggest, other migrants have money so they withdraw easily from the community"**
Male, Small town, high school Age>40 (Two individuals)	Office holder, behavior well established (weak evidence of learning).
Male, Large city, Secondary School, Age>40	Already very active (weak evidence of learning).
Male, Large city, High School, Age<40	"I don't like to get involved…People get suspicious of your intentions. They say "now your back, now you think you have power" just because you were up there."
Female, Medium city, High School, Age>40	"I haven't been back very long. And I'm not from here. I don't yet feel that I have a sense of what I can do in this community."
Male (4), Female (1), Large city, College, Age<40 (Five individuals)	No time/not interested in politics (weak evidence of learning in 2 of 5).
Male, Small town/rural, College, Age>40 years	Not interested (weak evidence of learning).
Female, Small town/rural Grade School, Age>40	"I would like to do something to help my community, but I wouldn't know what to do."

APPENDIX F

Characteristics of Interview Respondents: Migrants Living in the United States and Non-Migrants who Communicate with Migrants in the U.S.

Table F-1. Characteristics of Interview Respondents: Migrants in the U.S.

(20 Respondents)

Sex	Age	Education	Time in USA	State of Residence	Frequency of Travel to Mexico	Frequency of Calls Home
M	28	4 years of university of more	2 years	Colorado	Twice a year	2-3 times per week
M	33	4 years of university of more	9 years	Colorado	Once a year	Weekly
F	49	Grade School	20 years	Colorado	Not since 1992	Weekly
M	29	4 years of university of more	4 years	Indiana	Twice a year	Weekly
F	34	Grade School	14 years	Colorado	3 times in 14 years	Never
F	37	Secondary School	13 years	Colorado	Never	3 times per week
F	30	4 years of university of more	6 years	Indiana	Twice a year	Every other day
F	31	4 years of university of more	8 months	California	4 times year	Daily
F	24	Middle School	9 years	Colorado	Never	Every two weeks
F	34	4 years of university of more	8 years	Virginia	Twice a year	3 or more times per week
M	34	4 years of university of more	9 years	Rhode Island	Twice a year	3 times per week
M	45	4 years of university of more	20 years	Colorado	Twice a year	Weekly
F	38	Technical High School	11 years	Colorado	Not in 9 years	Everyday
F	34	Middle School	7 years	Colorado	Never	Weekly
F	47	4 years of university of more	9 years	Michigan	Once a year	Weekly
M	50	Middle School	14 years	Colorado	Once a year	Every month
M	48	Grade School	18 years	Colorado	Once a year	Weekly
M	26	Middle School	2 years	New York	Never	Weekly
M	60	Grade School	15 years	New York	Never	Once a month
M	58	High School	30 years	Chicago	Once a year	Once a month

Table F-2. Characteristics of Interview Respondents: Friends and Family without Contact with Other Returnees

(10 Respondents)

Respondent's Relationship to Return Migrant ⇩	6 from urban municipalities (pop. >35,000		4 from small, rural municipalities (pop. < 10,000)	
	Female	Male	Female	Male
Parent	2	1	2	
Spouse	1		1	
Friend		1	1	
Sibling		1		

APPENDIX G
Interview Protocols for In-depth Field Interviews

Interview Protocol for Non-Migrants Living in Mexico

Municipality:

Date:

1. Sex: 1b. Age:
2. Occupation:
   Does he/she currently hold a political/government position? YES NO.
   If YES, what position?

3a. Education:

4. Marital Status:

5. What is your relationship with a migrant or migrants living in the U.S. or migrants who have returned from the U.S.?

6. Where in the U.S. does/did the migrant you know reside?

7. When and why did that individual emigrate?

8. Did the migrant cross with documents? YES NO

9. Is the migrant currently legally present in the U.S. (was the migrant legally present prior to returning?)?

10. How often do/did you speak with the migrant over the phone?

11. How often does/did the migrant visit Mexico?

12. Have/did you visited the migrant in the U.S.?

13. Do/did you engage in other forms of regular communication with a migrant or migrants living in the U.S.?

14. What do you mainly talk about with your friends and family? Please write either the number one, two, three, four, or five next to the topics of conversation that you discuss with your family in order of importance. For example, if when you speak with your friends or family living in the U.S. you talk with them more than anything about the people's health and wellbeing, then write a one (1) next to that response below. You should mark only five responses, each with a different number.	
FAMILIES HEALTH AND WELLBEING	
MEXICAN ECONOMY	
ECONOMIC SITUATION OF FAMILY AND HOUSEHOLD EXPENSES	
FUTURE PLANS	
YOUR JOB IN THE U.S.	
YOUR DAILY LIFE IN THE U.S.	
POLITICAL AFFAIRS IN THE MEXICO (for example, elections, local candidates, political parties, corruption and crime, public works, political conflicts, civic activities in which you or your interlocutor engage, labor union activities, etc.)	
POLITICAL AFFAIRS IN THE UNITED STATES	
EMPLOYMENT POSSIBILITIES FOR INTERLOCUTOR IN U.S.	
OTHER: DISCUSS	

15. Do you feel mostly satisfied or mostly disappointed that your friend or family member emigrated to the U.S.? Discuss.

16. Has emigrating to the U.S. mostly benefitted or mostly harmed your friend or family member? Discuss.
17. Has their decision to migrate mostly benefitted or mostly harmed you and/or your family? Discuss.

18. What about the decision to return, did you feel mostly satisfied or mostly disappointed about your friend or family member's decision to return? (Discuss beyond immediate response)

19. Does the decision to return mostly benefit or mostly harm migrants in general? HARM BENEFIT
Explain.

19b. What about the migrant you know in particular? HARM BENEFIT
Explain.

20. Does the decision to return mostly harm or mostly benefit the families of migrants in general? HARM BENEFIT
Explain.

20b. What about in the case of your family? HARM BENEFIT
Explain.

21. How frequently do you interact with people who have returned permanently from the U.S.? Are they people close to you?

22. What are the main things you talk about with return migrants?

23. In what contexts do you engage migrants who have returned to Mexico?

24. Do migrants have difficulty adapting to life here when they return to Mexico? Or is it easy for them to adapt to life here when they return? DIFFICULT EASY Explain.

25. Is it very difficult for people who do not leave Mexico to adapt to migrants when they return or is it perfectly easy? YES NO
Explain.

26. What could return migrants do to adapt better in their hometowns when they return from the U.S.?

27. Do you follow politics at all? If so what issues concern you? YES NO
Explain.

28. Do you discuss these issues with migrants abroad? YES NO
Explain.

29. Do you regularly participate in the life of your community or do you not participate much at all? YES NO
Explain.

30. Has the level and/or the specific ways in which you participate changed since your friend or family member emigrated? YES NO
Explain.

31. Has your role in your household and/or community changed since your friend or family member left for the U.S.? (Since he/she returned) YES NO
Explain.

32. Do you participate more or less politically (civically) you were before your friend or family member left for the U.S./returned? MORE LESS
How so? Why?
AFTER OPEN ANSWER, THEN ASK ABOUT:
-voting
-protest
-membership in collective organizations
-signing petitions
-support for an electoral campaign
-running for office
-other

33. Do you follow the news and local affairs more or less than you did before your family member left for the U.S./returned? MORE LESS
Why?

33b. Has the type of news that interests you remained the same or changed since your friend or family member emigrated to the U.S./returned?
CHANGED STAYED THE SAME

34. Do you have more or fewer responsibilities in your community than you did before your friend or family member left/returned? MORE LESS
How so? Why?

35. What about other migrants who have returned. Do they participate more or less than they did before they emigrated? MORE LESS
Why? How so?

36. Do you mostly interact with others who have not migrated or others who have migrated?
    Why?

37. Are you more or less optimistic about the future of your community since your family member emigrated/returned? MORE LESS
    Why?

38. Would the community be better or worse off if more migrants returned from the U.S.? BETTER WORSE
    Why?

39. Would the community be better or worse off if more people emigrated to the U.S.? BETTER WORSE
    Why?

40. Are you more or less optimistic about the future of Mexico since your family member emigrated/returned? MORE LESS
    Why?

41. Do you consider migration beneficial or harmful to Mexico? Explain.
    BENEFICIAL HARMFUL
    Why?

42. Do you think the government should create policies that help people migrate safely or policies that help prevent emigration? Explain.

43. Have you learned from migrants about life in the U.S.? YES NO
    What and why?

44. Do you wish anything about Mexico were like the U.S.? YES NO
What and why?

45. Do you think it is possible or impossible for Mexico to be like the U.S. in these ways? Explain.

46. Have you discussed these beliefs (answers 37 and 38) with your friends and family here in the U.S./return migrants? YES NO

47. Have you taken action to make that possible? YES NO
Why or why not?

48. Do migrants living in the U.S. that you know take action to make this possible? YES NO
Why or why not?

49. What about returnees? Do they ake actions to make this type of change possible? YES NO
Why or why not?

Interview Protocol for Return Migrants

Municipio:

Date:

1. Sex: 1b. Age:
2. Occupation:

   Does he/she currently hold a political/government position? YES NO.

   If YES, what position?

3a. Education:

3b. English language skills:

4. Marital Status:

5. How many times have you emigrated?

6. Where did you go each time and how long did you stay? IF NOT U.S., then terminate interview. If YES U.S. then:

DATES:_____STATE:_____

7. Why did you emigrate?

7b. If you emigrated more than one time, did you migrate for the same reason both times? YES NO.

IF NO, then WHY?

8. Did you have work here in Mexico prior to emigrating? YES NO

9. What type of work did you have prior to emigrating?

10. Did you already know someone in the U.S. when you arrived? YES NO

Please discuss.

11. Did you find employment in the U.S.? YES NO

12. What type(s) of employment?

13. When you were in the U.S., did you interact with non-Mexicans or Mexicans who have been there for a long time?

    YES Non Mexicans
    YES Mexicans who have been there a long time

    In what situations did you interact with these people?
    Was this interaction positive or negative?

14. Did you have documents or did you emigrate without documents?
    YES, what documents?_____
    NO.

15. When you were in the U.S., in what contexts did you interact with American society most of the time?
    -school
    -job
    -sports
    -migrant club
    -others?

16. Did you regularly access any of the following types of institutions while you were in the U.S.?

-Schools
-Public libraries
-Health care facilities
-Church

17. Did you participate politically in the U.S.? YES NO
How so? Why?

18. Did you participate in any of the following?
-voting
-marches
-signing a petition
-labor strike
-political campaign
-attend political meeting
-other

19. When you returned to Mexico, did you come straight home to this community or did you return to another locality within in Mexico?

RETURNED TO THIS COMMUNITY
RETURNED TO ANOTHER LOCATION IN MEXICO. WHERE?

20. Why did you return?
Voluntarily
-savings
-couldn't adapt
-didn't find a job

-didn't like it

-family obligations

Deported involuntarily

21. Do you have children? If your son or daughter decides to emigrate, will you encourage him/her or discourage him her.

ENCOURAGE DISCOURAGE

Why? (If they say for the *experience*, then PROBE).

22. How were you received by your family when you returned to your hometown? Why?

23. How were you received by your friends when you returned to your community? Why?

24. How were you received by your community? Why?

28. What was most difficult thing to adapt to when they returned? Why?

29. Do you discuss your experience as a migrant with family members and people in your community? YES NO

If YES, what do you talk to them about?

27. What was your impression of your community when you returned?

28. What was your impression of Mexico as a country when you returned?

29. Do you believe that your values or beliefs changed when you were in the U.S. or did you remain the same? How?

30. Did you adopt any new customs, habits, practices, in the U.S. or did you not adopt any customs?

    IF YES, Have you maintained these customs, habits, practices, since you returned or have you gone back to your old ways?

31. Are you more or less interested in the issues affecting your community since you returned from the U.S.? Why?

32. Do you participate more or less in your community than you were before you left?
    How so? Why?

33. Do you have more or fewer responsibilities in your community than you did before you left? How so? Why?

34. What about other migrants who have returned. Do they participate more or less than they did before they emigrated?

    Why? How so?

34. Do you mostly interact with others who have not migrated or others who have migrated?

Why?

36. Are you more or less optimistic about the future of your community since you returned? MORE LESS

Why?

37. How would you characterize your experiences with U.S. authorities (government and/or employers)?

Do you consider them more respectful, less respectful or equally respectful of you than Mexican authorities?

38. Are you more or less optimistic about the future of Mexico since you returned? MORE LESS

Why?

39. Do you consider migration beneficial or harmful to you personally?

Why?

40. Do you think the government should create policies that help people migrate safely or policies that help prevent emigration?

Please explain.

41. Do you wish anything about Mexico were like the U.S.? YES NO

What and why?

42. Do you think it is possible for Mexico to be like the U.S. in these ways?
YES NO

Please explain.

43. Have you shared (answers 37 and 38) this with your friends and family here in Mexico? YES NO

Why or why not?

44. Have you taken action to make that possible? YES NO
Why or why not?

45. Would you like to migrate again? YES NO
Why or why not? How likely is it that you will emigrate again?

Interview Protocol for Migrants Living in the United States

1. Full name (optional):

2. Age:

3. Education:

4. English language proficiency (zero is no English language, 10 is perfect):

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

5. Do you work outside the home? NO Part Time Full Time

6. What type of employment do you have?

7. In what year did you arrive in the U.S.?

8. Since you entered the U.S. for the first time, how many times have you returned to Mexico for one year or more?

9. How often do you travel to Mexico?

Neverl	Almost never	Once per year	Twice per year	Every three months	Monthly

10. How often do you call your friends and family who live in México?

Never	Almost never	Once per year	Twice per year	Every three months	Monthly	Weekly	Other (Explain):

11. What do you mainly talk about with your friends and family? Please write either the number one, two, three, four, or five next to the topics of conversation that you discuss with your family in order of importance. For example, if when you speak with your family in Mexico you talk with them more than anything about the their health and wellbeing, then write a one (1) next to that response below. You should mark only five responses, each with a different number.

FAMILIES HEALTH AND WELLBEING	

MEXICAN ECONOMY	
ECONOMIC SITUATION OF FAMILY AND HOUSEHOLD EXPENSES	
FUTURE PLANS	
YOUR JOB IN THE U.S.	
YOUR DAILY LIFE IN THE U.S.	
POLITICAL AFFAIRS IN THE MEXICO (for example, elections, local candidates, political parties, corruption and crime, public works, political conflicts, civic activities in which you or your interlocutor engage, labor union activities, etc.)	
POLITICAL AFFAIRS IN THE UNITED STATES	
EMPLOYMENT POSSIBILITIES FOR INTERLOCUTOR IN U.S.	

12. Has your interest in the well being of Mexico and/or your community DECREASED or INCREASED since you moved to the United States?
    Explain.

13. Have your ideas concerning the privatization ofenergy changed since you moved to the United States? Or are your ideas the same?
    Explain.

14. Since you moved to the United States have your ideas concerning the rights of minorities, such as blacks, indigenous people, homosexuals, women, and people with disabilities changed? Or have they remained the same?
    Explain.

15. Have your ideas about government corruption changed since you moved to the U.S. or are they pretty much the same?
    Explain.

16. Have your ideas concerning the governments' responsibility to citizens changed or stayed the same since you moved to the U.S. (with respect to transportation, education, health care, infrastructure)?
    Explain.

17. And your ideas concerning your own responsibilities vis-a-vis the government? Have they changed or remained pretty much the same since you moved to the U.S.?
    Explain.

18. What about your ideas about politics and democracy? Are your ideas the same as before you left Mexico or different?
    Explain.

19. What about the actions you take or believe people should take to bring about political change? Do you support the same actions as before or different ones?
    Explain.

20. Do you speak with your family and friends who remain in Mexico about the responses to questions 12-17 above?
    Explain.

21. How do your family and friends respond when you share your new ideas or observations with them?
    a. They are interested and ask many questions
    b. I am not sure, but they listen
    c. They are not interested
    d. They say Mexico could never be that way, it's good that I left
    e. Other?

22. Do you think your family and friends could do more to improve political life and outcomes in Mexico—to make their country better? Or do you think there is nothing they can do?
    Explain.

23. What could they do?

24. Have you shared this view (Q. 22 and 23) with your friends and family in Mexico?
    Explain. Why or why not?

25. Before you moved to the U.S., did you believe that your family could or should make more of an effort to help improve political life and outcomes in Mexico?

Yes, nothing has changed	Yes, but now my beliefs are stronger
No, but now I do	No, nothing has changed

APPENDIX H

Desencanto Ciudadano en México Survey

Desencanto Ciudadano en México
Junio de 2006

FOLIO |_____|

DATOS DE IDENTIFICACION

ESTADO _____|___|___| MUNICIPIO_____|___|___|___|___|

LOCALIDAD _____|____|____|____|____|

DISTRITO ELECTORAL FEDERAL |___|___|___| SECCION ELECTORAL |___|___|___|___|

MANZANA |___|___| VIVIENDA |___|___|

Domicilio de la vivienda _____

(Calle, Avenida, Callejón)

_____ _____ _____

Número exterior *Número interior* *(Colonia, fraccionamiento, barrio, unidad habitacional)*

Tipo de supervisión: 1. Directa 2. Posterior 3. Revisión

OBSERVACIONES_____

SUPERVISADO POR:	CRITICADO / CODIFICADO POR:	CAPTURADO POR:
_____|___|___|	_____|___|___|	_____|___|___|
FECHA |___|___| -|___|___| - | 2 | 0 | 0 | 6 |	FECHA |___|___| -|___|___| - | 2 | 0 | 0 | 6 |	FECHA |___|___|-|___|___| -| 2 | 0 | 0 | 6|
Día Mes Año	Día Mes Año	Día Mes Año

"Buenos días (tardes / noches), mi nombre es _____ y trabajo para Berumen (MUESTRE SU CREDENCIAL), una empresa que se dedica a conocer las opiniones de los mexicanos, y para la Universidad de Texas en Austin. Estamos realizando una encuesta sobre la democracia en México. ¿Me permitiría hacerle unas preguntas? Su participación es voluntaria y la información que nos proporcione es estrictamente confidencial y únicamente para fines de investigación académica. **(DAR HOJA DE INFORMACIÓN SI EL ENTREVISTADO PIDE MAYORES DETALLES.)**

FILTRO A: ¿Quién es el miembro del hogar mayor de 18 años más próximo a cumplir años**? (ANOTE NOMBRE)**

_____

FILTRO B: ¿Me permite hablar con **(MENCIONE PERSONA DE FILTRO A)** ?

1.SI…… ***PASE A FILTRO C***

2. NO…… ***MARQUE EL INTENTO Y PIDA CITA PARA CONTACTAR AL INFORMANTE***

FILTRO C: ¿Es usted mexicano/a?

1.SI…… ***CONTINÚE Y MARQUE EL INTENTO***

2. NO……. ***MARQUE EL INTENTO Y SEGUIR A PROXIMO HOGAR***

VISITAS DEL ENTREVISTADOR	1	2	3
FECHA	|___|___|-|___|___|-|2|0|0|6| **Día Mes Año**	|___|___|-|___|___|-|2|0|0|6| Día Mes Año	|___|___|-|___|___|-|2|0|0|6| Día Mes Año
NOMBRE DEL ENTREVISTADOR			
CÓDIGO DEL ENTREVISTADOR	|___|___|	|___|___|	|___|___|
HORA DE INICIO	|___|___| : |___|___| Horas Minutos	|___|___| : |___|___| Horas Minutos	|___|___| : |___|___| Horas Minutos
HORA DE TÉRMINO	|___|___| : |___|___| Horas Minutos	|___|___| : |___|___| Horas Minutos	|___|___| : |___|___| Horas Minutos

RESULTADO *	|___|	|___|	|___|
* CODIGO DE RESULTADO	1. ENTREVISTA COMPLETA	4. AUSENTE EN EL MOMENTO DE LA VISITA	7. CITA/APLAZADA (Anote en observaciones)
	2. ENTREVISTA INCOMPLETA (Anote en observaciones)	5. SE NEGÓ A PARTICIPAR	8.OTRO (Anote en observaciones)
	3. AUSENTE TEMPORAL	6. INFORMANTE INADECUADO	

Observaciones:

_____

_____

I. PARTICIPACIÓN Y PREFERENCIAS POLÍTICAS

1.1 Independientemente de cómo haya votado en las elecciones pasadas, ¿regularmente Ud. se identifica con algún partido político?

1. SI ➔ ¿Con cuál? 2.NO➔ PASE A 1.3

1. PAN	5. PVEM	9. OTRO _____
2. PRI	6. CONVERGENCIA	77. NINGUNO➔ **PASE A 1.3**
3. PRD	7. NUEVA ALIANZA	88. NO SABE ➔ **PASE A 1.3**
4. PT	8. ALTERNATIVA SOCIALDEMOCRÁTICA Y CAMPESINA	99. NR ➔ **PASE A 1.3**

1.2 ¿Y diría que Ud. es "muy" o "algo" (panista/perredista/priísta/verde/petista)?

1. MUY ➔ **PASE A 1.4** 2. ALGO ➔ **PASE A 1.4** 8. NS ➔ **PASE A 1.4** 9. NR➔ **PASE A 1.4**

1.3 Aunque no se identifique plenamente con ningún partido, ¿hay uno que se acerca más a su forma de pensar que otros?

1. SI ➔ ¿Cuál? 2.NO➔ **PASE A 1.4**

1. PAN	5. PVEM	9. OTRO _____
2. PRI	6. CONVERGENCIA	77. NINGUNO
3. PRD	7. NUEVA ALIANZA	88. NO SABE
4. PT	8. ALTERNATIVA SOCIALDEMOCRÁTICA Y CAMPESINA	99. NR

1.4 En las elecciones presidenciales de 2000, muchas personas no pudieron votar porque tuvieron que trabajar o por otra razón. ¿Votó en las elecciones presidenciales de 2000?

1. SI 2. NO ➔ **PASE A 1.7** 3. NO, NO ERA MAYOR DE EDAD ➔**PASE A 1.7** 8. NS ➔ **PASE A 1.7** 9. NR➔ **PASE A 1.7**

1.5 ¿Se puede saber por quién votó? Le recordamos que la información que usted proporcione es estrictamente confidencial.

1. VICENTE FOX (PAN/PVEM – ALIANZA POR EL CAMBIO)	5. PORFIRIO MUÑÓZ LEDO (PARM – PARTIDO AUTÉNTICO DE LA REVOLUCIÓN MEXICANA)	77. NINGUNO/ANULÓ SU VOTO
2. FRANCISCO LABASTIDA (PRI)	6. GILBERTO RINCÓN GALLARDO (PDS – PARTIDO DEMÓCRATA SOCIAL)	88.NS
3. CUAUTÉMOC CÁRDENAS (PRD/PT/PAS/PNS/CONVERGENCIA – ALIANZA POR MÉXICO)	7. OTRO _____	99.NR
4. MANUEL CAMACHO SOLÍS (PCD – PARTIDO DEL CENTRO DEMOCRÁTICO)	8. EL VOTO ES SECRETO	

1.6 ¿Y por qué partido votó en la Cámara de Diputados en las elecciones de 2000?

1. PAN/PVEM – (ALIANZA POR EL CAMBIO)	5. PARM – (PARTIDO AUTÉNTICO DE LA	77. NINGUNO/ANULÓ SU VOTO

	REVOLUCIÓN MEXICANA)	
2. PRI	6. PDS – (PARTIDO DEMÓCRATA SOCIAL)	88.NS
3. PRD/PT/PAS/PNS/CONVERGENCIA – (ALIANZA POR MÉXICO)	7. OTRO _____	99.NR
4. PCD – (PARTIDO DEL CENTRO DEMOCRÁTICO)	8. EL VOTO ES SECRETO	

1.7 ¿Votó en las elecciones federales de 2003?

1. SI 2. NO ➔ **PASE A 1.9** 3. NO, NO ERA MAYOR DE EDAD ➔**PASE A 1.9** 8. NS ➔ **PASE A 1.9** 9. NR➔ **PASE A 1.9**

1.8 ¿Se puede saber por qué partido votó en la Cámara de Diputados en 2003?

1. PAN	8. PAS	77. NINGUNO/ANULÓ SU VOTO
2. PRI	9. MÉXICO POSIBLE	88.NS
3. PRD	10. PARTIDO LIBERAL MEXICANO	99.NR
4. PT	11.FUERZA CIUDADANA	
5. PVEM	12. PRI/PVEM	
6. CONVERGENCIA	13. OTRO _____	
7. PSN	14. EL VOTO ES SECRETO	

1.9 Finalmente, ¿votó en las últimas elecciones de gobernador del estado?

1. SI 2. NO ➔ **PASE A 1.11** 3. NO, NO ERA MAYOR DE EDAD ➔**PASE A 1.11** 8. NS ➔ **PASE A 1.9** 9. NR➔ **PASE A 1.11**

1.10 ¿Y por qué partido o candidato votó para gobernador?

1. PAN	8. PAS	14. EL VOTO ES SECRETO
2. PRI	9. MÉXICO POSIBLE	77. NINGUNO/ANULÓ SU VOTO
3. PRD	10. PARTIDO LIBERAL MEXICANO	88.NS
4. PT	11.FUERZA CIUDADANA	99.NR
5. PVEM	12. PRI/PVEM	
6. CONVERGENCIA	13. OTRO_____	
7. PSN	14. CANDIDATO _____	

1.11 ¿Cuenta usted actualmente con credencial de elector con fotografía?

1. SI 2.NO ➔ **PASE A 1.15** 9.NR➔ **PASE A 1.15**

1.12 ¿Nos la permite ver?

1. SI, TIENE CREDENCIAL VÁLIDA	3. NO, SE NEGÓ A MOSTRARLA
2. NO, PORQUE ESTÁ EXTRAVIADA O NO LA TIENE A LA MANO	4. OTRO (ESPECIFIQUE)_____

1.13 ¿Qué tan probable es que usted vote en estas elecciones presidenciales? **(LEER OPCIONES)**

1. Definitivamente 2. Muy probable 3. Algo probable 4. Poco probable 5. Nada probable 8. NS 9. NR

1.14 Si el día de hoy fueran las elecciones, ¿por quién votaría para Presidente de la República? **DAR TARJETA 1 A ENTREVISTADO, PIDA QUE TACHE SU OPCIÓN DE VOTO, DOBLE LA TARJETA Y GUÁRDELA EN SU MOCHILA**

1. FELIPE CALDERÓN DEL PAN
2. ROBERTO MADRAZO DE LA ALIANZA PRI/PVEM
3. ANDRÉS MANUEL LÓPEZ OBRADOR DE LA ALIANZA PRD/CONVERGENCIA/PT
4. PATRICIA MERCADO DE ALTERNATIVA SOCIALDEMOCRÁTICA Y CAMPESINA
5. ROBERTO CAMPA CIFRIAN DE PARTIDO ALIANZA SOCIAL
6. VÍCTOR GONZÁLEZ TORRES / DR. SIMI
7. OTRO _____
8. EL VOTO ES SECRETO
9. NO VOY A VOTAR

77. NINGUNO

88.NS

99.NR

1.15 Le voy a leer una serie de acciones. Dígame por favor ¿cuáles ha realizado usted en los últimos tres años? **(LEER OPCIONES)**

	SI	NO	NS	NR		SI	NO	NS	NR
1. ¿Firmó una queja en contra del gobierno?	1	2	8	9	7. ¿Participó en una marcha?	1	2	8	9
2. ¿Mandó una carta al periódico?	1	2	8	9	8. ¿Participó en un plantón?	1	2	8	9
3. ¿Llamó a un programa de radio o televisión?	1	2	8	9	9. ¿Participó en una toma de oficinas de gobierno?	1	2	8	9
4. ¿Escribió al presidente o a las autoridades?	1	2	8	9	10. ¿Participó en una invasión de tierra o predios?	1	2	8	9
5. ¿Repartió circulares o manifiestos?	1	2	8	9	11. ¿Participó en un bloqueo de vías públicas?	1	2	8	9
6. ¿Colocó una manta o cartel?	1	2	8	9					

1.16 ¿Actualmente con qué frecuencia participa en las siguientes organizaciones? **(LEER OPCIONES Y MUESTRE TARJETA 2)**

	Muy frecuentemente	Frecuentemente	Ocasionalmente	Nunca	NS	NR
1. Partidos políticos	1	2	3	4	8	9
2. Asociación política no partidaria	1	2	3	4	8	9
3. Sindicatos	1	2	3	4	8	9
4. Campesinas	1	2	3	4	8	9
5. Indígenas	1	2	3	4	8	9
6. Religiosas (además de ir a misa)	1	2	3	4	8	9
7. Profesionales	1	2	3	4	8	9
8. Vecinales	1	2	3	4	8	9
10. Cooperativas	1	2	3	4	8	9
11. Derechos humanos	1	2	3	4	8	9
12. De mujeres	1	2	3	4	8	9
13. Ecologistas	1	2	3	4	8	9
14 Organizaciones cívicas	1	2	3	4	8	9

1.17 ¿Participa usted en alguna otra organización?

1. SI ➔ ¿Cuál? _____ 2. NO ➔ **CONTINÚE** 9. NR ➔ **CONTINÚE**

II. INTERÉS POLÍTICO

2.1 Generalmente, ¿por qué medio de comunicación más se entera usted de lo que pasa en la política? **(ANOTE PRIMERA RESPUESTA)**

1. PERIÓDICO
2. RADIO
3. TELEVISIÓN
4. REVISTAS
5. OTRAS PERSONAS
6. INTERNET
7. OTRO _____
8. NS
9. NR

2.2 ¿Con qué frecuencia acostumbra usted ver noticias en la televisión?

1. DIARIO
2. VARIAS VECES POR SEMANA
3. UNA VEZ POR SEMANA
4. CADA 15 DÍAS
5. UNA VEZ AL MES
6. NUNCA
7. OTRA_____
8. NS
9. NR

2.3 ¿Con qué frecuencia acostumbra escuchar noticias en la radio?

1. DIARIO
2. VARIAS VECES POR SEMANA
3. UNA VEZ POR SEMANA
4. CADA 15 DÍAS
5. UNA VEZ AL MES
6. NUNCA
7. OTRA_____
8. NS
9. NR

2.4 ¿Con qué frecuencia acostumbra leer noticias en el periódico?

1. DIARIO
2. VARIAS VECES POR SEMANA
3. UNA VEZ POR SEMANA
4. CADA 15 DÍAS
5. UNA VEZ AL MES
6. NUNCA
7. OTRA_____
8. NS
9. NR

2.5 En general, ¿qué tan interesado está usted en la política? (LEER OPCIONES)

1. Muy interesado 2. Algo interesado 3. Poco interesado 4. Nada interesado 8.NS 9.NR

III. MIGRACIÓN Y REMESAS

3.1 ¿Usted ha vivido fuera de México alguna vez?

1. SI 2. NO ➔ PASE A 3.10 8. NS ➔ PASE A 3.10 9. NR ➔ PASE A 3.10

3.2 ¿En qué país vivió?

1. ESTADOS UNIDOS ➔ ¿En qué estado? 11. CALIFORNIA 12.TEXAS 13. ARIZONA 14. NUEVO MÉXICO 15. OREGON 16. WASHINGTON 17. ILLINOIS 18. CAROLINA DEL NORTE

19. FLORIDA 20.OTRO _____ (ESPECIFIQUE)

2. CANADA 3. OTRO PAÍS _____ (ESPECIFIQUE) 8. NS 9. NR

3.3 ¿En cuántas ocasiones distintas vivió fuera de México?

|___|___|___| VECES 888. NS 999. NR

3.4 ¿Cuándo fue la última vez que vivió fuera del país?

1. DENTRO DE LOS ÚLTIMOS CINCO AÑOS 8. NS
2. HACE ENTRE CINCO Y DIEZ AÑOS 9. NR
3. HACE MÁS DE DIEZ AÑOS

3.5 Y en total, ¿cuántos años vivió fuera del país?

|___|___| AÑOS |___|___| MESES 88. NS 999. NR

3.6 Y cuando vivió fuera del país, ¿con qué frecuencia participaba en las siguientes organizaciones? **(LEER OPCIONES Y MUESTRE TARJETA 2)**

	Muy frecuentemente	Frecuentemente	Ocasionalmente	Nunca	NS	NR
1. Organizaciones de la iglesia	1	2	3	4	8	9
2. Sindicatos	1	2	3	4	8	9
3. Padres de familia	1	2	3	4	8	9
4. Profesionales	1	2	3	4	8	9
5. Clubes de migrantes	1	2	3	4	8	9
6. Vecinales	1	2	3	4	8	9
7. Política o ciudadana	1	2	3	4	8	9

3.7 Y cuando vivió fuera, ¿con qué frecuencia utilizó los siguientes servicios públicos? **(LEER OPCIONES Y MUESTRE TARJETA 2)**

	Muy frecuentemente	Frecuentemente	Ocasionalmente	Nunca	NS	NR
1. Bibliotecas	1	2	3	4	8	9
2. Servicios médicos	1	2	3	4	8	9
3. Parques	1	2	3	4	8	9
4. Transporte público	1	2	3	4	8	9
5. Apoyos sociales del gobierno	1	2	3	4	8	9

3.8 Cuando vivió fuera del país, ¿asistió a la escuela pública o algún pariente que viviera con Ud.?

1. SI 2. NO 8. NS 9. NR

3.9 ¿Piensa Ud. regresar a (MENCIONE PAÍS DE P3.2) en algún momento?

1. SI 2. NO 3. PROBABLEMENTE 5. OTRO _____ 8. NS 9. NR

3.10 ¿Tiene otros familiares o amigos que actualmente viven fuera de México?

1. SI 2. NO ➔ **PASE A 4.1** 8. NS ➔ **PASE A 4.1** 9. NR ➔ **PASE A 4.1**

3.11 ¿Qué tan seguido se comunica con ellos?

1. MÁS DE UNA VEZ POR SEMANA
2. CADA SEMANA
3. VARIAS VECES POR MES
4. CADA QUINCENA
5. CADA MES
6. ENTRE 6 Y 11 VECES AL AÑO
7. ENTRE 3 Y 5 VECES AL AÑO
8. DOS VECES AL AÑO
9. UNA VEZ AL AÑO
10. OTRO_____
88. NS
99.NR

3.12 Cuando se comunican, ¿qué tanto hablan de política? (**LEER OPCIONES)**

1. Siempre 2. Mucho 3. A veces 4. Casi nunca 5. Nunca 8. NS 9. NR

3.13 ¿Algún familiar o amigo que vive fuera de México le manda dinero?

1. SI 2.NO ➔ PASE A 4.1 8. NS ➔ PASE A 4.1 9. NR ➔ PASE A 4.1

3.14 ¿Qué tan seguido le manda dinero?

1. MÁS DE UNA VEZ POR SEMANA
2. CADA SEMANA
3. VARIAS VECES POR MES
4. CADA QUINCENA
5. CADA MES
6. ENTRE 6 Y 11 VECES AL AÑO
7. ENTRE 3 Y 5 VECES AL AÑO
8. DOS VECES AL AÑO
9. CADA AÑO
10. OTRO_____
88. NS
99.NR

3.15 Y en promedio, ¿cuánto le mandan cada vez?

1. MENOS DE 500 PESOS
2. ENTRE 500 Y 1000 PESOS
3. ENTRE 1000 Y 2000 PESOS
4. ENTRE 2000 Y 3000 PESOS
5. MAS DE 3000 PESOS
6. OTRO_____
8.NS
9.NR

IV. CONCEPTOS GENERALES DE DEMOCRACIA

4.1 Mucha gente está de acuerdo en que la democracia significa igualdad ante la ley. Sin embargo, algunas personas piensan que la democracia también significa mayor igualdad económica entre las personas. ¿Qué tan importante es la igualdad económica para que un país sea democrático? **(LEER OPCIONES)**

1) Muy necesaria 2) Algo necesaria 3) Poco necesaria 4) Nada necesaria. 8. NS 9. NR

Ahora le voy a leer una frase acerca de la democracia y quisiera que Ud. me diga si está muy de acuerdo, de acuerdo, ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo, en desacuerdo o muy en desacuerdo con la frase. **(MOSTRAR TARJETA 3)**

	Muy de acuerdo	De acuerdo	Ni de Acuerdo ni en desacuerdo	En Desacuerdo	Muy en desacuerdo	**NS**	**NR**
4.2 Más que cualquier otra cosa, la democracia significa seleccionar los líderes políticos en elecciones libres y justas.	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
4.3 Un país con grandes diferencias entre los ricos y los pobres no puede ser considerado una democracia.	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
4.4 Un gobierno democrático debe garantizar que todos los grupos sociales tengan el derecho de protestar por medios pacíficos.	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
4.5 En una democracia real, no habría hambre ni pobreza.	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
4.6 Elecciones libres por sí solas no hacen que un país sea democrático.	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
4.7 La democracia y el capitalismo van juntos.	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
4.8 Las políticas públicas de un gobierno democrático deben reflejar los valores religiosos de la mayoría.	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
4.9 En una democracia, los y las homosexuales tienen el derecho de organizar marchas públicas.	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
4.10 Más que nada, la democracia es que los partidos compiten por el apoyo de la mayoría.	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
4.11 Además de igualdad ante la ley, la democracia también es mayor igualdad económica entre las personas.	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
4.12 Los mexicanos no están preparados para la	1	2	3	4	5	8	9

democracia.							
4.13 Es mejor que exista nada más un partido político en México.	1	2	3	4	5	8	9

V. EVALUACIÓN DE LA DEMOCRACIA EN MÉXICO

(SIGA MOSTRANDO TARJETA 3)	Muy de acuerdo	De acuerdo	Ni de Acuerdo ni en desacuerdo	En Desacuerdo	Muy en desacuerdo	NS	NR
5.1 El gobierno federal respeta los derechos de la gente.	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
5.2 El Gobierno estatal (ó el Distrito Federal) respeta los derechos de la gente.	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
5.3 Las elecciones federales pasadas en 2003 fueron limpias.	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
5.4 Las elecciones estatales pasadas fueron limpias.	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
5.5 Los diputados federales toman en cuenta a la gente cuando hacen leyes.	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
5.6 Las decisiones económicas del gobierno han sido buenas **para el país** en los últimos 5 años.	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
5.7 La decisiones económicas del gobierno han sido buenas **para mí** en los últimos 5 años.	1	2	3	4	5	8	9

5.8 En general, ¿qué tan satisfecho está usted con la democracia en México? (LEER OPCIONES)

1. Muy satisfecho
2. Algo satisfecho
3. NI SATISFECHO / NI INSATISFECHO
4. Poco satisfecho
5. Nada Satisfecho
8. NS
9. NR

Ahora quisiera que usted califique las siguientes personas e instituciones y en una escala de 1 a 7, donde "1" quiere decir "nada satisfecho" , 4 "ni satisfecho ni insatisfecho" y 7 es "muy satisfecho". **(MUESTRE TARJETA 4)**

	CALIFICACIÓN							**NS**	**NR**
5.10 ¿Qué tan satisfecho está con el desempeño del presidente Fox?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

5.11 ¿Y del Congreso de la Unión en general?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
5.12 ¿Qué tan satisfecho/a está del desempeño del gobernador del Estado? (ó en el Distrito Federal del Jefe de Gobierno)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
5.13 ¿Y del presidente municipal? (ó en el Distrito Federal del Delegado)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
5.14 En general, ¿qué tan satisfecho está usted del suministro de agua?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
5.15 ¿Y del suministro de luz?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
5.16 ¿Qué tan satisfecho está de la educación pública?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
5.17 ¿Y del desempeño de la policía?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

5.18 En su opinión, ¿qué tan democrático es México? **(LEER OPCIONES)**

1) Muy democrático 2) Algo democrático 3) Poco democrático 4) Nada democrático 8. NS 9. NR

VI. APOYO POR LA DEMOCRACIA

Ahora le voy a leer dos frases. Quisiera que usted me diga si está muy de acuerdo con la primera, más de acuerdo con la primera que con la segunda, en el medio entre las dos frases, más de acuerdo con la segunda que con la primera o muy de acuerdo con la segunda **(MUESTRE TARJETA 5)**

FRASE 1	Muy de acuerdo con la Primera	Más de acuerdo con la Primera que con la Segunda	En medio	Más de acuerdo con la Segunda que con la Primera	Muy de acuerdo con la Segunda	**NS**	**NR**	FRASE 2
6.1 1) Todos tenemos que aceptar el resultado de una elección libre, gane quien gane. Ó	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	2) El gobierno debe anular un resultado electoral si el ganador provoca inestabilidad.
6.2 1) Todos tienen el derecho de libertad de expresión aunque pueda amenazar la unidad nacional. Ó	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	2) Nadie tiene el derecho de expresar un punto de vista que amenaza la unidad nacional, aunque haya menos libertad de expresión.

6.3 1) El gobierno debe poner primero el orden público, aun a costa de algunas libertades Ó	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	2) Es mejor que haya mucha libertad aun a costa del desorden público.
6.4 1) El gobierno debe garantizar un juicio penal justo para todos los acusados aunque no se castigue a algunos delincuentes Ó	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	2) El gobierno debe castigar a los delincuentes aunque se acuse falsamente a algunas personas inocentes.
6.5 1) El país debe tener un líder que toma decisiones rápidas, aun si sus acciones no cumplen con a ley Ó	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	2) El país debe tener un líder que cumpla con la ley a costa de tomar decisiones rápidas.
6.6 1) Es mejor que el partido del Presidente tenga mayoría en el Congreso para que no se atoren las leyes Ó	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	2) Es mejor que haya muchos partidos en el Congreso para que haya más debate.
6.7 1) Es mejor un gobierno autoritario que resuelve los problemas sociales que una democracia que no los resuelve los problemas Ó	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	2) Es mejor una democracia que permite mucha participación aunque no siempre resuelve los problemas sociales.
6.8 Ponga por caso que el gobierno quiere construir un centro de ayuda social. El único lugar factible se ubica en un terreno privado, pero el dueño se opone. Un gobierno democrático debe inclinarse por...								
1) Respetar la propiedad privada Ó	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	2) Anteponer el interés público y tomar la tierra.
6.9 Si a la gente no le parece bien alguna decisión del gobierno, entre las diversas cosas que puede hacer la gente, la acción más eficaz de cambiar la decisión es ...								
1) Votar por otro partido en las próximas elecciones Ó	1	2	3	4	5	8	9	2) Protestar y presionar al gobierno por otros medios que no sean el voto.

VII. CONOCIMIENTOS POLÍTICOS

Ahora voy a hacer unas preguntas para saber qué tan buena es la información que hay sobre la política. Muchas personas no van a saber las respuestas. Si Ud. no sabe alguna, puede decir sencillamente, "No sé"

7.1 ¿Se acuerda de la fecha de estas próximas elecciones federales?

1. 2 DE JULIO DE 2006 8. NS

2. OTRA FECHA EN JULIO 9. NR

3. OTRA FECHA

7.2 ¿Sabe usted cuánto tiempo duran los diputados federales en su puesto?

1. SI, TRES AÑOS 2.SI, OTRA RESPUESTA_____ 3.NO 9. NR

7.3 ¿Sabe usted cómo se llama el gobernador de (ESTADO, o Jefe de Gobierno en el D.F.)? **(ENTREVISTADOR: CONSULTE TARJETA DE APOYO)**

1. NOMBRE Y APELLIDO PATERNO CORRECTOS 2. PARCIALMENTE (NOMBRE O APELLIDO) CORRECTO

3. INCORRECTO 8. NS 9. NR

7.4 ¿Y sabe a qué partido político pertenece? **(ENTREVISTADOR: CONSULTE TARJETA DE APOYO)**

1. PARTIDO CORRECTO (EN CASO DE COALICIÓN, CUALQUIER PARTIDO INTEGRANTE SE DA POR BUENO)

2. PARTIDO INCORRECTO 8. NS 9. NR

(MUESTRE TARJETA 6)

7.5 Dígame, por favor, el número abajo de la foto del personaje que fue sometido a desafuero político en 2005. Recuerde que no importa si Ud. no sabe la respuesta correcta.

1. VICENTE FOX
2. BEATRIZ PAREDES
3. FELIPE CALDERON
4. ELBA ESTHER GORDILLO
5. ANDRES MANUEL LOPEZ OBRADOR
6. ROBERTO MADRAZO
7. MARTA SAHAGÚN
8. DIEGO FERNÁNDEZ DE CEVALLOS
9. MARIO MARIN

88. NS

99.NR

7.6 ¿A cuál de estos personajes se le vincula con un cuñado incómodo? **(SIGA MOSTRANDO TARJETA 6)**

1. VICENTE FOX
2. BEATRIZ PAREDES
3. FELIPE CALDERON
4. ELBA ESTHER GORDILLO
5. ANDRES MANUEL LOPEZ OBRADOR
6. ROBERTO MADRAZO
7. MARTA SAHAGÚN
8. DIEGO FERNÁNDEZ DE CEVALLOS
9. MARIO MARIN

88. NS

99.NR

7.7 ¿Cuál es líder sindical de los maestros y priísta inconforme? **(SIGA MOSTRANDO TARJETA 6)**

1. VICENTE FOX
2. BEATRIZ PAREDES
3. FELIPE CALDERON
4. ELBA ESTHER GORDILLO
5. ANDRES MANUEL LOPEZ OBRADOR
7. MARTA SAHAGÚN
8. DIEGO FERNÁNDEZ DE CEVALLOS
9. MARIO MARIN

88. NS

6. ROBERTO MADRAZO 99.NR

7.8 ¿Qué es "Oportunidades"? **(LEER OPCIONES INCLUYENDO "NO SABE" PERO NO "NR")**

1. Una dependencia del gobierno.
2. Un programa del gobierno de ayuda escolar.
3. Un programa del gobierno de ayuda al campo.
4. Un fondo para drogadictos que quieren dejar el vicio
8. No sabe.
9. NR

VIII. DATOS DEL INFORMANTE

8.1 EL ENTREVISTADO ES ....

(REGISTRE SEXO Y ANOTE SIN PREGUNTAR)

HOMBRE ..... 1 MUJER 2

8.2 ¿Cuántos años cumplidos tiene Usted?

AÑOS ..... |___|___|

99. NR

8.3 ¿Cuál fue el último año que aprobó en la escuela?

01. NO ESTUDIÓ	06. CARRERA COMERCIAL	11. LICENCIATURA COMPLETA
02. PRIMARIA INCOMPLETA	07. CARRERA TÉCNICA	12. MAESTRÍA / DIPLOMADO
03. PRIMARIA COMPLETA	08. PREPARATORIA INCOMPLETA	13. DOCTORADO
04. SECUNDARIA INCOMPLETA	09. PREPARATORIA COMPLETA	99. NR
05. SECUNDARIA COMPLETA	10. LICENCIATURA INCOMPLETA	

8.4 ¿Cuál es su ocupación?

1. TRABAJADOR EN EL GOBIERNO
2. TRABAJADOR EN SECTOR PRIVADO
3. PROFESIONISTA INDEPENDIENTE
4. TRABAJADOR POR CUENTA PROPIA
5. ESTUDIANTE
6. AMA DE CASA
7. DESEMPLEADO
8. JUBILADO O PENSIONADO
9. CAMPESINO O JORNALERO
10. OTRO (Especifique): _____

8.5 Considerando a todos los miembros que trabajan en su hogar. Aproximadamente, ¿en cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentra su ingreso mensual familiar? **(MUESTRE TARJETA 7)**

1. Hasta 1,430 Pesos (HASTA 1 VSM)
2. De 1,431 a 2,861 Pesos (1 A 2 VSM)
3. De 2,862 a 4,291 Pesos (2 A 3 VSM)
4. De 4,292 A 7,152 Pesos (3 A 5 VSM)
5. De 7,153 pesos y más (5 Y MÁS VSM)
9. NR

8.6 ¿Algún miembro del hogar habla una lengua o dialecto indígena?

1. SI 2. NO ➔ AGRADEZCA Y PASE A P 8.10 9. NR ➔ AGRADEZCA Y PASE A P 8.10

8.7¿Qué parentesco o relación tiene Ud. con la persona que habla la lengua indígena?

1. PADRE
2. MADRE
3. ABUELO
4. ABUELA
5. HERMANO
6. HERMANA
7. TIO
8. TIA
9. PRIMO
10. PRIMA
11. OTRO PARIENTE _____ **(ESPECIFIQUE)**
12. AMIGO/AMIGA
13. OTRO_____

88. NS

99. NR

8.8 ¿Qué lengua o dialecto habla?_____ **(ANOTE RESPUESTA)**

8.9 ¿Y (MENCIONE RESPUESTA DE P 8.7), también habla español?

1. SI
2. NO
9. NR

8.10 ANOTE SIN PREGUNTAR NIVEL SOCIOECONÓMICO APRECIATIVO, DE ACUERDO A LAS CARACTERÍSTICAS DE LA VIVIENDA

1. BAJO
2. MEDIO BAJO
3. MEDIO
4. MEDIO ALTO
5. ALTO
9. NR

8.11 ANOTE SIN PREGUNTAR COLOR DE PIEL DEL ENTREVISTADO

1. BLANCO/GÜERO
2. MORENO CLARO
3. MORENO OSCURO
4. NEGRO (ASCENDENCIA AFRICANA, CABELLO RISADO)
5. ASIÁTICO (PIEL “AMARILLA”, OJOS RASGADOS)
6. OTRO_____
9. NR

AGRADEZCA Y TERMINE

Yo entrevistador _____, número _____ declaro que seguí todas las indicaciones metodológicas para la selección de la muestra y que toda la información contenida en este cuestionario es verídica. Acepto que si existe algún dato falso en él, la empresa ***Berumen*** tome las medidas legales pertinentes.

FIRMA DEL ENTREVISTADOR _____ FECHA DE ENTREVISTA |___|___|-|___|___|-|2|0|0|6|

Día *Mes* *Año*

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